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ABSTRACT
 As western democracies face challenges unseen since the Cold War ended, 
understanding the correlates of legitimacy for democratic institutions has grown in 
importance. While scholars have well-developed theories and empirical evidence of 
Supreme Court support, we know far less about state supreme court legitimacy. This is 
despite the fact that these courts hand down 100,000 legal decisions annually. Relying on 
an original survey conducted with participants in 46 states, I develop and test a theory 
that respondents rely on the Supreme Court as a cue when deciding whether they should 
extend legitimacy to state supreme courts they know next to nothing about. With this 
foundation, I examine several questions: First, how little do respondents know about state 
supreme courts and how does this ignorance influence the likelihood that they will extend 
legitimacy to these important institutions? Second, does the United States Supreme Court 
act as a heuristic for respondents who know little about their state supreme court when 
they are asked to decide whether they should extend legitimacy to state high courts? 
Third, does the recency of a state supreme court election alter any reliance on the 
Supreme Court as a heuristic informing state supreme court legitimacy among those with 
low knowledge of state high courts? 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-
enforcement away from our country, is ridiculous and will be 
overturned! 
—Tweet from President Donald Trump, February 4, 2017 
 
By questioning the very legitimacy of Robart's position as a judge, Trump 
is planting seeds in the minds of his supporters. These seeds will grow 
until a culture has developed in which it's acceptable to not simply 
question the legal decisions of judges, but to undermine the judicial 
system at large if the proclamation of a judge does not comport with one's 
understanding of the world. The puncture of such a fundamental part of 
our republic is insidious; it will have long-term repercussions. 
—Frank Camp, The Daily Wire, February 5, 2017 
 
In any event we are EXTREME VETTING people coming into the U.S. in 
order to help keep our country safe. The courts are slow and political! 
—Tweet from President Donald Trump, June 5, 2017 
 
Poll: Majority of people believe SCOTUS is split into parties 
— USA Today, March 17, 2017 
 
Understanding the sources of judicial legitimacy is important for democracies. 
This is increasingly so in an age of ever-growing political polarization that threatens to 
damage American courts. Add to this mix a president who takes less care in his 
discussions about the judiciary than many of his predecessors, and concerns about 
American judicial legitimacy appear well founded. In fact, to believe accounts from some 
journalists, the United States is nearing a polarized judiciary with plunging support from 
the public. It is at least some comfort that, in the CSPAN/PBS poll that USA Today 
references in the epigraph of this chapter, 57% of respondents thought that President 
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Trump’s criticism of sitting judges is either not very appropriate or not at all appropriate. 
Though, 42% thought it was either appropriate or very appropriate (Rosenblatt and 
Berland 2017). While other findings in the survey were troubling, including the 62% of 
respondents who agree that the Supreme Court is as split politically as Congress, the 
survey does include some supporting evidence that judicial legitimacy in the United 
States remains quite high, so much so that a clear majority disapprove of the president of 
the United States attacking a sitting judge. However, with all of the political tumult of the 
contemporary political environment, it is not surprising that public and scholarly interest 
in the legitimacy of institutions is on the rise.  
 Maintaining legitimacy among the governed, where the actions and decisions of 
the government are accepted even when individuals disagree with them, is essential for 
the success of democracy and the judiciary. Unlike the executive and legislature, the 
courts lack forceful means of coercion and, thus, rely upon legitimacy for compliance 
with their decisions. Within political science, scholars have examined the sources and 
structure of legitimacy in democratic government broadly (Easton 1965) and have placed 
sustained focus on the Supreme Court and the influence of knowledge, education, and 
judicial behavior as causal influences on judicial legitimacy (Bonneau and Hall 2009; 
Casey 1974; Gibson 2012; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; Mondak and Smithey 1997). 
However, scholars are still uncovering the drivers of legitimacy in state supreme courts, 
with most studies focusing on the influence of elections. This focus on elections fails to 
account for an important piece of the judicial legitimacy puzzle: a great portion of the 
population is largely ignorant of state supreme courts. As a result, most scholarship 
focusing on state supreme courts fails to address the central question of how these courts 
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maintain legitimacy among individuals with low knowledge of these institutions.  
State supreme courts decide more than 95,000 cases annually. Despite this 
enormous and far-reaching docket, not to mention the vast power associated with these 
institutions, we have an incomplete understanding of the sources and maintenance of 
state supreme court legitimacy. Despite much excellent work by scholars on the sources 
and correlates of judicial legitimacy in American courts, we have yet to fully reconcile 
evidence that state supreme courts maintain high levels of legitimacy among citizens 
largely ignorant of these institutions. This gap in scholarly knowledge makes it 
challenging to accurately estimate which activities may harm judicial legitimacy. This is 
an important problem in an age of increasingly politicized judicial elections in states 
where missteps threaten judicial legitimacy, judicial independence, and rule of law 
(O’Connor 2010). The present study begins the work of remedying our incomplete 
understanding by examining the influence of the Supreme Court on citizens’ decisions to 
confer legitimacy on state supreme courts. Here, I focus on whether citizens use their 
relatively superior knowledge of the Supreme Court, widely seen as a legitimate 
institution, as a heuristic for deciding whether to confer legitimacy upon a state supreme 
court about which they know far less.  
To illustrate how the phenomenon may work in ways that scholars have yet to 
understand, I first turn to a state legislature as an example in Table 1.1. In 2010, the 
Republican Party took control of the United States House of Representatives and made 
gains in the Senate, fueled in part by frustration with President Obama and congressional 
Democrats. The state legislatures saw large Republican gains as well, with the party 
winning control in 18 chambers. The scope of the sweep at the state level follows the 
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contours of the federal results in size and geographic scope. In the election, voters 
punished Democrats at all levels of government. Polling from North Carolina provides 
evidence of this correlation as well.  
 The results of this poll, conducted by Public Policy Polling, show strikingly 
similar patterns, even as the national and state Democrats engage in different activities.1 
At the national and state level, preferences are nearly identical for Congress and the state 
legislature across party. The results from this polling data provide some evidence that 
there are connections between opinions of what occurs at the federal level and at the state 
level. Going a bit beyond the data, I posit that this is evidence of a link between decisions 
voters make about the federal government and those they make about state institutions of 
which they know far less. While this link is likely driven, in part, by partisan preferences, 
especially given the electoral climate of 2010, the identical levels of support in the poll 
are striking given how different the two institutions are. If evidence of a relationship 
between federal and state legislatures exist, does a similar connection exist between 
federal and state-level courts in America? In particular, do voters make decisions on 
whether to confer legitimacy, the judiciary’s most important political capital, to state 
supreme courts based at least in part on what they know and think about the Supreme 
Court?   
 While it is still the least known federal institution, Americans appear to know 
more about the Supreme Court than state supreme courts, where the dearth of knowledge 
is quite pronounced. However, surveys indicate a similarity in levels of legitimacy 
                                                             
1 In a year marked by conservative anger over Washington spending, the North Carolina legislature was 
steeply cutting spending to balance the budget as the state constitution requires. While Washington 
Democrats increased spending on a flurry of social programs, North Carolina Democrats were cutting 
funding for transportation and education. 
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between the courts. Roughly 69% of respondents in separate surveys confer legitimacy 
on both the Supreme Court and the Kentucky Supreme Court, despite lower levels of 
awareness of the state court (Gibson 2012). To date, the literature on state supreme court 
legitimacy tends to focus on state-level institutions as independent structures, free from 
influence from federal-level institutions as far as mass opinions are concerned. 
Conversely, I argue that this is an unrealistic assumption because citizens lack adequate 
knowledge of state supreme courts. Instead, I posit that these similarities reflect reliance 
by some citizens on their opinions about the Supreme Court to supplement a lack of 
information about state supreme courts. Specifically, I argue that the state supreme courts 
are not independent actors in the minds of citizens when they are deciding whether or not 
to confer legitimacy. Easton (1965) argues that specific actions over time can either build 
or degrade institutional legitimacy. This work is the foundation on which judicial 
legitimacy studies are built. However, if citizens are not aware of the specific actions of 
an institution, how is that institution supposed to build legitimacy based upon those 
actions? 
 Much as individuals rely on partisanship and other cues to make voting decisions 
when they lack information, I argue that a similar process is occurring in the minds of 
individuals between state supreme courts and the Supreme Court. The public is more 
aware of the Supreme Court even if they do not possess encyclopedic knowledge of the 
institution (Gibson and Caldeira 2009c). This awareness, built over time through 
education and the media, appears to have created a large reservoir of legitimacy. That 
being said, these educational processes happen with much less regularity for state 
supreme courts. State supreme courts are covered less often in the news and many 
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government classes in secondary and higher education only provide a small introduction 
to those state institutions. Given this general paucity of education, meaning there is a 
larger portion of the public who lacks much knowledge and awareness of their state 
supreme courts, scholarly findings of robust state supreme court legitimacy are curious. 
The notions of legitimacy are likely not the result of knowing about the state supreme 
courts, as it appears to be with the United States Supreme Court. Instead, in this study, I 
argue that some individuals use the Supreme Court as a cue for extending legitimacy to 
state supreme courts in the absence of adequate knowledge of the state courts. The 
ramifications of a reliance on heuristics to confer legitimacy on little-known judicial 
institutions are potentially large for the courts, the judges that make decisions, and the 
shape those decisions take in an environment where many members of the public are 
largely ignorant of their existence. 
 With the broad powers of courts, it is understandable that judicial legitimacy is an 
important topic receiving attention from judicial scholars who examine the influence of 
specific Supreme Court decisions (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Hoekstra 2000), 
appointments to the Supreme Court (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 2009b), citizen 
knowledge (Gibson and Caldeira 2009c), and the role that legal reasoning and adherence 
to mechanical jurisprudence play (Farganis 2012; Gibson and Caldeira 2011). This 
scholarship indicates a public that, for the most part, extends a large degree of legitimacy 
to the Supreme Court, cutting across ideology and party identification. The key for 
judicial legitimacy appears to be that courts and judges behave as citizens expect them to. 
That is, citizens expect justices to be fair and impartial, and, importantly, to not behave 
like their more politically-motivated counterparts in other institutions. It is when judges 
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begin to appear similar to more politicized actors in the legislature or executive that the 
potential for damage to judicial legitimacy begins. The literature on judicial legitimacy, 
though, focuses on the Supreme Court, the judicial institution that receives the largest 
degree of scholarly and media attention. State supreme courts, while more numerous and 
responsible for vastly larger dockets, receive far less attention. Fortunately, there are 
theoretical foundations on which to build to bridge this problem. 
 Citizens appear to rely on cues when making decisions in low information 
environments (Lupia 1994), and I propose that a similar process occurs regarding state 
supreme court legitimacy. In the absence of knowledge sufficient to make an informed 
decision about whether to extend legitimacy to state supreme courts, I argue that citizens 
turn to a similar institution they know more about to serve as a cue. The Supreme Court is 
better known, is more widely covered than any other American judicial institution, and is 
largely perceived as legitimate. In this study, I argue that the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court acts as a cue for citizens when deciding whether to extend legitimacy to state 
supreme courts. This project contributes to the literature on judicial legitimacy by 
including a new piece to the puzzle: the influence of heuristics. Next, I look at the 
scholarship on knowledge and the use of heuristics among individuals. 
Citizen Knowledge of Courts 
 Studies of judicial legitimacy indicate that greater knowledge of the judiciary is 
correlated to some extent with conferring legitimacy. On the one hand, there is evidence 
that greater knowledge of the courts leads to citizens with unrealistic views of how the 
courts work (Casey 1974). However, greater knowledge also goes hand in hand with 
increased legitimacy (Gibson and Caldeira 2009d; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998). 
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Further, support for the judiciary does not evaporate when respondents with unrealistic 
views of a court governed by mechanical jurisprudence are presented with evidence of 
active legal realism (Gibson and Caldeira 2011).2 Another troubling aspect also emerges 
in the literature: a lack of knowledge of the courts also indicates a lack of ability to 
distinguish the courts from other political institutions, a distinction that is key to 
conferring judicial legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003). Given this 
relationship between knowledge and legitimacy, the potential trouble for the courts is 
clear. The distinction between the courts and the other political institutions is a key 
component of judicial institutional loyalty, and if individuals are not able to make this 
distinction, the threat to judicial legitimacy increases.  
 The studies of knowledge that focus on the courts provide a double-edged sword: 
there is evidence that citizens are more knowledgeable than generally given credit for 
when it comes to the Supreme Court, but most studies that examine knowledge of the 
judiciary are limited to the federal high court. Gibson and Caldeira (2009d) demonstrate 
that previous studies that claim the American public is ignorant of the courts suffer from 
key design flaws. In particular, they point out that the recall approach used in many 
studies, including the oft-cited American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys, is 
an inaccurate way to measure knowledge. In the past, the ANES relied on open-ended 
questions, which is not the most accurate method to capture knowledge of political 
institutions. Instead, Gibson and Caldeira point to evidence that closed-ended questions 
that provide a bit of information and a frame of reference in the question are a superior 
alternative. A survey environment where there is more information available to 
                                                             
2 “To know it is to love it,” say Gibson and Caldeira about the relationship between knowledge and the 
courts (2009d, 437). 
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respondents more closely reflects how individuals operate in their daily lives when 
thinking about politics (Lupia 2006). Individuals rarely think about politics without 
access to information, and studies that use closed-ended questions provide evidence that 
citizens are more knowledgeable about the Supreme Court than results using simple 
recall questions indicate (Gibson and Caldeira 2009d; Mondak 2001). In the Gibson and 
Caldeira (2009d) study, the results show that between 57% and 74% of respondents 
correctly answered questions about judicial appointment method, the term length of 
justices, and the power of the Supreme Court to have the final word on constitutional 
questions. These results are heartening, and the high levels of legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court make intuitive sense in light of this evidence that citizens have a reasonable 
amount of knowledge about the institution. However, these studies focus on the Supreme 
Court in the United States. Studies of state supreme court knowledge reveal a public that 
is considerably less knowledgeable. 
 Moreover, studies of state supreme courts and judicial legitimacy focus in large 
part on elected judges. This is understandable, of course, since a large majority of states 
have selections systems where judges may face some type of election.3 Despite the 
widespread use of elections, citizen knowledge of state courts appears to be quite low. 
Studies of state court elections and ballot roll-off indicate that elections with partisan 
labels result in lower ballot roll-off than nonpartisan elections: evidence of potential 
reliance on partisan cues in state judicial elections by the public (Hall 2007). Challengers 
to incumbent judges also increase awareness (Bonneau and Hall 2003), and voters appear 
                                                             
3 The Federalist Society provides the State Courts Guide, a useful source for information on states supreme 
courts available at http://www.statecourtsguide.com/. The American Judicature Society also provides a 
wealth of information on selection methods of state court judges at http://www.judicialselection.us/. 
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to consider legal experience when evaluating challengers to incumbent judges (Hall and 
Bonneau 2006). But even in contests receiving greater attention and participation from 
the electorate, there remains some degree of ballot roll-off. Additionally, engaging in 
electoral behavior has the potential to blur the distinction between the judiciary and other 
political institutions even while there is evidence that elections may actually enhance 
legitimacy (Bonneau and Hall 2009; Gibson 2012; Gibson et al. 2011; Gibson and 
Caldeira 2012). 4 These findings are useful, but they also present a puzzle: even in 
situations where judicial candidates are receiving the most attention, there is evidence 
that knowledge is still low in comparison to other institutions. Further, few of the studies 
attempt to deal directly with the lack of knowledge about states supreme courts. 
 Gibson’s (2012) book offers some important insights into levels of knowledge of 
one particular state supreme court. A 2006 survey of Kentucky voters used closed-ended 
questions to test knowledge of the state’s supreme court. The results indicate that: 
§ Only 24% of respondents correctly answered that Kentucky judges are elected.  
§ 32.9% correctly answered that the judges serve a fixed term. 
§ 45.6% correctly answered that the justices are the final word on the state 
constitution (Gibson 2012, 74).  
 There were no judicial elections in Kentucky while this survey was in the field, so 
that may partially reflect the low correct responses, but the results are not encouraging. In 
a separate 2008 national survey, 45% of respondents admit they do not know whether 
their state supreme court judge is elected or appointed nor the length of the term they 
                                                             
4 Concerns about electing judges has sparked a considerable debate among legal scholars. See Frederick 
and Streb 2011, O’Connor 2010, and Streb and Frederick 2009. 
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serve (Gibson 2012, 196). The same survey finds a low number of respondents who know 
their state’s selection method. The correct answers range from around 34% in partisan 
and nonpartisan elections to 45% in merit systems with retention elections, and only 
27.4% in states with gubernatorial appointments. Despite this low level of knowledge of 
state supreme courts, the literature indicates that these courts are generally considered 
legitimate institutions (Benesh 2006; Cann and Yates 2008; Gibson et al. 2011; Gibson 
2012; Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 2012). Moreover, not only are they perceived as 
legitimate, the legitimacy of the state supreme courts appears to mirror that of the 
Supreme Court.5 Given the evidence that indicates knowledge of courts is at least 
partially related to institutional loyalty to courts, how do we reconcile low knowledge and 
high legitimacy for state supreme courts?   
 Gibson (2012) argues that legitimacy of state supreme court is more nuanced than 
merely having knowledge of that specific court. In his study, he finds evidence that level 
of education  and support for democratic values offer the strongest positive relationships 
with institutional support, suggesting that “those with the ability to understand the role of 
the judiciary in a democratic system and who are committed to the rule of law, 
democracy, and due process are more likely to extend legitimacy to this court” (2012, 
84).6 This is similar to findings from studies of the Supreme Court indicating levels of 
knowledge, education, and support for democratic values are key to understanding 
                                                             
5 69.1% of Kentucky respondents do not support “doing away with the [state supreme] court,” while 68.9% 
of Americans say the same about the Supreme Court. 41.9% would limit the jurisdiction of the Kentucky 
Supreme Court against 51.4% of national respondents who would limit the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. 
65.9% of Kentucky respondents offer that the state supreme court is worthy of their trust, while 65.5% of 
Americans say the same about the Supreme Court (Gibson 2012, 76).  
6 Gibson (2012) operationalizes support for democratic values using three variables: support for the rule of 
law, support for liberty over order, and support for democratic values. 
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legitimacy in the judiciary (Gibson 2007).7 In both cases, Gibson offers that citizens are 
extending legitimacy based on their understanding of the judiciary as being a unique and 
special political institution that is not politicized in the way that the legislative and 
executive branches are. The concept that the judiciary is unique is key to understanding 
institutional support for the courts. The source of this idea that courts are unique appears 
to be education, knowledge of courts, and support for democratic institutions and values. 
This relationship between support for democratic values, education, and knowledge with 
Supreme Court legitimacy makes sense, but the much lower levels of knowledge and 
public awareness of state supreme courts indicate that something else may be at play.  
In the rest of this study, I develop and test a theory of state supreme court judicial 
legitimacy that accounts for low knowledge among a large portion of the public. In the 
theory chapter, I develop a theory that state supreme court legitimacy is dependent, at 
least partially, on the United States Supreme Court acting as a cue among members of the 
public who possess low knowledge of their state high courts. While individuals with 
greater knowledge of their state supreme courts are able to distinguish their state high 
courts from other courts for the purposes of conferring legitimacy, individuals without 
knowledge of those institutions must instead rely on a cue to overcome their ignorance. 
Building on legitimacy theory and heuristics scholarship, I argue that individuals with 
                                                             
7 In the 2007 article, Gibson offers the following causal process: “If I am allowed to take some liberties in 
moving away slightly from the data, the causal process involved here seems relatively clear. Citizens who 
are better educated learn more about the Supreme Court and the democratic theory in which the Court is 
embedded and sustained. I suspect that the primary content of the learning is to stress that ‘courts are 
different.’ They are relatively nonpolitical, and judges make decisions on the basis of principled criteria—
impartiality, for instance—without regard to self-interest (even the self-interest of being reelected or 
reappointed). This knowledge predisposes people to accept the viewpoint that courts have a distinctive role 
in a democracy and that role is not necessarily to mollify the preferences of the majority. The reason 
democratic values and court support are so closely connected is that supporting a court—an institution that 
often tells the majority that it cannot do that which it very much wants to do—requires a relatively 
sophisticated understanding of democratic theory” (531-532). 
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low knowledge of state supreme courts rely on the United States Supreme Court as a 
heuristic to guide whether they confer legitimacy on their state high courts. I derive 
hypotheses to test the theory that I develop with a focus not only individuals with low 
knowledge of state supreme courts, but also on the electoral context in which those 
decisions to confer legitimacy occur. In the theory chapter, I also describe the data 
collection process. I rely on a convenience sample from a survey distributed in 46 states. 
Survey respondents are randomly assigned into five groups to receive one of four 
experimental treatments. The four treatments are designed to stimulate respondent 
thought about the United States Supreme Court in different contexts. After receiving the 
treatment, respondents are given an index that measures their state supreme court 
knowledge. The fifth group receives no treatment and serves as a baseline for 
comparison. 
In the first empirical chapter, I review the results of respondent knowledge 
questions asking about state supreme courts, finding generally that respondents know far 
less about their state supreme courts than they do about the United States Supreme Court. 
In this chapter, I examine how the convenience sample I use compares to the larger 
population in the United States. Generally speaking, a majority of respondents appear 
knowledgeable to some degree about the Supreme Court, while a notably smaller portion 
of respondents are knowledgeable about their state supreme court. With this evidence that 
supports my hypothesis that there is widespread ignorance of state supreme courts, even 
among individuals who are knowledgeable about the Supreme Court, I turn in the next 
two chapters to test the remaining hypotheses.  
 The second empirical chapter tests the primary theoretical contention of this 
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project: finding evidence that the Supreme Court acts as a cue for state supreme court 
legitimacy. In the survey, respondents are given a three-question index of state supreme 
court knowledge questions. Respondents are divided between those who cannot answer 
even one question correctly and those who answer one or more questions correctly. 
Relying on OLS regression for the analysis, I find results that provide support for my 
theoretical argument that the Supreme Court acts as a cue for those individuals who 
cannot answer even one question about their state supreme court correctly. However, 
among individuals who answer one or more questions correctly, the Supreme Court does 
not appear to act as a cue.  
In the final empirical chapter, I test the influence of elections by relying on the 
temporal proximity of the 2016 election. In this chapter, I take advantage of the same 
knowledge model as before, where respondents who cannot answer even one question 
correctly are separated from those who answer one or more correctly. I further divide the 
groups by whether or not they live in a state with a judicial election in November 2016, 
two months prior to the survey being in the field. Again relying on OLS regression for 
the analysis, the results indicate that the presence of an election seems to alter the reliance 
on the Supreme Court as a cue among respondents who answer zero state supreme court 
knowledge questions correctly. This is evidence that the campaign and election process 
may have some influence on individuals who cannot correctly answer the knowledge 
questions in the survey, but who may at least temporarily possess greater awareness of 
their state supreme court as a separate legal institution. 
In the final chapter, I focus on the implications of this research for future 
scholarship, what this means about judicial legitimacy in the United States, and what this 
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might mean for other government bodies that are not well known. This study indicates 
that scholars should take individual ignorance of state supreme courts seriously and 
account for this lack of knowledge in future studies of state supreme court legitimacy. 
These results also indicate that, in the United States, there is a large segment of the 
population that knows little about important judicial institutions, and those people rely in 
part on what they know about the Supreme Court when making judgements about their 
state supreme courts. In the event that the United States Supreme Court were to lose 
legitimacy, the negative influence of such a loss appears to have the potential to cascade 
throughout the entire judicial structure in the United States. Finally, if individuals are 
relying on this Supreme Court cue to overcome their lack of knowledge about their state 
supreme courts, it seems possible that a reliance on cues exists for state level legislative 
and executive institutions as well. These results have potential implications, not just for 
political science scholars, but also for the individuals who make up those institutions and 
the public who must live with the policies they create. 
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Table 1.1: A Survey of Support for Congress and the North Carolina Legislature 
If the election were for the (Congress, state legislature) today, would you vote 
Democratic or Republican? 
 Congress State Legislature 
Democratic 42% 42% 
Republican 51% 50% 
Undecided 7% 8% 
September 23-26, 2010 
N = 681 
MOE = +/- 3.8% 
 
 
.
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CHAPTER 2 
A THEORY OF STATE SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY
Scholars devote a great deal of attention to judicial legitimacy as well as the 
correlates of that legitimacy. Initial findings indicated that knowledge of courts appeared 
to correlate with support for those judicial institutions while later works suggest that 
judicial knowledge is a weak predictor of judicial legitimacy. Scholars instead explore 
other factors, such as the influence of court decisions, the politicized appointment 
process, the influence of support for democratic values, and the impact of judicial 
campaigns. 
However, I argue that, in these pursuits, scholars overlook the crucial role that 
ignorance may play in conferring legitimacy on lower courts. Surveys show that while 
members of the public have reasonably high levels of knowledge about the Supreme 
Court, they are largely ignorant of state supreme courts. Understanding how people 
overcome this ignorance to confer legitimacy on institutions they know nothing about is 
crucial for a complete understanding of support for state supreme courts overall.8 In this 
chapter, I develop and propose a theory that the public relies on the Supreme Court as a 
heuristic when deciding whether or not they should confer legitimacy on their state 
supreme court.   
 
                                                             
8 I follow the lead of other judicial scholars and use diffuse support, judicial legitimacy, institutional 
loyalty, and institutional support interchangeably (see Gibson 2012, 183). 
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Legitimacy Theory 
Institutional Legitimacy Defined 
 The judiciary broadly and Supreme Court specifically wield enormous power in 
the United States, reinforced in large measure by a significant well of public support, or 
legitimacy. Judicial scholars tend to conflate legitimacy as a concrete measure of 
institutional loyalty to courts with the abstract concept of diffuse support, which emerges 
from the work of David Easton. Easton’s pioneering work in the field of institutional 
legitimacy yielded two important concepts: diffuse support and specific support (Easton 
1965, 1975). Easton describes diffuse support as forming a “reservoir of favorable 
attitudes or good will” that allows individuals to tolerate actions or decisions they do not 
support by an institution, allowing diffuse support to be “independent of the effects of 
daily outputs” (1965, 273). In other words, institutions rely not on approval of any single 
decision, but instead on general loyalty to the institution even when it makes decisions 
the public disapproves of.  
 Specific support instead is the approval or disapproval of a given action. For 
example, specific support in the judicial context might be an individual supporting a 
singular decision by a court, while diffuse support is loyalty to the judiciary even in the 
face of a decision or series of decisions that an individual may disagree with. Diffuse 
support is the type of support that endures over time, while specific support changes 
depending on the particular output of the court. All governing institutions require 
legitimacy in order to function effectively, in no small part because it is sometimes 
essential to take unpopular actions. As Gibson and Nelson (2016) put it: 
Legitimate institutions are those recognized as appropriate decision-making 
bodies even when one disagrees with the outputs of the institution; their decisions 
are respected, enforced, and implemented even in the face of dissent. To be 
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effective, courts need legitimacy—the leeway to go against public opinion (as, for 
instance, in protecting unpopular political minorities). (3)9 
Legitimacy theory is generally accepted among political science scholars, and I 
make no challenge to it here. Instead, in this chapter I examine the works on legitimacy 
theory and focus in on scholarly debates that revolve around factors that may enhance or 
harm legitimacy. This is even more important for the courts where, even in states that 
select judges by popular election, they do not receive the legitimacy-enhancing effects of 
elections as often as other institutions of the government, if they do at all.   
Judicial Legitimacy in the United States Supreme Court 
Studies of Supreme Court legitimacy indicate that the public has a great deal of 
loyalty to that institution. However, this was initially not well understood due to 
measurement error of the concept of diffuse support. Relying on a survey collected by 
Gallup, Berkley and Michigan Research Centers, and the Wisconsin Survey Research 
Laboratory, Dolbeare and Hammond (1968) examine the influence of partisanship, 
ideology, and region on respondents who have a favorable opinion of the court. They 
focus on evidence that individuals appear to lack knowledge of the Supreme Court, and 
their results indicate that partisanship is a driver of favorable opinions. Kessel (1966) 
finds broad support for the Supreme Court, which was reinforced by decisions the court 
made, rather than harmed by critics of court actions. Murphy and Tanenhaus (1968) also 
find broad support for the Supreme Court using a measure of diffuse support that more 
accurately captures the theoretical concept. They find that increasing knowledge of the 
                                                             
9 Unpopular actions can be actions that large majorities disagree with (i.e., the TARP legislation in 2008 
that provided funds to failing banks). These unpopular actions can happen more frequently to the courts, 
where any given decision may be met with approval or disapproval by any given demographic, depending 
on the details of the case. 
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court has no measurable influence on diffuse support, but increased knowledge has a 
positive influence on the percentage of the population willing to perceive major changes 
by the court as legitimate.10 
The work by Murphy and Tanenhaus (1968) laid the foundation for 
conceptualizing diffuse support in a way that was measurable and conceptually distinct 
from specific support. Scholars examine the influence of ideology  (Bartels and Johnston 
2013; Caldeira 1986; Gibson and Nelson 2015), opinion content (Farganis 2012), 
knowledge of the court (Caldeira 1986; Caldeira and Gibson 1992), as well as the 
influence of the confirmation process (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 2009c) on judicial 
support. Generally speaking, the findings from these works indicate that the Supreme 
Court enjoys a huge reservoir of support, even in the face of decisions as contentious as 
the 2000 Bush v. Gore decision (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003) and in the 
contemporary polarized polity (Gibson 2007a). Attitudes about the Supreme Court also 
appear to be fairly realistic. Early evidence that individuals were ignorant of the Supreme 
Court was upended when Gibson and Caldeira discover measurement error in answering 
open-ended questions as well as generally high levels of knowledge when respondents 
answer multiple choice questions (Gibson and Caldeira 2009e). Emerging from this 
scholarship is evidence that the strongest drivers of institutional support are education 
(Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Handberg and Maddox 1982) and support for democratic 
values (Caldeira and Gibson 1992). Caldeira and Gibson develop these theoretical 
mechanisms in the theory of positivity bias. 
                                                             
10 They asked: “Some people think that the Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics. Others don't feel 
that way. How about you? Do you think the Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics or not?” (1968, 
373). This question is one of several commonly used today to create an index of support for the court.  
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Positivity Bias and Expectancy Theory 
 The theory of positivity bias provides a mechanism for individuals to frame the 
political conflicts of the day (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a; Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 
2003).11 This theory postulates that some judicial event captures the attention of the 
public, like a confirmation hearing, controversial decision, or judicial election. This event 
awakens dormant attitudes about the courts that have been built over time, including the 
information that the courts are a different type of political institution from the legislature 
or the executive. This reminder that courts are a different type of political institution 
initiates a switch in thinking from a policy perspective to a different dimension that the 
authors dub a judiciousness model. Based upon role theory where actors in any given 
institution are subject to expectations about their behavior (Gibson 1981), judiciousness 
acts as “an alternative to ideology as a criterion for preference formation and is based on 
the qualities the respondent views as important for being a good judge” (Gibson and 
Caldeira 2009a, 80). Further, Hansford, Intawan, and Nicholson (2018) find evidence that 
survey respondents perceive the Supreme Court as less political than Congress but more 
so than local traffic courts, and this perception is tied to diffuse support. The distinction 
between the courts and other political institutions is vital to the theory of positivity bias. 
If the exposure to the courts reinforces the judiciary as a different type of institution from 
the legislature or executive, where actors routinely engage in behavior the public finds 
distasteful, then support for the judiciary is strengthened.12 However, activities that make 
                                                             
11 Grosskopf and Mondak (1998) offer a theory of negativity bias where institutional support is harmed 
when the Supreme Court takes an action that the public does not like. However, this research is at odds 
with the large amount of research showing strong levels of institutional support. 
12 The activities in which executives and legislators engage that the public may find distasteful include 
fundraising, making deals, and an appearance of motives that go beyond merely acting in the best interest 
of the public. 
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the court appear more like the other political institutions possess the power to harm 
judicial legitimacy. 
 The difference between the courts and other political institutions is key to the 
theory of positivity bias, and Gibson and Caldeira expand on this distinction with what 
they call expectancy theory (2011a). Importantly, individuals understand that the role of 
the judiciary contains a policy-making component and that discussion of philosophy and 
ideology by judges is acceptable. These activities are acceptable to the public so long as 
judges maintain the appearance of being fair and impartial arbiters of the law. Gibson 
explains that expectancy theory begins with individuals varying in their expectations of 
the appropriate behavior of judges. Members of the public assess the activity of judges 
against their own expectations and any “dissatisfaction diminishes legitimacy accorded to 
the court” (Gibson 2012, 111). The source of institutional legitimacy is the expectation 
that judges make fair and impartial decisions during the procedural component of any 
case. However, “fair and impartial” may mean different things for different people, and 
they may vary in their preferences when the choice becomes, for example one of rule of 
law versus fairness versus broader societal values (Gibson 2012, 89–90). While 
expectations may lack consistency or even coherence in some cases, it does not change 
the fact that individuals possess expectations, and violating those expectations has the 
potential to harm judicial legitimacy. Expectancy theory, in particular, points to a general 
support for democratic values.13 How then, does this evidence fit together to form a 
general theoretical understanding of judicial legitimacy? 
 To recap: Gibson and Caldeira argue that the public holds certain expectations for 
                                                             
13 Gibson offers that support for the courts is grounded in support for democratic institutions and processes, 
political knowledge broadly, and court knowledge specifically. (Gibson (2012, 83).  
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judges and that those expectations generally include a fair and impartial process that is 
distinct from the processes found in other political institutions. If judges violate that 
process, they risk harm to judicial legitimacy. However, due to the different nature of the 
courts, individuals extend to the judiciary a positivity bias akin to a benefit of the doubt 
because people believe they should receive a fair hearing in the court. Confirmation 
hearings where interest group ads take a side and appear to politicize the court have the 
potential to harm legitimacy of the Supreme Court (Gibson and Caldeira 2009a, 2009c). 
This extends to state judicial campaigns with politicized ads (Gibson, Gottfried, Carpini, 
et al. 2011) or the appearance of unseemly fundraising (Gibson and Caldeira 2012).14 
Conversely, elections themselves do not alone appear to be harmful to judicial legitimacy 
(Gibson 2012). This literature broadly demonstrates the correlates of judicial legitimacy, 
generally at the federal level. I next turn to studies that explore state supreme court 
legitimacy. 
State Supreme Court Legitimacy 
 The literature on state supreme court legitimacy largely focuses on the influence 
of state court elections on legitimacy for those institutions. Benesh (2006a) and Cann and 
Yates (2008) break ground in this area and find evidence that respondents in states with 
judicial elections have lower confidence in their courts than those in states without 
elections. Support for this argument that elections may harm legitimacy extends beyond 
the political science literature to high-level jurists like Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
                                                             
14 Nelson and Gibson distinguish between politicization of the courts and political decisions. Politicization 
is “the degree to which individuals view a Court or its judges acting like ordinary politicians, most 
prominently by believing that they engage in strategic or self-interested behavior” (Nelson and Gibson 
2016, 21). This is distinct from political decision making, along the lines of behavior described by the 
attitudinal model.  
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(O’Connor 2010).  
 As Benesh (2006) noted, she starts with a relatively clean slate in her article on 
state court legitimacy as few scholars before her pay it much attention. The dependent 
variable she employs is a categorical variable that assesses confidence in state supreme 
courts by asking respondents, “What is your level of confidence in the courts in your 
community?” and offering a four-point scale from no confidence to a great deal of 
confidence (2006, 701). There are two initial flaws in the design. First, the survey 
question about confidence is more likely to elicit specific support rather than the diffuse 
support that indicates institutional loyalty. Second, the question asks about confidence in 
local courts. Benesh, as she herself notes, makes an interpretive leap by assigning this 
same confidence to state supreme courts, as she was limited by the survey data available. 
The results indicate that experience with and knowledge of courts, perceptions of fairness 
about court procedures, and institutional designs created a constellation of factors that 
influence support for state supreme courts.15 Particular among them is the influence of 
institutional design. Respondents in states with partisan elections had less confidence in 
their state high courts than survey takers in other states. Given the large number of states 
who elect their state supreme court judges via partisan elections, this is an important 
finding. However, Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2003) develop and deploy an index that 
measures support for the courts in a more nuanced way that is a closer match to the 
concept of diffuse support than the measure Benesh employs. Because Benesh’s measure 
appears to capture specific support rather than diffuse support, it is not surprising that she 
                                                             
15 Brace and Hall (1990) and Hall and Brace (1989) argue that institutional design influences judicial 
decision making on state supreme courts. However, Owens et al. (2015) find evidence that state selection 
method has no influence on the likelihood that the US Supreme Court will review and reverse a decision by 
a given court.  
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finds such variability. 
 Cann and Yates (2008) produce a survey with a dependent variable similar to 
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence (2003) and find results that indicate partisan elections harm 
the legitimacy of the courts as well. The Cann and Yates (2008) model includes a 
variable that codes respondents with a dummy variable indicating whether they live in a 
state with partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, or merit selection, with remaining 
selection methods as a baseline. Only the partisan election variable is significant, and it 
indicates that it has a negative influence on diffuse support. However, as Gibson (2012) 
points out, this is not quite a direct test of the influence of campaigns and elections on 
state supreme court legitimacy. In his 2012 book on the state supreme court of Kentucky, 
Gibson finds that campaign activity can actually enhance diffuse support for state 
supreme courts. He conducted a survey during a campaign season where respondents 
were exposed to ads and information about the candidates as experimental treatments. 
The results indicate that, while elections can enhance legitimacy of state supreme courts, 
they only do so as long as judges do not appear to be politicized by the process.16 Once 
they do, the election effect reverses and becomes negative.17 
 While scholarly work on state supreme court legitimacy remains relatively 
infrequent, the results thus far indicate that, similar to the US Supreme Court, state 
supreme courts possess a good deal of diffuse support. Conversely, knowledge of state 
supreme courts is far lower than that of the Supreme Court. Gibson and others follow a 
                                                             
16 I refer here to the concept of a political court versus a politicized court. 
17 A large literature developed around the influence of elections at the state supreme court level that did not 
have to do with legitimacy, per se, but did find that the fears that elections are corrupting and negative are 
overblown. See Bonneau (2004, 2005), Bonneau and Hall (2009), Bopp and Neeley (2008), Brace and 
Boyea (2008), and Hall (1992, 2001). 
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practice when researching court legitimacy at the US Supreme Court, state supreme 
court, and international high courts of setting apart those members of the public who are 
not attentive to the court to either exclude them from the analysis (Gibson 2012, Gibson, 
Caldeira, and Baird 2003) or examine them separately (Gibson and Caldeira 1995). 
Depending upon the type of analysis, either is defensible and theoretically rigorous. 
However, my analysis of state supreme courts focuses on the reality of an environment 
where there is a Supreme Court about which the public has generally high levels of 
knowledge and a state supreme court about which they have very low levels of 
knowledge.  
 I follow the lead of Gibson and Caldeira (1995), Cann and Yates (2008), and 
Converse (1964) in arguing that members of the public at the lower end of state supreme 
court knowledge are thinking differently than others with greater knowledge. In this 
project, I am interested in the people with the least knowledge of state supreme courts 
and how their though process works regarding conferring legitimacy to state high courts. 
Along these lines but in a separate literature, scholars find evidence that the public relies 
on cues, or heuristics, to make decisions when they lack thorough knowledge to do so. I 
argue that some members of the public are relying on cues when they decide to extend 
legitimacy to state supreme courts about which they have very little knowledge. To 
explore this further, I next turn to studies of knowledge in the broader American 
democracy and explore the ways in which individuals make decisions when they are 
ignorant or ill-informed.   
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Political Knowledge in the Broader American Democracy 
 At first glance, it seems a logical assumption that a successful democracy requires 
an informed public. In truth, the theorized need for an informed public runs counter to the 
empirical evidence that depicts widely ignorant members of the public in an otherwise 
functioning democracy. The conflict between the knowledge elites possess and a 
government designed to incorporate the will of less-knowledgeable masses is evident in 
the early debates and designs of the American Constitution. In The Federalist Papers No. 
68, Hamilton writes that getting “a sense of the people” is necessary when electing a 
president but that the electors are “most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the 
station…” (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay [1788]  2008). The founders designed a congress 
with senators selected by state elites to serve as a buffer against the passions of the House 
of Representatives specifically and the people generally. Given the later American 
success, others see the concern as slightly overblown. Schattschneider writes that 
“nobody knows enough to run the government” and that concern with a fully informed 
public who knows everything are a “road to insanity” (1960, 133). There is empirical 
evidence to support the thinking of both sides. 
Scholarship on Individual Knowledge 
 Empirical evidence for individual ignorance is plentiful. Campbell et al. (1960) 
argue that members of the public are not terribly knowledgeable or issue-driven, relying 
instead on a social-psychological model that envisions a funnel of causality toward vote 
choice that is based on long-term partisan attachments developed from parents. Downs 
points out that the costs to obtaining information are high and that it is irrational to be 
well-informed because “the low returns from the data simply do not justify their cost in 
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time and other scarce resources” (1957, 259). Converse argues that evidence from 
surveys indicates that the public lacks a clear understanding of what ideology is and relies 
on other tools to overcome this deficit (1964). Not all scholars in this earlier debate agree, 
with Key in particular writing that “voters are not fools” (1966, 7).  
Converse (1964) focuses on ideological constraints and argues that the mass 
public does not have the capacity to develop an organized set of beliefs on political 
issues.18 However, Nie and Andersen (1974) point out that Converse depends on data 
from 1958 and 1960. They argue that a longer time series would be more reliable and 
point to their own research showing that measuring a longer period of time provides 
evidence of shifting partisanship and ideology, indicating a shift in preferences and 
thought about the topics. Peffley and Hurwitz (1985) take issue with Converse’s 
operationalization of constraint, finding that respondent views are constrained by abstract 
beliefs while Achen (1975) finds a number of problems with question design and 
measurement errors. Still others point to evidence that Converse’s findings may not be 
time bound as many claim (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1978).  
Studies of political sophistication, or the degree to which individual belief 
systems are highly constructed and constrained in the sense that Converse describes, find 
evidence that most individuals are not sophisticated (Luskin 1987) and that this is 
primarily due to levels of interest and intelligence (Luskin 1990). However, Key (1966) 
and Fiorina (1981) argue that people are not as hopeless at the individual level as some 
might assume and that voters engage in retrospective voting, rewarding candidates based 
                                                             
18 Which is to say that “if a person is opposed to the expansion of Social Security, he is probably a 
conservative and is probably opposed as well to any nationalization of private industries, federal aid to 
education, sharply progressive income taxation, and so forth” (Converse 1964, 3). 
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on individual, personal experiences. At the same time, these studies offer a fairly grim 
analysis: intelligence, lack of interest, and information costs all appear to obstruct 
information processing. 
Debates over evidence of ignorance extend to studies of the courts as well. Lupia 
(2006) points out that many scholars test ignorance on questions they think that 
respondents should know, rather than studying what individuals really need to know to 
make informed decisions. Gibson and Caldeira (2009) report that perceptions of the 
public’s ignorance are partially a result of poorly designed surveys that ask open-ended 
questions. Given questions with multiple-choice options, more respondents correctly 
answer questions on how justices are appointed, whether they serve a life term, and 
whether the state court has the final say on the United States constitution (433).19 This 
concern about open-ended questions in the American National Election Study (ANES) 
survey led to an investigation by Krosnick, Lupia, DeBell, and Donawoski (2008).20 They 
found that ANES surveys in prior years suffer not only from use of open-ended questions 
to test knowledge, but also systematic error in coding answers as incorrect that by any 
reasonable standard were correct, if imperfect. Condemning the American public as 
completely ignorant is too simple, but claiming they are adequately informed is not 
supported by the evidence. How individuals navigate this ignorance is the next topic of 
this study. 
 
                                                             
19 Correct responses range from 56.8% saying the Court is the final word on the constitution to 73.9% of 
respondents who correctly answered that justices are appointed. 
20 The investigation began after James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira reached out to the ANES and the 
results were reported in 2008, even as Gibson’s article on the subject was not published in the Journal of 
Politics until 2009. 
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How Individuals Process Political Information 
 The tension between the predictions of Madison, the differing empirical results of 
tests of respondent knowledge, and the reality of functioning American democracy 
generated a literature to understand how individuals process information when cognitive 
bandwidth is limited. Zaller and Feldman (1992) and Zaller (1992) develop the RAS, or 
memory model.21 The RAS model (Zaller 1992) and the on-line processing model 
(Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989) provide two similar but theoretically distinct insights 
into the problem of information. The online processing model is driven more by 
impressions, which allows for individuals to act as “cognitive misers” so they may keep a 
running impression about candidates, issues, and parties without the contextual 
information that accompanies it (1989, 401).  
 This is in contrast to Zaller’s theory that individuals process information over 
time where the most recently accepted information is easily sampled from the “top of the 
head” (1992, 38). Given the flood of information available, understanding how that 
information is received, processed, and later used is essential to understanding how 
knowledgeable the public really is. Further research by Lodge and associates finds 
evidence that the on-line model and impressions are a powerful way of conceptualizing 
information processing (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). Others look at different 
factors that influence information processing including: studying genetics as a driver of 
interest in politics (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008; 
Hatemi et al. 2009), incorporating cognitive neuroscience to aide in understanding 
                                                             
21 RAS is an acronym for: Receive the information (those with greater cognitive abilities will be better able 
to receive more information), Accept the information (where more recently received information will be the 
most accessible as the “top of the head” part of the model), and Sample from the information to respond to 
it. 
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political information processing (Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003), and 
analyzing how successful some individuals are at using heuristics to aide in accurate 
recall of previously processed information (Huckfeldt et al. 1999). 
The influence of emotion, or affect, is an important piece of the political 
knowledge puzzle. Emotion is such an integral part of the human experience that 
attempting to understand what individuals know without understanding the emotion 
behind their knowledge is negligent. Similar to the evidence in the heuristics literature, 
individuals with the least information are more likely to be influenced by emotion in their 
decision making. The relationship between affective decision making and cognitive 
processes is not mutually exclusive. Rather, they appear to inform one another. There is 
evidence suggesting that affect may strongly influence vote choice (Abelson et al. 1982), 
that different emotions like anxiety and enthusiasm lead to different types of behavior 
(Brader 2005; Marcus and Mackuen 1993), that different behaviors result from related 
emotions like anxiety and fear (Huddy et al. 2005), and that low- and medium-
information voters are more likely to rely on affect than their high-information 
counterparts (Rahn 2000). Affect includes likes and dislikes of different groups serving 
as a cue to estimate where those groups fall along the political spectrum (Brady and 
Sniderman 1985) as well as the conflicting influences of positively and negatively 
evaluated information, which may lead to lower quality decisions (Redlawsk 2002).  
Gibson and Nelson (2016) argue that the symbolic power of the Supreme Court, 
through robes and procedure, fills gaps in knowledge and plays a role in whether 
individuals extend legitimacy to the courts. Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson (2014) find 
that individuals are more willing to accept decisions from the Supreme Court that they 
 32 
disagree with if the news includes some sort of symbol of the court. They find that 
symbols activate attitudes toward the court they had in their memory, increasing their 
reverence for the decision. However, this symbolic emotional power has limits, including 
evidence that the appearance of judicial symbols of power like a gavel may negatively 
influence state supreme court legitimacy among African Americans (Gibson and Nelson 
2016). While not universal, the power of judicial symbols to activate emotional 
responses, both good and ill, is not surprising given the reverence with which the judicial 
system in the United States is broadly, though not exclusively, held.22 Symbols that 
activate cognitive or emotional responses are not the only device people may draw upon 
to overcome deficits of knowledge. There is also evidence that individuals rely on 
heuristics to guide decision making about a political topic about which they are ignorant. 
Heuristics As a Tool to Overcome a Lack of Knowledge 
 A body of scholarship evolved around the idea that, while lacking the intellectual 
capacity or interest to process all available political information, individuals may 
successfully rely on heuristics, or cues, to make decisions similar to those they would 
make if they were fully informed. Respondents possess some degree of awareness of their 
ignorance when participating in surveys (Graham 2018), helping to fuel a reliance on 
heuristics. As a concept, a cue is simply a message that members of the public may use to 
infer something about a complicated process (Bullock 2011). Essentially, the argument 
goes that individuals lack the cognitive capacity to process all of the knowledge they 
need to make informed decisions and that they are not oblivious to this deficit. To 
overcome their ignorance, they may rely on cues to aide their decision making. For 
                                                             
22 The judicial system may well be held in disdain among some segments of the population like minorities 
with negative experiences with police or the courts (Tyler 2000).  
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example, a voter might rely on the cue of partisanship when deciding whether to cast a 
vote for a congressional candidate they may not have heard a great deal about. The party 
cue gives information about how close the candidate’s values may be to the voter in 
comparison to their opponent. 
While some of the scholarship focuses on heuristic usage by elites too busy to 
process the bulk of information they need (see Tanenhaus 1960), the majority focuses on 
cue use by members of the mass public (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Lupia 
and McCubbins argue that individuals may even be capable of making a reasoned choice 
absent detailed information on issues and candidates (1998). They point out that, if the 
standard for reasoned engagement by the electorate is a detailed knowledge, then “it must 
also be true that choices can be made only by ambulatory encyclopedias” (1998, 18). 
Even as they found evidence that individuals may make reasoned decisions by relying on 
heuristics to guide them, they place important caveats on the usefulness of cues and the 
specific conditions under which they are most helpful.  
There is also evidence against successfully using cues to replace information. The 
risks include increasing the avenues in which politicians may use fear cues to manipulate 
support for policy (Lupia and Menning 2009) and relying on incorrect information when 
receiving cues from elites who disagree with expert opinion (Darmofal 2005a). 
Sometimes individuals misuse cues even on retrospective assessments of incumbent 
performance (Huber, Hill, and Lenz 2012). Additionally, elites, despite their enhanced 
abilities to process political information are not necessarily good users of cues themselves 
(Miler 2009). The source of cues influences the meaning that individuals attach to the cue 
(Kuklinski and Hurley 1994), and heuristics increase probabilities of correct voting by 
 34 
political experts while decreasing the probability of correct voting for individuals who 
are less knowledgeable (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Further, Ashworth and Beuno de 
Mesquita point out that studies that focus only on the behavior of respondents miss the 
reaction of elites to the public’s use of heuristics (2014). They argue that this creates a 
circle of reaction between individual knowledge and elite responses that should be taken 
into account when considering the mechanics of heuristics. 
The debate about the usefulness of heuristics as a tool remains unsettled, but the 
evidence is abundant that individuals do rely on cues to make decisions. Scholars explore 
this reliance on cues as a tool to overcome ignorance in voting extensively. However, 
scholars have not applied this line of thinking to individual thoughts about the courts. 
While studies from the last ten years provide evidence that individuals have more 
knowledge about the Supreme Court than previously thought, the results of surveys that 
test knowledge of state supreme courts is not nearly so optimistic. Even the presence of 
multiple-choice options in surveys about state supreme courts, similar to those that 
improve accurate responses to questions about the Supreme Court, do not reveal any 
previously unmeasured stores of knowledge.  
To briefly restate: there is evidence of broad-based loyalty to the US Supreme 
Court, as well as state supreme courts. It also appears that a large number of individuals 
have a general knowledge of the Supreme Court, even as they are largely ignorant of their 
state supreme courts. Building on the evidence of reliance on cues to inform decision 
making, I develop a theory of how individuals rely on their knowledge and support for 
the Supreme Court as a heuristic to guide whether they should confer legitimacy on state 
supreme courts. 
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A Cue-Based Theory of State Supreme Court Legitimacy 
I begin the development of my theory with a brief return to my primary research 
question: why do individuals extend legitimacy to judicial institutions they have very 
little knowledge of? In particular, why do state supreme courts enjoy very high levels of 
institutional support in environments of low knowledge?23,24 Building on previous 
research, I argue that individuals who lack knowledge of state supreme courts rely, at 
least partially, on their perception of Supreme Court legitimacy as a cue for conferring 
legitimacy on state supreme courts they know far less about.  
 That state supreme courts are not well-known institutions is not surprising, given 
the complexity of the system. There are 52 state supreme courts in 50 states, some 
operating under names different than “supreme court,” with a variety of docket sizes, 
jurisdictions, selection methods, and numbers of judges on the court. This complexity at 
the state level exists alongside a complex federal judiciary, and the intricate institutional 
designs of these institutions make it harder for individuals to learn and understand how 
their courts operate. Given the demands on their cognitive processes in their everyday 
lives, members of the public know very little about how most judicial institutions operate, 
even while they appear to know a reasonable amount about the comparatively simple 
design and higher profile of the Supreme Court. Individuals appear largely ignorant of 
their state supreme court’s institutional design, selection method, and general output. Not 
                                                             
23 I am aware that there are several institutional names for state high courts in the United States. I refer to 
all of these as state supreme courts. I do this for two reasons. First, this simplifies terminology while 
developing my theory. Second, it is the most commonly used term in the news when describing these 
institutions, and, thus, what I use it in the research design. 
24 This is even more surprising in light of studies about the influence of elections on legitimacy. Even in 
this context, where the courts come much closer than at the federal level to engaging in political activities 
that threaten to strip them of the difference that is the apparent foundation of their legitimacy, individuals 
are forgiving of many types of campaign activities. 
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only do they know little, the resources available to the public to research these courts are 
not nearly as accessible as information about the Supreme Court. There are many 
volumes about the Supreme Court in academic libraries, but far fewer texts about state 
supreme courts. The news also focuses far more heavily on the Supreme Court than state 
supreme courts.25 Even websites devoted to tracking state supreme courts are not updated 
as frequently as is necessary to stay current on what happens on these courts.26 
 However, the evidence also indicates that knowledge of a given court is not 
strictly necessary for one to extend legitimacy to that institution (Benesh 2006a; Cann 
and Yates 2008; Gibson 2012). Level of education and support for democratic values are 
stronger predictors of institutional support than knowledge of the court, which is a 
weaker predictor. If detailed knowledge is necessary, then most courts would suffer from 
a severe lack of institutional support, and the evidence indicates this is not the case.27 
Notwithstanding, the extant research to date on state supreme courts is fairly limited in 
scope. In fact, an intriguing asymmetry exists: the Supreme Court possesses both high 
levels of knowledge and high institutional support. This is juxtaposed against state 
supreme courts with low levels of knowledge and high levels of support. Gibson and 
Caldeira offer convincing evidence that the linking elements are education and support 
for democratic values. Figure 2.1 illustrates their theorized causal process.  
 As individual education generally and knowledge of the Supreme Court 
                                                             
25 While not terribly rigorous, a Google News search of the term “state supreme court,” executed with 
syntax that forces the search engine to include all three terms, results in 26,000 articles. Conversely, a 
search term of “US Supreme Court,” executed with syntax forcing results that include all three terms, 
results in 68,000 articles, despite the Supreme Court’s smaller docket. 
26 The State Courts Guide has a “Docket Watch” section that was last updated for 2018. See 
http://www.statecourtsguide.com/docket-watch/. 
27 Previous scholarship as well as the continued existence of the courts provides reasonable support of this 
conclusion. 
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specifically increases, individuals are more likely to support democratic values and, in 
turn, increase support for the Supreme Court. Support for and exposure to the Supreme 
Court reinforces support for democratic values.28 While support for democratic values is 
also a driver of state supreme court legitimacy, I argue that a previously unexplored link 
exists where experience with the Supreme Court acts a cue for extending legitimacy to 
state supreme courts. I illustrate this further in Figure 2.2. Here, both support for abstract 
democratic values and support for the Supreme Court, built partially through knowledge 
and exposure to that court as a unique political institution, are causal influences on state 
supreme court legitimacy. 
 At the Supreme Court level, it appears that a commitment to democratic values 
and a “fairly sophisticated understanding of democratic theory” drives legitimacy 
(Gibson 2007b, 532). I argue that the same theory cannot be easily applied to the state 
supreme court level, primarily due to two potential flaws.29 First, the theory does not take 
into account the evidence that knowledge of the Supreme Court may operate as a 
reinforcing mechanism for support for democratic values. In school and in popular media, 
individuals are exposed to the Supreme Court acting in ways that support the rule of law 
and democratic values.30 Thus, support for democratic values does not exist in an 
intellectual vacuum. Rather, it is reinforced by the existence of and actions by the 
Supreme Court, as theorized by Easton (1965, 1975). Individuals, because they know 
                                                             
28 When I refer to democratic values, I am referring broadly to aspects like preferences for rule of law, 
judicial independence, separation of powers, political tolerance, and a balance between liberty and order 
(See Gibson and Caldeira 2009c). Gibson explains the causal process from education to support for courts, 
leading individuals to the conclusion that “courts are different” (2007a, 532). 
29 Not including the inherent flaw of trying to apply federal level theories to state institutions that are not 
identical. 
30 This is of course not to say that students are not taught about state supreme courts in school. They just 
tend to receive far less attention than the Supreme Court. 
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more about the Supreme Court, are better able to understand the abstract concepts of 
democratic values when they link those values with an institution that upholds them 
while avoiding the messy parts of politics the public dislikes.  
 Second, the federal-level theory assumes a level of intellectual sophistication in 
the political thinking of Americans that may not be present when the context is changed 
to an institution that individuals know and care less about. At the state supreme court 
level, the public receives less exposure to those courts acting in ways that reinforce 
democratic values. Since individuals can turn to what they know about the Supreme 
Court and feel reasonably comfortable they know enough to make an informed opinion of 
that institution, they can use that to make judgments on similar institutions. In this way, 
the Supreme Court becomes a cue for individuals to reference when thinking about 
judicial institutions they know far less about. 
 Recall that individuals are inclined to confer legitimacy on courts because they 
perceive them to be different from their political counterparts in the legislative and 
executive branches.  Supporting democratic values is an important component in this 
scenario because it provides an understandable context for thinking about the judiciary as 
an institution uniquely different from the other branches of government. However, 
individuals are aware enough to realize they do not know a great deal about state supreme 
courts. Therefore, broadly accepted but abstract democratic values may not be enough in 
this context. Given this theoretical tension, I offer my primary theoretical contribution: 
 When thinking about state supreme courts, some members of the public turn to 
their support for democratic values broadly and their support and understanding of the 
Supreme Court specifically when making determinations about conferring legitimacy on 
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state supreme courts. Put another way, the Supreme Court acts as a cue for individuals 
when deciding whether to confer legitimacy upon state supreme courts. 
 Building on the works of Caldeira and Gibson (1992); Gibson, Caldeira, and 
Baird (1998); and Gibson and Caldeira (2009a), I theorize that the causal process for 
conferring legitimacy among members of the public with low levels of knowledge of 
state supreme courts goes something like this:  
1. Thinking about the state supreme court is activated by some event that garners 
their attention. This event may be a court decision, a campaign, or a 
nomination process.  
2. Once their thinking about the court is activated, they become cognizant of the 
fact that they have little institutional knowledge of the state supreme court to 
make an informed decision about the attention-grabbing events.  
3. These individuals, in turn, lean on what they do know, which for many is 
support for democratic values.  
4. Those values in the context of the judiciary are frequently reinforced by 
perceptions of the Supreme Court.  
5. Individual’s support for state supreme courts is thus partially a consequence of 
their support, or lack of support, for the Supreme Court.  
 However, this process is likely only so when members of the public lack 
information about state supreme courts.31 What level of information may be adequate for 
individuals to make decisions about the legitimacy of state supreme courts? I do not offer 
                                                             
31 While studies show that court knowledge is not a particularly powerful influence on judicial legitimacy, 
it is typically statistically significant in studies, providing evidence that it plays a role, if small, in 
conferring legitimacy. 
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a specific level but rather theorize that enough information may come from some activity 
by a state supreme court that garners a great deal of attention.32 Even this attention and 
subsequent knowledge gained is likely ephemeral over the long term. Any member of the 
public’s opinion of the state supreme court, built from knowledge of a specific action or 
series of actions, would weaken over time in the absence of new information, to be 
replaced once again with the Supreme Court acting as a cue for lower court legitimacy. I 
reduce this into my first hypothesis: 
Supreme Court Cue Hypothesis: Among members of the public with low 
knowledge of state supreme courts, support for the Supreme Court acts as a cue 
informing whether those people should extend legitimacy to the state supreme 
court. 
 It may be useful to think of this hypothesis through an analogous example. Gibson 
and Caldeira refer to loyalty to the Supreme Court as something akin to the loyalty one 
extends to a friend (1998). A person may be disappointed in an action of that friend, but 
individual actions are usually not enough to destroy the loyalty of the friendship. This is 
especially true if that loyalty is the result of many actions that person supports. I take this 
analogy one step further at the state supreme court level. Here, this is more like extending 
loyalty to the familial relative of a friend. While a person may not know the relative very 
well, they have a great deal of loyalty toward the friend. From their limited perspective, 
they perceive the relative to be similar to the friend in many ways, and are thus willing to 
give the relative the benefit of the doubt, given the trust they hold in their friend. Thus, if 
a member of the public extends legitimacy to the Supreme Court, they are likely to do the 
                                                             
32 The inciting activity at the state supreme court level could be a particularly compelling or impactful case, 
a calm or vicious election campaign, or scandal. 
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same for the state supreme court absent knowledge or opinions about the state court. 
 I argue that actions by the Supreme Court that meet the expectations of the public 
are likely to have a positive influence on state supreme courts while behavior that does 
not meet the expectations will have a negative influence. Since both the Supreme Court 
and state supreme courts have high levels of legitimacy, behavior that meets the 
expectations of the public is unlikely to have any measurable influence on diffuse support 
because the institutions are already at a high starting point. Given that there is not a lot of 
room for improvement, behavior that does not meet expectations is more likely to cause a 
negative, measurable change in levels of support because it means a change from high 
levels of legitimacy built upon a history of met expectations. Thus, if the Supreme Court 
acts as a cue for extending support to state supreme courts, then behavior that does not 
meet the public’s expectations by the Supreme Court is where evidence of this is most 
likely to appear.  
 It is important to return briefly to the difference between politicized and political 
courts. The evidence to date indicates that courts that appear politicized are most likely to 
suffer in their perceptions of legitimacy. However, the evidence indicates this 
relationship is not completely straightforward. Baird and Gangl (2006) find that college 
students react positively to decisions that appear motivated by legal reasoning versus 
those that appear more politically motivated. Perceptions of the process by which the 
decision is made are also important. Simon and Scurich (2011) find that opposition to a 
decision enhances the likelihood that the public will penalize the court if the process 
appears to be politicized. Christenson and Glick (2015) use an experiment that randomly 
assigns information to respondents about Chief Justice John Roberts’ decision to switch 
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his vote on the Affordable Care Act in 2012, casting his decision as politically motivated. 
Those who receive the treatment report lower levels of diffuse support than those who do 
not. Strategic behavior in decision making on the court is not the only perception that can 
hurt legitimacy. So too can evidence of a politicized confirmation process to the U.S. 
Supreme Court (Gibson and Caldeira 2009) or campaign activity that appears overly 
politicized (Gibson 2012). With this evidence, it is more likely that information 
indicating a politicized court will negatively and strongly influence state supreme court 
legitimacy. Information about specific support, either positive or negative, or diffuse 
support if it is positive, is unlikely to influence a decision to confer legitimacy to state 
supreme courts. 
 Additionally, recall how support for democratic values and support for the 
Supreme Court form an endogenous loop, making it difficult to distinguish between 
them. I offer that focusing on behavior by the Supreme Court that is perceived negatively 
by the public is the best place to tease this out theoretically. If support for democratic 
values and institutions are the strongest drivers of state supreme court legitimacy, then 
actions by the Supreme Court and the perceptions they cause should have little to no 
influence on state supreme courts. If state supreme courts are independent institutions for 
the purposes of conferring legitimacy, then that independence should be most visible 
when the legitimacy of the Supreme Court is harmed. If they are not harmed and my 
argument that the Supreme Court acts as a cue for state supreme court legitimacy is 
correct, then support for the state supreme court should be negatively influenced by 
actions of the Supreme Court. Thus, I offer: 
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Negative Supreme Court Cue Hypothesis: If the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court is harmed or called into question, this will have a negative influence on 
state supreme court legitimacy. 
 Note that this hypothesis is specifically dealing with diffuse support, rather than 
specific. Given the evidence that specific actions by the Supreme Court do not have an 
enduring negative influence on the legitimacy of that body, I offer that specific actions do 
not negatively influence diffuse support for any given state supreme court either. Put 
another way, only if the diffuse support of the Supreme Court is weakened will state 
supreme court diffuse support be harmed. 
 While much of the recent literature focuses on states with elections, there is some 
evidence that selection method may play a role in judicial legitimacy. Recall that Benesh 
(2006a) and Cann and Yates (2008) finds that respondents in states with judicial elections 
have lower confidence in their courts than their counterparts in states without elections. 
However, Benesh’s dependent variable is confidence in the court rather than judicial 
legitimacy. Cann and Yates use a better measure of diffuse support, and while diffuse 
support among the public in states with partisan elections is lower among respondents 
with low knowledge than those in other states, it is not dramatically different. This 
information is juxtaposed against evidence that judicial elections are not as harmful as 
theorized, and may even enhance legitimacy (Bonneau and Hall 2009; Gibson 2012). 
Still, selection method may lead to some variation in results. The evidence in all of these 
studies is that people in states that elect judges have more knowledge of state supreme 
courts than their counterparts in states that do not elect judges. This adds an additional 
level of theoretical variation to address.  
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Elected Judge Hypothesis: People in states that elect judges are more likely to 
have knowledge of their state supreme court and thus less likely to rely on the 
Supreme Court as a cue for conferring legitimacy on state supreme courts than 
members of the public in states that do not elect judges. 
 To summarize, I argue that the majority of the public lacks knowledge of their 
state supreme court. However, many know a reasonable amount about the Supreme 
Court, and most people generally support democratic values, broadly defined. When 
deciding whether to confer legitimacy to a state supreme court they know little about, I 
argue they rely both on their support for democratic values as well as their support for the 
Supreme Court, which acts as a cue indicating whether they should extend legitimacy to 
their state supreme court. In particular, this should be most apparent when the Supreme 
Court engages in behavior that does not meet the expectations of the public, thus harming 
the Supreme Court as well as the state supreme court. Additionally, I argue that states 
with judges who are elected are likely to have a public with more knowledge of state 
supreme courts, reducing their reliance on the Supreme Court heuristic when deciding to 
confer legitimacy at the state level. In chapter three, I test the theory that the public 
broadly lacks knowledge of state supreme courts. Additionally, I examine the degree to 
which the sample I rely on for this study is representative, for the purposes of this project. 
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Figure 2.1: An Illustration of Support for the United States Supreme Court 
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Figure 2.2: An Illustration of Support for State Supreme Courts 
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CHAPTER 3 
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF STATE SUPREME COURTS 
Measuring citizen knowledge of political institutions and phenomena is a 
challenging task. The public may appear as hopelessly ignorant or surprisingly well-
informed, depending on the method of assessment (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). That 
being said, the research does generally indicate that knowledge of the Supreme Court is 
more extensive than knowledge of state supreme courts (Gibson 2012). One of the 
questions that this project seeks to answer is: What do citizens know about state supreme 
courts? In this chapter, I rely on evidence from my survey to first look at how 
representative the survey sample is. Next, I examine in detail the results of my survey 
experiment to answer what kind of knowledge citizens possess about their state supreme 
courts as well as how they feel about those state institutions. Finally, I review the results 
of survey questions that measure judicial legitimacy as well as support for democratic 
values to understand the degree to which state supreme courts are perceived as legitimate 
among the public. 
Measuring Knowledge of the Courts 
Measuring what citizens know is a challenging exercise, specifically due to 
disagreement over survey design. Debates over the best ways to approach this task 
revolve around the types of questions to ask. The scholarly evidence indicates a general 
lack of knowledge about American government among respondents. However, surveys 
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showing the lowest level of knowledge tend to rely on open-ended questions. Multiple 
choice questions are more likely to yield results that indicate citizen knowledge is not as 
low as some scholars suggest. Open-ended and multiple-choice questions are the two 
primary methods of measuring knowledge, and I next review these as a foundation for the 
types of questions I rely on in my survey. 
Types of Questions 
The usage of open-ended questions is common practice for ascertaining citizen 
knowledge in many scholarly studies. This practice involves asking a respondent a 
factual question about the government and recording their response. While common, this 
approach introduces two particular problems. First, asking respondents to recall political 
knowledge off the top of their head is not an accurate method to test what they know 
(Krosnick et al. 2008). Political discussions do not generally occur with the reliance only 
on what an individual citizen knows in an impromptu environment. Citizens may rely on 
each other, news sources, or information from the internet to shape their opinions. The 
open-ended question results paint a picture of ignorance that is widespread and divergent 
from what political theorists contend is necessary for successful democracy. On the other 
hand, the multiple-choice question results provide evidence of a citizenry that is more 
knowledgeable than previously given credit for.   
Second, coding the responses to open-ended questions introduces the possibility 
of measurement error. Kronick et al. (2008) report that, in the American National 
Election Study (ANES) survey, many responses to the open-ended questions were 
technically correct but recorded as incorrect because they did not precisely match the 
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correct answer coders were given.33 To avoid this, I ask respondents a series of multiple 
choice questions about court knowledge. Using these types of questions provides a more 
accurate picture of court knowledge and makes the survey a tougher test of my theory. I 
contend that those with lower levels of knowledge are more likely to rely on the Supreme 
Court as a cue to inform what they know about state supreme courts. By more accurately 
narrowing down respondents to those who know so little about their state supreme courts 
based on their multiple-choice answers, I provide the most direct test possible. 
Feasibility is another consideration with surveys of this type. Scholars report that 
the greater the pay on survey sites like Mechanical Turk, the better the quality of 
responses researchers will receive (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). The more time the 
survey takes to complete, the more each respondent may expect in payment. In addition 
to the fact that open-ended questions are time-consuming to answer for respondents, they 
have also been proven to be an unfair test of knowledge and difficult for researchers to 
code. Thus, I rely on multiple-choice questions because they are more accurate 
assessments of knowledge, they are more straight-forward to code, and they keep the 
survey reasonably affordable without greatly sacrificing quality in the type of respondent 
who participates. 
A New Survey of State Supreme Court Knowledge 
We know quite a bit about the amount of knowledge the general population 
possess about the Supreme Court. When it comes to state supreme courts and knowledge 
of those institutions among citizens, though, I start with very little previous scholarship to 
build upon. Gibson (2012) examines state supreme courts and asks what citizens know 
                                                             
33 Questions about the chief justice are noteworthy. Many answers were coded as incorrect, even while the 
respondent clearly knew which person the survey was referring to.  
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about those courts relying on multiple-choice questions. Even among citizens attentive to 
political events, the results are abysmal. The question with the highest number of correct 
responses, 45.6% of respondents in the Gibson survey correctly answer that the Kentucky 
State Supreme Court has the “last say” on the meaning of the state constitution (2012). 
Only 32.9% of respondents knew the term that Kentucky justices serve, and 24.0% knew 
whether their state court justices were elected. We may contrast this with Supreme Court 
questions by Gibson and Caldeira (2009), where 56.8% of respondents knew the federal 
Supreme Court was the final word on the constitution and 73.9% of respondents correctly 
answered that the justices are appointed by the president. Before I analyze respondent 
knowledge about state supreme courts in my study, I first turn to the demographic results 
of the survey and how representative they are of the general U.S. population. Through 
this analysis, I offer evidence that the survey is somewhat representative of the country, 
with some bias in the direction of Democrats, liberals, younger respondents, and those 
with greater education. 
Demographic Results 
I begin with gender in Table 3.1. While not perfectly representative of the country 
as a whole, nor of the individual states, it is very similar to the demographic contours of 
the country in general shape if not in specific boundaries. The gender breakdown of the 
sample skews male more than the overall population.34 According to 2010 census data, 
the male-to-female ratio is 49.2 to 50.8 (Howden and Meyer 2011). In my sample, the 
                                                             
34 To make it easier to compare the survey data to the 2010 United States census data, I have included 
direct comparisons in the tables where this comparison is possible based on the ways in which the data is 
divided in the sample. In this chapter, the direct comparisons are possible for the gender and race 
categories. The other sample demographic tables do not have this direct comparison because the 2010 
census data and Gallup results are not comparable across the same categories. 
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male-to-female ratio is 53.64 to 46.36. This difference is relatively small and still close to 
the national results. A question I will return to for each of these demographic variables is 
the extent to which I expect any difference to influence what citizens know about state 
supreme courts. In previous studies of judicial legitimacy, gender rarely plays a 
statistically significant role in extending institutional support to any given institution, 
particularly at the state supreme court level (Cann and Yates 2008; Gibson 2012).35 
Examining the results by race reveals a sample that skews white in Table 3.2. 
While 77.9% of the sample is white, the 2010 census reveals a white population of 72.4% 
(Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011). This is because African Americans and Hispanics are 
underrepresented in my study. African Americans and Hispanics make up 7.4% and 
6.8%, respectively, of the sample. This is five percentage points fewer for African 
Americans and ten percentage points fewer for Hispanics than the 2010 census. Asians 
are slightly overrepresented in the sample at 5.5% compared to the 2010 census report of 
4.8%. Native Americans closely match the ratio found in the population, but the total 
number of respondents who report that race is seven. In the survey I conduct, I include a 
category labeled “A Different Race.” The census does not use this language, instead 
referring to “Two or More Races.” It is not a direct comparison, and there is no way to 
tell directly based on the data, but these two categories are similar, with the sample 
reporting 1.3% claim A Different Race versus 2.9% who claim Two or More Races in the 
census. On the whole, this is not a perfect match for the racial breakdown, but I argue that 
the difference is not large enough to disrupt the reliability of the sample. First, the 
difference is generally small. Second, ignorance of state supreme courts likely crosses 
                                                             
35 In some cases, gender is statistically significant, but the magnitude of influence is weak. 
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racial lines because of the conditions that make state supreme courts hard to follow, 
understand, and develop an opinion about. Further, while race may play a role in support 
for the Supreme Court, it typically does not appear as a statistically significant factor in 
state high court legitimacy scholarship (Gibson 2012; Gibson and Caldeira 1992). 
 The sample skews younger than the population at large by a fairly considerable 
degree in Table 3.3. The census bureau data indicate that, in 2010, 16.2% of the 
population is over the age of 62 (Howden and Meyer 2011), where only 5.1% of the 
sample is 60 and up. Citizens between the ages of 45 and 64 are 26.4% of the population 
in the census, similar to the 26.3% of the respondents that are ages 40 to 59 in my 
sample. However, those 18 to 29 make up a disproportionate share of the sample, coming 
in at 33.7% versus a mere 9.9% of those 18 to 24 in the 2010 census. While this is not a 
representative sample regarding age, the result is similar to what other scholars find using 
Mechanical Turk (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). I offer that, while there may be 
some variation of state supreme court knowledge by age, it is likely small, for the same 
reasons I discuss above about the conditions that make state supreme court knowledge 
difficult to gather. Thus, while age is not perfectly representative, it is unlikely to 
strongly bias the results of my analysis. 
The results of the sample by political party indicate the sample is skewed toward 
Democrats in Table 3.4. This is not surprising given previous research on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk samples, which indicates that the samples tend to be Democratic and 
liberal (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). The sample I draw indicates similar biases. 
However, it is difficult to get a reliable measure of partisanship in the country. First, 
many states do not require citizens to register with a political party when they vote, and, 
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even when they do, the results are not always trustworthy.36 Second, surveys introduce 
the potential for sample bias, although many companies strive to draw representative 
samples and reduce bias as much as possible. I compare the results of the survey against 
those of the Gallup organization, a pollster with a relatively solid reputation for 
representative samples. I do not suggest that the Gallup poll is as accurate as the census, 
but it is likely a more reliable look at national partisan preferences than the survey I 
provide via the Mechanical Turk pool of participants.37 
 According to a Gallup poll taken during the same period the survey is in the field, 
the partisan affiliation of the country breaks down as follows: 25% claim to be Democrat, 
44% claim to be Independent, and 28% claim to be Republican. Given trends going back 
several years, this is something of a high mark for Independents, who range from 27% as 
a low to 47% as a high in data going back to January of 2004.38 The Democratic number 
also is a little low by historic standards, with those reporting as Democrats ranging from a 
low of 26% to a high of 40%. Republicans in this series range from a low of 20% to a 
high of 39%. Given the wide fluctuation over time, it is difficult to compare, but it is not 
too big a leap to say that Democrats are likely overrepresented in my survey while 
Republicans are likely underrepresented. By historic standards, the numbers my survey 
returns are not outside the extremes, although they do reflect an American polity that 
resembles that found during the waning days of the Bush era rather than what one might 
                                                             
36 Take North Carolina, for example. On December 2, 2017, Democrats outnumber Republicans 
among registered voters by 600,000. However, Republicans dominated the state legislature in 
December of 2017. Further, Republicans have a slight edge at statewide races, although these races 
have become more competitive. See the report here: 
https://vt.ncsbe.gov/RegStat/Results/?date=12%2F02%2F2017. 
37 Relying on the census is not foolproof, of course. There are problems getting answers from every 
single person in the country, and the data are collected six years before the present survey.  
38 See the full report here: http://www.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx.  
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expect during the victorious interlude for Republicans between the 2016 election and the 
start of the Trump administration. However, there is no theoretical reason to believe that 
knowledge of state supreme courts is reliably different across party affiliation, especially 
since affiliation is so fluid over time. 
 Concerning ideology, the sample I provide is decidedly more liberal than the 
country appears to be in Table 3.5. Unlike partisanship, Gallup reports that ideology is 
comparatively stable, if trending slowly toward a larger liberal proportion versus smaller 
conservative and moderate proportions. According to a January 2017 Gallup survey, 36% 
of Americans claim to be conservative, 34% claim to be moderate, and 25% claim to be 
liberal.39 This is markedly different from the Mechanical Turk survey, where only 25.1% 
of respondents are conservative, 21.1% are moderate, and 53.8% are liberal, including 
22.6% who say they are very liberal. While the partisanship of the Mechanical Turk 
sample is not so far off the Gallup survey, the ideology makeup of the sample group is 
substantially different. For the purposes of this study, the question becomes: Does this 
large difference matter? I argue that it does not matter in a materially important way, 
primarily because ideology alone does not provide a great deal of insight about 
knowledge of government.  
 I turn next to Table 3.6 and the final demographic variable: education. This is the 
only variable that I argue is likely influential in knowledge of state courts, and the one 
that should be as close to national levels as possible. The sample I draw reports higher 
education than the general population. According to the 2010 Census Bureau, 12% of the 
U.S. population has less than a high school diploma in 2011 (Bauman 2012). Only 0.7% 
                                                             
39 See the full report here: http://news.gallup.com/poll/201152/conservative-liberal-gap-continues-
narrow-tuesday.aspx?g_source=IDEOLOGY&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles.  
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of respondents in the sample have less than a high school diploma. 31% of the population 
possesses a high school diploma as their highest educational attainment, while only 
11.3% of survey respondents report the same. 26% of the population has some college or 
an Associate’s degree, while my survey includes 36.9% with the same level of education. 
19% of the population possesses a Bachelor’s degree, while 39.1% of survey respondents 
report having this degree. At the higher end of educational attainment, the national 
numbers and my own are similar. 8% of the population has a Master’s degree in 
comparison to 8.5% of the survey, 1% of the population has professional degrees in 
comparison to 2.1% in the survey, and 2% of the population has doctoral degrees in 
comparison to 1.5% in the survey. The bulk of the difference here is in the number of 
people with college degrees or some experience in college. This is the demographic 
characteristic most likely to influence the results of my experience. The greater 
educational attainment a survey respondent has, the more likely it is that they have some 
familiarity with state supreme courts, but I argue in the theory chapter that ignorance of 
state supreme courts is relatively widespread. Relying on a survey of people with greater 
education helps to illuminate the connection between education and knowledge of lesser 
known courts.  
 On the whole, my sample reports greater educational attainment, is more liberal, 
and is younger than the general population. Additionally, given the available evidence, it 
appears it is also more Democratic than the population. However, I offer that these 
differences are immaterial given the widespread ignorance of state supreme courts that I 
argue crosses most demographic lines. I next turn to the thermometer questions before 
examining what it is that respondents think they know about state supreme courts as well 
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as the questions they actually answer correctly. 
Thermometer Questions 
 As another means of assessing the preferences of my sample, my survey includes 
thermometer questions that gauge cool or warm feelings on a scale of 0 to 100. I ask 
respondents to report their warmth toward President Obama, President-elect Trump, the 
United States Congress, local police, and corporations. The results are in Table 3.7. 
President Obama is seen more warmly than President-elect Trump in the sample. 
President Obama’s mean thermometer rating is 59.47, while President-elect Trump’s is 
26.96. However, there is wide variation around that measurement with all results 
reporting large standard deviations. Given the liberal bent of the sample, it is not 
surprising that warmth for President Obama is higher than that of President-elect Trump. 
What is striking is the mean warmth rating for Congress, which, at 34.71, is higher than 
President-elect Trump’s mean score. During the transition between administrations, it 
appears that respondents in this sample are not giving the President-elect any benefit of 
the doubt. Local police receive the highest mean warmth score at 60.81, but corporations 
do worse with a mean warmth score of 42.81.  
 Taken together, these mean thermometer scores provide a portrait of a sample that 
is similar to approval or favorability ratings in other surveys. Many national surveys ask 
for approval or disapproval of the institutions I have chosen, but comparing mean feeling 
thermometer results to approval scores is not an exact one-to-one exercise. Even so, the 
results of my sample are generally similar to other surveys’ overall findings. Congress 
remains quite unpopular, with approval ratings routinely in the twenties and teens.40 
                                                             
40 See here for the full record: http://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx.  
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Approval of police is in the mid-fifties according to an October 2016 Gallup poll, an 
increase from a low in the previous year in connection with the racially-charged events in 
Ferguson, Missouri (McCarthy 2016). Corporations appear unpopular in my sample, 
similar to ranking of big business by Gallup, in which only 21% of respondents say they 
have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in them.41 The survey is in the field during 
the presidential transition, when President Obama received high job approval ratings in 
the fifties and sixties.42 President-elect Trump’s popularity increased during the transition 
as well, although the liberal lean of the sample reveals itself most strongly via the 
thermometer question about him.43 
 The feeling thermometer questions reveal a sample that is similar to the general 
public in many ways, given the evidence available from public polling. However, there is 
an undeniable liberal lean in the sample that reveals itself in thermometer questions about 
President Obama and President-elect Trump. I next turn to levels of knowledge about 
state supreme courts. Thus far, I theorize that lack of knowledge about state supreme 
courts is extensive, and that it crosses most demographic lines. I examine the evidence in 
support of this claim. 
State Supreme Court Knowledge 
 I begin the analysis of citizen knowledge by reviewing how respondents rank 
themselves. I ask them to answer how much they think they know about the United States 
Supreme Court and their state supreme courts on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is nothing 
                                                             
41 See here for the full record: http://news.gallup.com/poll/5248/big-business.aspx.  
42 See here for Obama approval: 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/president_obama_job_approval-1044.html.  
43 See here for Trump approval: 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/president_trump_job_approval-6179.html.  
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and 10 is a great deal. The results of these questions mirror both assessments of 
knowledge in other surveys and indicate that there is awareness among the population 
about their ignorance of these institutions, particularly at the state level. The results are in 
Table 3.8. The mean score among respondents who answer how much they know about 
the Supreme Court is 5.09. This is supportive of other surveys that show that citizens are 
not completely ignorant of the Supreme Court, even if they do not recall much about it 
off the top of their heads with great detail. 55% of respondents rate themselves at a 5 or 
below, indicating that 45% of the sample think they know a reasonable amount about the 
Supreme Court. Nearly one-third of the sample rate themselves a 4, 5, or 6. Only 1.2% 
rate themselves a 10, while 1.9% rate themselves a 1. Perhaps these relatively high 
numbers reflect the skew of the sample toward greater educational achievement. 
However, this depiction of relatively high citizen knowledge evaporates when it comes to 
the state supreme courts. The mean score of self-knowledge assessment is 3.25, 
significantly smaller than for the Supreme Court. 86.8% of the sample rank themselves at 
a 5 or below, with a full 17.8% ranking their knowledge of state supreme courts as a 1, 
meaning no knowledge. A mere 0.5% rank their knowledge of state supreme courts as a 
10. 
 The survey also includes factual questions about the United States Supreme Court 
as well as the state supreme court for the state in which survey respondents live.44 
Generally speaking, as my theory predicts, citizens know a reasonable amount about the 
United States Supreme Court. The results are in Table 3.9. 77.4% of respondents 
correctly answer that the Chief Justice is John Roberts. 88.0% answer correctly that the 
                                                             
44 I follow the lead of Gibson and others, borrowing some of the knowledge questions from the survey 
Gibson (2012) relies on for his work on Kentucky’s state supreme court elections. 
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Supreme Court is the final word on federal constitutional matters. 77.6% of respondents 
correctly answer that justices are appointed for a life term. However, only 41.0% of 
respondents knew that President Obama appointed two of the three women on the 
Supreme Court at the time of the survey. Overall though, the results are in keeping with 
other surveys that show knowledge of the Supreme Court to be quite high, particularly 
when the assessment tool includes multiple choice questions. 
 Respondent knowledge about state supreme courts was quite different. A mere 
16.8% of respondents are able to correctly identify the state court selection method for 
their state high court. 24.8%—the highest percentage of respondents who answer a 
question about state supreme courts correctly—know their state high court’s term of 
office. Only 12.3% of respondents correctly answer the question about state courts having 
the final word on issues regarding the constitution of their state. This question may be a 
bit tricky for respondents to answer, because the United States Supreme Court may make 
decisions about state constitutions if those cases include a federal question. If the issues 
are state questions exclusively, then the state court is the final word. 
 Lack of knowledge of state supreme courts cuts across demographic lines. With 
few exceptions, the level of knowledge of state supreme courts is low for all categories 
and subcategories of people in the sample. Tables 3.10 through 3.15 include the 
percentage of respondents who answer the state supreme court knowledge questions 
correctly or incorrectly, divided into the different demographic categories I survey. 
Levels of knowledge of state supreme courts do not vary much from one subcategory to 
another. The exceptions are: respondents with very high levels of education on the 
question regarding term length and very conservative respondents on selection method 
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questions. These findings indicate that state supreme court knowledge is not only low 
among respondents, but it also generally does not vary a great deal across demographic 
variables. With this evidence that state supreme court knowledge ignorance among 
respondents is fairly widespread, I next turn to measures of legitimacy and confidence in 
courts. 
Legitimacy of High Courts in the United States  
 In the theory chapter, I explain that asking about confidence in courts is not a 
valid measure of legitimacy, because it better captures the concept of specific support. 
However, I ask respondents this because my legitimacy measure only assesses 
institutional support for state supreme courts. I do not measure Supreme Court 
legitimacy, though I am interested in some measure of support for the Supreme Court, 
even if it is closer to the theoretical concept of specific support. I ask respondents 
whether they have more confidence in the Supreme Court, in their state supreme court, in 
both courts, or in neither. The results are in Table 3.16. 47.3% of respondents reply that 
they have more confidence in the Supreme Court, while only 13.5% have more 
confidence in their state supreme court. 9.7% respond that they have confidence in both 
courts, while nearly one-third, 29.6%, say they do not have confidence in either court. 
This may reflect the fact that respondents know so much less about state supreme courts 
than the Supreme Court.45 I turn next to see the measure of support for the state supreme 
courts. 
 
 
                                                             
45 This is another piece of evidence in support of using an index to test legitimacy. Gibson (2012) finds 
very similar levels of institutional support for the Supreme Court and the state supreme court of Kentucky. 
However, when relying on confidence, a different matter is being asked in the minds of respondents. 
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Measuring State Supreme Court Legitimacy 
 
 Following the lead of Gibson (2012), I ask respondents a series of 9 questions 
about their state supreme courts. I code their responses as either supportive or not 
supportive of the court and then add the number of supportive responses they provide. 
The results of the index I create using that information is in Table 3.17. At first glance, 
the numbers may appear to indicate that state supreme courts are in a bit of trouble 
concerning legitimacy with respondents. A little over half of respondents answer in 
support of state supreme courts in four or fewer questions. The results of the index appear 
to indicate that state supreme court legitimacy is not particularly robust. This initial 
analysis is not that surprising, given the lack of knowledge about state supreme courts.  
However, closer inspection of the individual measures that make up the index 
indicates generally widespread support in Table 3.18. I ask respondents to reply to the 
following statement: “If the supreme court of my state started making a lot of decisions 
that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the supreme court of 
my state altogether.” Previous scholars rely on this statement as a benchmark of sorts to 
measure legitimacy aside from the index, which captures other dimensions of the concept 
(Gibson 2012). In the survey, 58.4% of respondents disagree with doing away with their 
state high courts, including 17.7% who strongly disagree. Conversely, only 5.2% strongly 
agree. These results are quite compelling, particularly against the backdrop of widespread 
ignorance for these institutions. 
 Other individual statements also indicate that state supreme courts possess a solid 
reservoir of support. I ask respondents whether “the supreme court of my state should be 
listened to, even if I disagree with the ruling.” Fully 69.5% of respondents agree, 
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including 15.3% who strongly agree. 54.5% of respondents trust their state supreme court 
to make decisions that are in the best interest of the state versus only 20.5% who 
disagree. Only 25.0% think that the courts’ authority to rule on controversial areas should 
be removed versus 47.1% who do not. While these statements revealed generally strong 
support for the state supreme courts, the results of other statements are less positive. 
 In particular, statements that assess support for judicial independence as well as 
the degree to which courts are seen as unique institutions in comparison to their more 
political counterparts reveal a murkier picture. One statement asks respondents to agree 
or disagree with whether a judge should be removed if they “routinely make decisions at 
odds with the majority of the people of my state.” 33.14% of respondents agree versus 
38.9% of respondents who disagree. 27.6% are uncertain. The next judicial independence 
statement asks respondents to agree or disagree with whether their state “supreme 
court…ought to be made less independent so that it listens a lot more to what the people 
want.” 40.4% of respondents agree versus 38.9% who disagree. 21.3% are uncertain. This 
shows a lack of consensus about judicial independence, but it is also uncovers a 
competition between American values. On the one hand, there is the importance of a fair 
and independent judiciary, but in these statements, citizens are asked only about going 
against the wishes of the people. Perhaps a more accurate statement might talk about 
specific court-curbing measures the executive or legislative branches might take. 
However, the hesitance of respondents to go overwhelming against the courts even when 
the statement positions the judiciary against the will of the people demonstrates a net 
positive for state supreme court legitimacy.  
 The statements that ask about the uniqueness of courts test the degree to which 
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citizens see the courts as special institutions that are different from their more politicized 
counterparts in the executive and legislative branches. The first statement asks 
respondents to agree or disagree with whether “there should be stronger controls in place 
to prevent the supreme court of my state from becoming involved in politics.” 51.4% of 
respondents agree with that statement, including 18.0% who strongly agree. 21.0% 
disagree, while 27.6% are uncertain. On the surface, this result may appear to suggest a 
lack of diffuse support for the state courts. Given the lack of knowledge respondents 
possess about their state supreme courts, though, this result may also be a reflection of 
the fact that citizens understand courts need to be separate from politics. I am going to 
extrapolate a bit beyond what the data alone say and offer that, because citizens 
understand that courts ought to be different from other government institutions, 
respondents might be more likely to want institutional checks to make sure it is so. This 
is not necessarily because respondents distrust the courts, but rather because they distrust 
human nature and the ability of people with access to power and money to remain 
unpoliticized. The next statement prompts the follow-up to the first uniqueness statement: 
“The supreme court of my state gets too mixed up in politics.” Only 34.2% agree versus 
31.4% who disagree. When I ask respondents directly about whether their court gets too 
involved in politics, the number shifts a good deal from when they are asked about 
whether stronger controls should be put in place to separate the branches. This appears to 
indicate that a reasonable portion of the population thinks their state supreme courts are 
not politicized, even as more than half recognize the importance of that uniqueness. 
 One final statement that assesses support for the court refers to the final word on 
the constitution. The statement reads: “The Supreme Court of my state may have ideas 
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about what the constitution means, but it is more important what the majority of the 
people think the constitution means.” On this statement only 26% agree versus 46.1% 
who disagree. This is an important acceptance and understanding of judicial authority. 
Specifically, the fact that the courts have to make decisions based on complicated legal 
documents, not what the people think they should mean. 
 Taken individually, the statements provide a perspective on judicial legitimacy 
that is generally positive and indicative of widespread state supreme court support. Aside 
from the support for the courts, I am interested in a causal factor that other scholars report 
is a significant influence on court legitimacy: support for democratic values. I measure 
support for democratic values similar to the way in which I measure support for the 
courts. I ask respondents to agree or disagree with statements about several abstract 
democratic values. I then compile the results onto a single variable to measure the degree 
to which support for democratic values influences support for state supreme courts. First, 
I turn to each statement and the results from the survey before discussing the summative 
measure of support for democratic values. 
Support for Democratic Values 
 Respondents are asked to answer whether they strongly agree, agree, are 
uncertain, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:46 
1. A society shouldn’t have to put up with those who have political ideas that are 
extremely different from the majority. 
                                                             
46 These questions are from the first round of Gibson’s (2006) survey. The first 6 questions are included in 
Gibson’s 2012 book, and the last two are omitted from that analysis. Instead, the author relies on three 
other questions that gauge support for due process. Given the timing of my survey, in the winter of 2016 to 
2017, and the salience of rights of the minority issues to many people in the United States at the time, I ask 
about support for minority rights instead of those inquiring about due process. 
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2. It is not necessary to obey a law you consider unjust. 
3. It is better to live in an orderly society rather than to allow people so much 
freedom that they become disruptive. 
4. Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law and solve problems 
immediately than wait for a legal solution. 
5. Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the 
danger to society of extremist political views. 
6. The government should have some ability to bend the law in order to solve 
pressing social and political problems. 
7. In politics, the majority ought to get what it wants, even if it means that the 
rights of some minorities are restricted. 
8. Majority rule may be an important principle for democracies, but the majority 
must always respect the rights of all minorities. 
 Statements 1, 3, and 5 are measures of support for the democratic value of liberty 
over order. Statements 2, 4, and 6 are measures of support for the rule of law. Statements 
7 and 8 are measures of support for rights of the minority in a majoritarian government 
structure. The results for statements 1, 3, and 5 indicate strong support for the democratic 
value of liberty over order in Table 3.19. Only 14.3% agree with statement 1, 30.3% 
agree with statement 3, and a mere 10.7% agree with statement 5. Nearly half of 
respondents disagree with statement 3, while around three-fourths of respondents agree 
with statements 1 and 5. On the whole, support for these abstract values is quite high, 
even when the alternative means exposure to extreme political views and the potential for 
disruptive political behavior. The percentage of respondents who report being uncertain 
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never goes beyond 20%, and disagreement approaches 50% or more in each statement. It 
appears that, among this sample, support for liberty over order is quite robust.  
 Statements 2, 4, and 6 indicate strong support for the democratic value of rule of 
law. Only 18.3% agree with statement 2, which asks about obeying laws the respondent 
personally considers unjust. 24.2% agree with statement 4, which asks about ignoring the 
law to solve problems more quickly. Similarly, just 21.6% respond in agreement with 
statement 6, which asks about the ability of the government to bend the law to solve a 
problem. At no point does support for these violations to the concept of rule of law pass 
beyond 25%. Further, the percentage of respondents who report they are uncertain never 
passes beyond 26%. More than 50% of respondents disagree with each statement 
regarding the rule of law. Similar to the findings regarding liberty over order, support for 
rule of law is robust in the circumstances described in these survey questions. 
 Questions 7 and 8 are a measure of support for minority rights in a majoritarian 
system. Similar to the other measures of support for democratic values, respondents are 
supportive of minority rights. A mere 14.1% of respondents agree that rights of the 
minority should be restricted to allow the majority to work its will. Only 5.1% of 
respondents disagree that the majority should always respect the rights of all minorities. 
On the whole, these questions indicate a fairly robust level of support for democratic 
values. Support for democratic values tends to be high and is a strong predictor of judicial 
legitimacy in much of the research on support for the courts. These survey results 
indicate that the sample falls generally in line with previous scholarly work regarding 
support for these important values. These results should be a reliable measure for analysis 
in chapters four and five. 
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Conclusion 
 Respondent knowledge of state supreme courts is quite low, while knowledge of 
the Supreme Court is reasonably high. This evidence intersects surprisingly with 
evidence from respondents that state supreme courts enjoy high levels of legitimacy. 
How is it possible to reconcile this reality in which citizens support institutions they 
know very little about? In the theory chapter, I develop a theory that citizens rely on their 
support for the Supreme Court to inform their support for state supreme courts, of which 
they are significantly less knowledgeable. This chapter tests a major assumption of my 
theory: that citizens are broadly lacking in knowledge about their state supreme courts. 
The pool I draw from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is not perfectly representative of the 
population, but the non-political demographics are quite similar. Additionally, lack of 
knowledge about state supreme courts is incredibly widespread across demographic 
factors. It appears to make little difference based on age, education, race, partisan 
identification, or ideology. Just as my theory predicts, ignorance of state supreme courts 
appears to be quite widespread. In the next chapter, I explore potential causal 
mechanisms of how a sample that is largely ignorant of state supreme courts still 
expresses high levels of diffuse support for those institutions.
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Table 3.1: Breakdown of the Sample by Gender 
Gender 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 2010 Census 
Male  361 53.6 49.2 
Female  312 46.4 50.8 
N = 673  
 
Table 3.2: Breakdown of the Sample by Race 
Race 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 2010 Census 
Asian 37 5.5 4.8 
Black 50 7.4 12.6 
Hispanic 46 6.8 16.3 
Native 
American 
7 1.0 0.9 
White 524 77.9 72.4 
A Different 
Race 
9 1.3 -- 
N = 673  
 
Table 3.3: Breakdown of the Sample by Age 
Age 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
18-29 227 33.7 
30-39 235 34.9 
40-49 104 15.5 
50-59 73 10.9 
60 and up 34 5.1 
N = 673 
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Table 3.4: Breakdown of the Sample by Party 
Party 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Democrat 301 44.7 
Republican 137 34.9 
Independent/Other 235 20.4 
N = 673 
 
Table 3.5: Breakdown of the Sample by Ideology 
Ideology 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Very Liberal 152 22.6 
Somewhat Liberal 210 31.2 
Moderate 142 21.1 
Somewhat Conservative 130 19.3 
Very Conservative 39 5.8 
N = 673 
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Table 3.6: Breakdown of the Sample by Education 
Education 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Some High school 5 0.7 
High School Graduate 76 11.3 
Some College 167 24.8 
Trade/Tech/Vocational training 29 4.3 
Associate’s Degree 52 7.7 
Bachelor’s Degree 263 39.1 
Master’s Degree 57 8.5 
Professional Degree 14 2.1 
Doctoral Degree 10 1.5 
N = 673 
 
Table 3.7: Results of the Feeling Thermometer Questions 
Feeling Thermometer Questions 
Support For the President and President-elect 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Obama 59.5 34.0 
Trump 27.0 32.7 
Support for Other Institutions 
Congress 34.7 24.5 
Local Police 60.8 27.5 
Corporations 42.8 24.5 
N = 673 
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Table 3.8: Results of the Knowledge Self-Assessment Question 
Knowledge Self-Assessment 
 Mean 
Supreme Court 5.1 
State Supreme Court 3.6 
N = 673 
 
Table 3.9: Results of the Judicial Knowledge Questions 
Court Knowledge Question Results 
Question Topic Percent 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percent 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
 
State Selection Method 16.8 83.2 
State Term of Office 24.8 75.2 
State Court Final Word on State Constitutional Issues 12.3 87.7 
Supreme Court Chief Justice is John Roberts 77.4 22.6 
Supreme Court is Final Word on American 
Constitutional Matters 
88.0 12.0 
Obama Appointed Two of Three Women on the 
Supreme Court 
41.0 59.0 
Supreme Court Term of Office 77.6 22.4 
N = 673 
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Table 3.10: Results of Knowledge Questions Subset by Education 
Education 
 Selection Method Question Term Length Question State Supreme Court Final Word 
Question 
 Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Some High School 80.0 20.0 80.0 20.0 100.0 0.0 
High School Graduate 84.2 15.8 77.6 22.4 90.8 9.2 
Some College 85.0 15.0 74.9 25.2 84.4 15.6 
Trade/Tech/ 
Vocational Training 
89.7 10.3 79.3 20.7 100.0 0.0 
Associate’s Degree 80.8 19.2 76.9 23.1 82.7 17.3 
Bachelor’s Degree 85.6 14.5 79.5 20.5 88.2 11.8 
Master’s Degree 70.2 29.8 61.4 38.6 84.2 15.8 
Professional Degree 78.6 21.4 50.0 50.0 100.0 0.0 
Doctoral Degree 83.2 16.8 40.0 60.0 90.0 10.0 
N = 673 
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Table 3.11: Results of Knowledge Questions Subset by Political Party 
Political Party 
 Selection Method 
Question 
 
Term Length Question State Supreme Court 
Final Word Question 
 Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Democrat 83.1 16.9 75.4 24.6 88.7 11.3 
Republican 82.5 17.5 74.0 26.0 86.0 14.0 
Independent/ 
Other 
83.8 16.2 76.6 23.4 88.3 11.7 
N = 673 
 
 
  
73 
Table 3.12: Results of Knowledge Questions Subset by Gender 
Gender 
 Selection Method 
Question 
 
Term Length Question State Supreme Court 
Final Word Question 
 Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Male 82.6 17.5 78.1 21.9 85.3 14.7 
Female 84.0 16.0 71.8 28.2 90.4 9.6 
N = 673 
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Table 3.13: Results of Knowledge Questions Subset by Race 
Race 
 Selection Method 
Question 
 
Term Length Question State Supreme Court Final 
Word Question 
 Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Asian 86.5 13.5 75.7 24.3 94.6 5.4 
Black 72.0 28.0 70.0 30.0 78.0 22.0 
Hispanic 87.0 13.0 71.7 28.3 89.1 10.9 
Native 
American 
71.4 28.6 71.4 28.6 85.7 14.3 
White 83.8 16.2 76.0 24.1 88.0 12.0 
A Different 
Race 
88.9 11.1 77.8 22.2 88.9 11.1 
N = 673 
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Table 3.14: Results of Knowledge Questions Subset by Age 
Age 
 Selection Method Question 
 
Term Length Question State Supreme Court 
Final Word Question 
 Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
18-29 83.7 16.3 78.0 22.0 85.5 14.5 
30-39 84.3 15.7 74.5 25.5 88.1 11.9 
40-49 83.7 16.4 69.2 30.8 89.4 10.6 
50-59 80.8 19.2 75.3 24.7 94.5 5.5 
60 and 
Up 
76.5 23.5 79.4 20.6 79.4 20.6 
N = 673 
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Table 3.15: Results of Knowledge Questions Subset by Ideology 
Ideology 
 Selection Method 
Question 
 
Term Length Question State Supreme Court 
Final Word Question 
 Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Incorrectly 
Percentage 
Answering 
Correctly 
Very Liberal 82.9 17.1 77.6 22.4 90.1 9.9 
Somewhat 
Liberal 
84.3 15.7 74.8 25.2 84.8 15.2 
Moderate 85.2 14.8 73.9 26.1 90.9 9.2 
Somewhat 
Conservative 
85.4 14.6 75.4 24.6 88.5 11.5 
Very 
Conservative 
64.1 35.9 71.8 28.2 79.5 20.5 
N = 673 
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Table 3.16: Results of Questions Asking about Confident in the Courts 
Court Confidence 
 Number of respondents Percentage 
More Confidence in the Supreme Court 318 47.3 
More Confidence in State Supreme 
Court 
91 13.5 
Equal Confidence in Both 65 9.7 
No Confidence in Either 199 29.6 
N = 673 
 
Table 3.17: Results of Index of State Supreme Court Legitimacy 
Number of Responses in 
Support of the 
Respondent’s State 
Supreme Court 
 
Percent Cumulative percent 
0 7.73 7.7 
1 11.74 19.5 
2 12.33 31.8 
3 11.14 42.9 
4 13.52 56.5 
5 12.78 69.2 
6 11.14 80.4 
7 9.66 90.0 
8 6.69 96.7 
9 3.27 100.0 
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Table 3.18: Results of the Individual Components of the Index of State Supreme Court 
Support 
 
Statements that Comprise the Measure of State Supreme Court Legitimacy 
 
 Percent of Respondents Answering With: 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Eliminate Court if 
People Dislike It 
5.2 
 
15.8 
 
20.7 
 
40.7 
 
17.7 
Obey Court Even if 
People Dislike It 
15.3 54.2 19.3 8.8 2.4 
Jurisdiction of the 
Court Reduced on 
Controversial Issues 
4.6 20.4 27.9 35.5 11.6 
Trust the Court to 
Make Good 
Decisions 
7.6 47.0 25.0 15.6 4.9 
Judges Should be 
Removed if they 
Rule at Odds with the 
People too often 
8.5 24.7 27.9 30.8 8.2 
Court Should be Less 
Independent so that it 
Listens to the People 
9.8 30.6 21.3 26.3 12.0 
Stronger Controls 
Should be in Place to 
Prevent Court from 
being Involved in 
Politics 
18.0 33.4 27.6 15.8 5.2 
Court is too Mixed 
Up in Politics 
10.3 23.9 34.5 26.1 5.2 
Court Interprets 
Constitution, not the 
People 
4.2 21.8 27.9 32.1 14.0 
N = 673 
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Table 3.19: Results of the Index of Support for Democratic Values 
Statements that Measure Support for Democratic Values 
 
 Percent of Respondents Answering With: 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Society should not put up 
with extreme political 
ideas different from the 
majority 
3.7 10.6 11.6 40.9 33.3 
It is not necessary to obey 
laws that the respondent 
considers unjust 
3.7 14.6 20.1 42.1 19.6 
Better to live in an orderly 
society than allow people 
the freedom to be 
disruptive 
6.4 23.9 19.9 33.7 16.1 
Sometimes better to 
ignore the law and solve 
problems immediately 
than wait for a legal 
solution 
2.8 21.4 25.7 37.2 12.9 
Free speech is not worth it 
if we have to put up with 
the danger to society of 
extremist political views 
1.9 8.8 10.7 37.0 41.6 
Government should have 
some ability to bend the 
law in order to solve 
pressing social and 
political problems 
2.1 19.5 26.0 30.5 22.0 
In politics, the majority 
ought to get what it wants 
even if the rights of some 
minorities are restricted 
3.0 11.1 15.8 36.0 34.2 
Majority rule is important, 
but the majority must 
always respect the rights 
of the minority 
47.1 38.3 9.5 3.6 1.5 
N = 673 
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CHAPTER 4 
STATE SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY AND THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT AS A HEURISTIC
In the theory chapter, I lay out a broad theory of how citizens overcome their 
ignorance of state supreme courts when deciding whether to confer legitimacy on those 
institutions. Succinctly, many citizens possess very low levels of knowledge about state 
supreme courts but comparatively high levels of knowledge about the United States 
Supreme Court. I argue that citizens rely on what they know and feel about the Supreme 
Court to inform what they think and feel about their own state supreme court. Of course, I 
do not theorize that this occurs in a vacuum. I expect that support for democratic values 
and individual levels of education also play a positive role in conferring judicial 
legitimacy, even among respondents with lower levels of state supreme court knowledge. 
In this chapter, I will test the primary theoretical argument of this dissertation: does the 
Supreme Court act as a cue for citizens when they decide whether they should confer 
legitimacy on state supreme courts they know relatively nothing about? 
 Previous research on judicial legitimacy at the state supreme court level makes an 
implicit assumption that a reasonable portion of the population knows enough about state 
supreme courts to make informed decisions about those institutions as individual, distinct 
entities. Scholars treat the widespread ignorance of state supreme courts as a control 
variable, or the least attentive respondents are excluded from the analysis. While these 
are perfectly acceptable approaches to answer some research questions, particularly those 
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that focus on the scholarly debate surrounding the influence of judicial elections, I argue 
that directly analyzing the widespread ignorance of state high courts reveals the existence 
of an overlooked and intriguing dynamic. In this chapter, I will test two of the hypotheses 
I develop in the theory chapter: 
Supreme Court Cue Hypothesis: Among citizens with low knowledge of state 
supreme courts, support for the Supreme Court acts as a cue informing whether 
those citizens should extend legitimacy to the state supreme court. 
Negative Supreme Court Cue Hypothesis: If the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court is harmed or called into question, this will have a negative influence on 
state supreme court legitimacy. 
 The Supreme Court Cue Hypothesis and the Negative Supreme Court Cue 
Hypothesis are testing the similar theoretical concept that citizens rely on the Supreme 
Court to inform their opinions. To test this, I randomly assign respondents into a 
treatment group that provides a brief script to read. There are five treatments: two dealing 
with diffuse support, two dealing with specific support, and a group that does not receive 
a treatment.47 Recall from the theory chapter that there is a positive diffuse support 
prompt and a negative diffuse prompt.48 As I argue in the theory chapter, positive diffuse 
support should not influence state supreme court legitimacy because it is merely 
reinforcing what many likely think about the Supreme Court.  
 Much of the research to date reveals that legitimacy of American courts is 
generally quite strong. However, if courts engage in behavior that citizens perceive as 
                                                             
47 I detail the concepts of diffuse support and specific support in the theory chapter. 
48 For the sake of convenience, the treatment language is available in the chapter appendix. 
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overtly politicized, those actions possess the potential to harm judicial legitimacy, at least 
in the short term (Gibson 2012, 2008, 2009). To capture this dynamic and test it, the 
negative diffuse treatment is written in a way that captures the essence of diffuse support 
and calls the legitimacy of the Supreme Court into question. The language casts the 
Supreme Court as being just like the rest of partisan and political Washington. The 
language also characterizes the judges as highly politicized in their voting, indicating that 
party line votes happen frequently. Further, the treatment informs respondents that this 
tendency to vote by party line has been going on for forty years in order to trigger a 
reaction in the participants so that they are likely to view the Supreme Court partisan line 
as a common and enduring pattern rather than a one-off event. This is an attempt to call 
into question the underpinning of diffuse support for the Supreme Court by casting it as 
yet another political and politicized actor in the federal government. Easton (1965, 1975) 
offered that diffuse support is built or lost based on the occurrence of specific events that 
people support or oppose. The treatment I construct is an attempt to elicit such a thought 
process in the minds of respondents, encouraging them to think that the United States 
Supreme Court frequently engages in specific behaviors of which the respondents might 
disapprove of. 
The strength of the Supreme Court’s judicial legitimacy appears to arise from its 
distinction as a non-politicized entity in the government. If my theory is correct, the 
negative diffuse support treatment is the only treatment that influences state supreme 
court legitimacy, and it will do so in a negative direction among respondents with low 
levels of knowledge about these courts. I argue that while respondents with low state high 
court knowledge likely know something about the Supreme Court and probably have 
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positive feelings about it, they are susceptible to politicized descriptions of the court that 
match generally negative feelings about politicians as a whole. Since they have low 
knowledge of their state supreme court and fewer points of reference concerning it, they 
use the Supreme Court as a guide when deciding to confer legitimacy on the state 
institution they know little about. Thus, evidence of reliance on the Supreme Court as a 
cue informing state supreme court legitimacy is most likely to emerge among respondents 
who receive this treatment. Conversely, the Negative Diffuse Treatment is less likely to 
influence respondents with greater state high court knowledge because they are not as 
reliant on their knowledge and perceptions about the Supreme Court to guide whether 
they should confer legitimacy on their state supreme court.  
 The specific support treatments are National Public Radio (NPR) articles from the 
year 2016. The first deals with President Barack Obama’s controversial nomination of 
Merrick Garland to replace Antonin Scalia. The appointment receives support from 
Democrats and opposition from Republicans, who pledge to stonewall the nomination. 
Respondents take the survey in December 2016 and January 2017. Donald Trump is the 
winner of the 2016 presidential election, and the nomination of Garland fails. However, 
the article serves primarily as a reminder of the politicized process for nominations in the 
form of a one-time event. Gibson (2007) finds that the politicized nomination process is 
harmful to Supreme Court legitimacy. I argue, though, that this treatment is unlikely to 
influence state supreme court legitimacy.49 It is an article from early in the nomination 
process several months prior to the survey distribution, and since the Senate never takes 
                                                             
49 There is evidence that the open Supreme Court seat was not as important as an issue in 2016 voting than 
retrospective analysis might have us believe. While there is evidence the open seat on the Supreme Court 
was important for evangelical Republican voters, the exit polls indicate that it was not the highest concern 
for those voters (Silver 2018). 
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up the nomination, it does not become politicized in the same way as other nominations 
that involve hearings and potential justices engaging with a more political branch.50 
Further, while the nomination of Garland and the ensuing political games are certainly a 
politicized event, it is a one-off event heavily influenced by actions in the legislature, and 
it is characterized as such in the article. 
That being said, given the fraught nature of the nomination and subsequent 
Republican refusal to give Garland a vote in addition to previous evidence that politicized 
nominations can harm legitimacy, including this sort of specific event in the test may 
illuminate how harmful the partisan politics of such an event continue to be months after 
Republicans officially refused to vote on an Obama nominee. If the variable measuring 
the influence of this treatment is a significant predictor of state supreme court legitimacy, 
it gives scholars additional information on how long this type of specific event negatively 
impacts judicial legitimacy. Further, any cascading influence on lower courts in the 
United States based on federal Supreme Court nominations indicates further evidence 
that respondents rely on events that happen on the federal level to guide their decisions 
about state level judges. However, since this example of specific support is one that does 
not reach the heights of controversy other appointments often achieve, I do not expect it 
to influence state supreme court legitimacy among respondents with low levels of 
knowledge. 
 The second specific support treatment is an NPR article recounting the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016). The 5-3 decision 
overturns a Texas law that makes it more difficult to receive an abortion. The topic of 
                                                             
5050 Samuel Alito’s nomination is the source of Gibson’s research and is much more contentious than 
anything Garland faced, since the Senate never debates Garland’s nomination.  
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abortion is perennially controversial, and the language in the article describes the 
decision as one that Democrats applaud and Republicans bemoan. However, as with the 
specific treatment about the controversial appointment, this is cast as a one-time 
occurrence that is not part of a larger pattern harmful to legitimacy. Citizens already 
perceive the courts as legitimate institutions, and that loyalty inoculates the court from 
much harm based on individual actions. Thus, I expect that the specific treatments have 
no influence on state supreme court legitimacy.  
 To recap, I argue that state supreme court legitimacy is partially conferred from 
perceptions of Supreme Court support among individuals with very low levels of 
knowledge about state supreme courts. I expect the only treatment to influence state 
supreme court legitimacy is the Negative Diffuse Treatment. If the results provide 
evidence in support of the theory, respondents with low levels of knowledge who receive 
the Negative Diffuse Treatment are likely to perceive their state supreme court as less 
legitimate than those who do not receive any treatment. I expect no other treatments have 
any influence on state supreme court legitimacy. 
Elections, Knowledge, and the Experimental Treatment  
 In the previous chapter, I provide evidence that many individuals appear to know 
little about their state supreme courts even as they show greater knowledge about the 
United States Supreme Court. Results like these are not unique to this study, as the levels 
of state high court knowledge results I find are similar to those found in other studies of 
state court legitimacy (Gibson 2012). In this chapter, I seek to answer how this state high 
court ignorance influences perceptions of the legitimacy of those judicial institutions. The 
rest of this chapter is a direct test of the hypothesis that respondents with lower levels of 
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state supreme court knowledge are more likely to rely on what they know and think about 
the United States Supreme Court as a cue when deciding whether they should confer 
legitimacy on state institutions of which they appear to be largely uninformed. I turn next 
to a description of the data I rely on for this test before analyzing the results. 
 I survey respondents on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.51 The model I use is similar 
to that in previous studies of court legitimacy. I rely on ordinary least squares regression 
analysis to measure various influences on a summated index of questions to assess a 
respondent’s loyalty to a court as the dependent variable. I follow the lead of previous 
scholars (Gibson 2012; Bartels and Johnson 2013) who provide a measure of judicial 
legitimacy that captures diffuse support rather than specific support. The dependent 
variable is a measure of loyalty to state supreme courts. Respondents receive the 
following statements to which they may strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree, or strongly disagree:52 
1. If the supreme court of my state started making a lot of decisions that most 
people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the supreme court of 
my state altogether.  
2. The supreme court of my state should be listened to, even if I disagree with 
the ruling.  
3. The right of my state supreme court to decide certain types of controversial 
issues should be reduced.  
4. The supreme court of my state can usually be trusted to make decisions that 
                                                             
51 I fully detail the data collection process in the theory chapter. 
52 Bolded text is in the survey instrument to emphasize that the statements are about state supreme courts 
and not the United States Supreme Court. 
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are right for the state as a whole.  
5. Judges of the supreme court of my state who routinely make decisions at odds 
with the majority of the people of my state should be removed from office.  
6. The supreme court of my state ought to be made less independent so that it 
listens a lot more to what the people want.  
7. There should be stronger controls in place to prevent the supreme court of my 
state from becoming involved in politics.  
8. The supreme court of my state gets too mixed up in politics.  
9. The supreme court of my state may have ideas about what the constitution 
means, but it is more important what the majority of the people think the 
constitution means.  
After removing question number four, which deals with trusting the court (see 
footnote), Common Factor Analysis reveals a unidimensional structure with an 
eigenvalue of 2.18.53 Given the unidimensional nature factor analysis reveals, I rely on 
the summated eight question index to measure institutional loyalty that serves as the 
dependent variable. The correlation between the factor score and summated index of 
eight questions without the trust question is .99.  
Some previous research on court legitimacy excludes the non-attentive public 
from analyses of judicial legitimacy (Gibson 2012; Gibson and Caldeira 2003). However, 
since I am specifically interested in the ways in which respondents overcome their 
                                                             
53 There is evidence the trust statement (statement 4) is capturing specific support rather than diffuse 
support. Since scholars are still debating whether to include it, I also include it in the survey. However, I 
drop this statement from the final analysis because the case against including it is strong. Notably, 
excluding the question from the index of support does not significantly alter the findings in any 
considerable way. See Gibson’s (2011) article for further explanation. 
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ignorance of state supreme courts and this is not a study of the influence of any specific 
campaign activities, I do not separate out the non-attentive public.54 I transform 
respondent answers to the dependent variable questions to account for reverse scoring 
and code their responses as either answering in support of their state supreme court or as 
not supportive.55 I then create a variable that adds the number of supportive responses for 
the eight statement set, excluding the trust statement.56 To make the analysis as simple 
and direct as possible, the dependent variable is the summated index of support for the 
eight statements.57 In other words, the variable is an index of the number of times each 
respondent supports the court. Next, I turn to the explanatory variables and what the 
theory indicates their influence might be.  
Treatment Variables 
 The primary independent variables that test the influence of the Supreme Court as 
a cue are the five treatment variables.58 Each respondent randomly receives one of the 
four treatments or no treatment. Two of the treatments attempt to trigger thoughts about 
diffuse support for the United States Supreme Court and cast it as worthy or unworthy of 
diffuse support. Those variables are labeled Positive Diffuse Support Treatment and 
Negative Diffuse Support Treatment. The other two treatments attempt to trigger 
thoughts of specific support for the United States Supreme Court, focusing either on a 
controversial decision about abortion or an ideological appointee to the Supreme Court. I 
                                                             
54 Further, while this was the custom for many years, scholars have recently moved away from reliance 
only on the attentive public (Zilis 2018; Gibson and Nelson 2016, 2015; Bartels and Johnston 2013; Gibson 
et al. 2011).  
55 Respondents who answer “neither agree nor disagree” in response to a dependent variable question are 
coded as not supportive. 
56 The eigenvalue of the second extracted factor is .50. 
57 I follow the custom in the literature and scale the dependent variable 0-1. 
58 The treatment language respondents receive is available in the appendix. 
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code the variables as 1 if the respondent receives the particular treatment, or lack of 
treatment, and 0 otherwise. I omit the no treatment variable from the analysis to serve as 
a baseline for comparison. I expect that the only treatment with a statistically significant 
influence is the Negative Diffuse Support Treatment variable among respondents with 
low levels of state supreme court knowledge in states that do not elect judges. 
Theoretically, I expect the election process to influence enough respondents so that, while 
they may not be able to answer knowledge questions, they are likely more familiar with 
their state supreme courts due to campaigns and elections. I expect the influence on the 
dependent variable to be negative. I expect that none of the treatments are significant 
among respondents with higher levels of state supreme court knowledge. 
Democratic Values 
 In previous research of judicial legitimacy, support for democratic values emerges 
as a strong predictor of court support. To measure support for democratic values, I 
include questions that measure political tolerance of minority opinions as well as support 
for the rule of law and liberty over order.59 I code each response as either supportive or 
not supportive of the particular value in question. In previous works using these types of 
variables, it is sometimes possible to construct a single variable of support for democratic 
values using a summated index of the responses. While factor analysis reveals a single 
factor with an eigenvalue of 1.24, not all of the variables load on it.60 The correlation 
between the summated index of democratic values and the factor score is .83. However, 
this is a closer approximation to a unidimensional result than index variables that seek to 
                                                             
59 See the appendix for the questions respondents receive about democratic values. The questions are 
borrowed from Gibson’s (2006) work on state supreme court legitimacy in Kentucky and are available in 
the index. 
60 The eigenvalue of the second factor is .64. 
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measure rule of law, liberty over order, and support for minority opinions separately. 
Among these individual index variables, no single factor emerges. Thus, while I cannot 
say with full reliability that the variable captures a single dimension, it is closer to doing 
so than the other variables, and I rely on it in the analysis. Since support for democratic 
values is usually a strong predictor of state court support, including this variable in the 
models makes them a more robust test of my theory. 
Court Knowledge and Education 
 Beyond democratic values, two additional variables are frequently influential in 
judicial legitimacy scholarship: education and knowledge of the courts.61 For this 
analysis, I separate out those who have no knowledge of state courts from those who have 
some knowledge. Respondents receive three questions about state supreme courts and 
four questions about the Supreme Court. I code them as answering the questions correctly 
or incorrectly.62 I add together the number of correct answers for each to create count 
variables of Supreme Court knowledge and state supreme court knowledge. For the test 
of my theory, I divide those who answer zero questions correctly about state supreme 
courts from those who answer one or more questions correctly.63,64 I code education from 
less than high school diploma to doctorate. This allows for an interpretation of a 
coefficient as a response to increasing education. I expect the democratic values variable 
as well as the education variable to report positive statistically significant coefficients. 
Additionally, I expect knowledge of the Supreme Court to have a positive and significant 
                                                             
61 Previous measures of court knowledge focus on basic facts about courts including the selection process 
for judges as well as term length. I follow suit in this study. 
62 Survey questions are available in the index. 
63 When I refer to citizens with low levels of knowledge about state supreme courts, I refer to those who 
answer zero factual questions correctly about those institutions. 
64 I divide the respondents here as close to the median as I can. Nearly 59% (N= 397 out of 673) of 
respondents answer zero knowledge questions about their state supreme court correctly.  
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influence among citizens with low knowledge about their state supreme court. 
Measures of Partisanship 
 The scholarly debate about the influence of partisanship and ideology on judicial 
legitimacy generally shows that these factors do not influence judicial legitimacy.65 
However, I include them in this analysis to see if there are any unexpected partisan 
influences. I code party as 1 for Democrats, 2 for Independents, and 3 for Republicans so 
that any change in the regression coefficients results from respondents becoming more 
Republican. I follow this logic as I code ideology as well so that any coefficient result 
indicates movement as respondents shift from very liberal to very conservative. 
Additionally, the survey results come from December of 2016 and January of 2017. 
Given that time frame, I include feeling thermometers about President Obama and, at the 
time, President-elect Trump. I ask respondents to rank how warmly they feel about either 
person on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is very cold and 100 is very warm. Since my study 
focuses on those with the least amount of state supreme court knowledge, I include these 
thermometer variables because they are less abstract than partisanship or ideology and 
may reveal an unexpected influence of partisanship on support for state supreme courts. 
Demographic Variables 
 I include the demographic variables of age, gender, and race. I code the age 
variable categorically in roughly 10-year age ranges from 18 and above.66 I code gender 
as 0 for male and 1 for female and label the variable Woman. I include a dummy variable 
                                                             
65 See Bartels and Johnson (2013) for evidence that partisanship does play a role. However, much 
additional scholarship does not support their finding (Gibson and Nelson 2017; Gibson 2012; Gibson 
2008). 
66 The original survey instrument includes a category for “younger than 18” as a way to reject respondents 
who do not meet the official criteria. While there are zero respondents in the age category of “younger than 
18,” I leave it in the data because it was in the original survey instrument. 
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for white respondents. The baseline for comparison of race are non-white respondents. 
This is primarily because of the very small N of some racial minorities once the sample is 
subset into different categories. I do not expect the demographic variables to influence 
support for state supreme courts in this model. I include a brief description of the 
explanatory variables in Table 4.1. 
Testing the Supreme Court Cue and Negative Supreme Court Cue Hypotheses 
 The primary question this dissertation seeks to address is whether citizens rely on 
what they think and feel about the Supreme Court as a cue to inform how they feel about 
state supreme courts when they lack knowledge of those state institutions. Using data 
based on vignettes embedded in an experimental survey, I offer two tests of my theory. 
First, I conduct a multivariate analysis of all survey respondents. I find evidence of the 
Supreme Court as a cue in the full model and then subset respondents in the multivariate 
analysis between those who answer zero questions about their state supreme court 
correctly and those that answer one or more questions correctly. Both tests reveal 
evidence that respondents with low levels of knowledge appear to rely on the Supreme 
Court as a cue to inform what they think about state supreme courts. Further, this 
heuristic effect has the potential to negatively influence state high court legitimacy. 
Multivariate Analysis of the Full Model 
 I begin by pointing out the first four rows of the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression results that represent the treatment variables in Table 4.2. Among all 
respondents, the only treatment variable with a statistically significant influence on state 
supreme court legitimacy is the Negative Diffuse Support Treatment variable, shaded in 
dark gray. The results are in line with what my theory predicts. The Positive Diffuse 
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Support Treatment variable does not appear to influence state supreme court legitimacy 
for respondents, nor do the two specific support treatments that invoke an ideological 
appointee or a controversial court decision. Further, the influence of the Negative Diffuse 
Support Treatment variable is stronger than any other significant predictor of state 
supreme court legitimacy. The Negative Diffuse Support Treatment is not only a strong 
predictor of state supreme court legitimacy in this model, but it is also negative. This 
indicates that, in comparison to respondents who do not receive a treatment, those who 
receive the Negative Diffuse Support Treatment are less likely to confer legitimacy on 
state supreme courts than their counterparts who never received a treatment. 
 The knowledge variables also indicates somewhat indirect support for my theory. 
The Supreme Court Knowledge variable is significant and positive, indicating that 
respondents who know more about the Supreme Court are more likely to confer 
legitimacy on state supreme courts. However, state supreme court knowledge is not a 
significant predictor of state high court legitimacy. These results are supporting evidence 
that knowledge of the Supreme Court influences state supreme court legitimacy and does 
so in a way that enhances state high court legitimacy. The results from the Supreme Court 
Knowledge variable and the Negative Diffuse Support Treatment variable provide some 
support for the Supreme Court Cue Hypothesis. While not isolated only among 
respondents with low levels of state supreme court knowledge, this model does show 
evidence that the Supreme Court may be acting as a heuristic to guide support for state 
supreme courts for respondents. 
 As is common in studies of judicial legitimacy, support for democratic values is a 
significant and positive predictor of state supreme court legitimacy. Given the scholarship 
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that shows how closely Americans link ideas of democratic values and the courts, this is 
not surprising. Along the same lines, greater education is a positive predictor of state 
supreme court legitimacy, and so is age. Given that higher levels of education may tend 
to come with more exposure to and knowledge of democratic government, it makes sense 
that this also reaps positive benefits for state supreme court legitimacy. Age is a slightly 
unexpected significant predictor. I have no reason theoretically to expect age to influence 
state supreme court legitimacy. It may be possible that age is acting here as an imperfect 
proxy for greater political knowledge acquired over time as respondents live and 
experience governments and courts.  However, absent further data for support, I cannot 
claim this with any degree of certainty. 
 None of the variables measuring partisanship or ideology are significant 
predictors of court support, as I expect. Additionally, while the variable measuring race 
does not report a significant coefficient, the variable measuring gender does. In the full 
model of all respondents, women are less likely than men to confer legitimacy upon state 
supreme courts. Similar to the age result, this result is unexpected. Given the results in 
the previous chapter detailing the demographics of the survey respondents, there is no 
reason to expect that women might perceive of their state supreme court as less legitimate 
than men who take the survey. While this table does not provide enough evidence to 
determine why this result exists, the upcoming models do helps illuminate this result a 
bit. 
Multivariate Analysis of Respondents Subset by State Supreme Court Knowledge Levels 
 In Table 4.3, I subset respondents by their level of state supreme court knowledge. 
The first column reports the OLS results among respondents who answer zero knowledge 
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questions about their state supreme courts correctly. The second column reports the OLS 
results among respondents who answer one or more knowledge questions correctly. I call 
your attention to the shaded cells in Table 4.3. The predicted null results are highlighted 
in light gray, and the hypothesized negative result is highlighted in dark gray. Subsetting 
respondents by knowledge reveals further evidence in support of my theory. Respondents 
in the first column who answer zero questions about their state supreme court correctly 
and receive the Negative Diffuse Support Treatment are less likely to confer legitimacy 
on their state high courts than their counterparts who do not receive a treatment. Among 
respondents in the second column who answer one or more state high court knowledge 
questions correctly, the Negative Diffuse Support Treatment variable is not a significant 
predictor. Further, Supreme Court knowledge is a significant and positive predictor of 
state supreme court legitimacy among respondents with low levels of state supreme court 
knowledge. Among respondents with higher levels of state supreme court knowledge, the 
influence of the Supreme Court disappears. These results are the strongest yet in support 
of the Supreme Court Cue and the Negative Supreme Court Cue hypotheses for this 
chapter.  
 The rest of the results from these subset models are generally in line with 
expectations. Support for democratic values is a positive predictor in both models, 
although the coefficient is twice as large for respondents with higher levels of state 
supreme court knowledge. It may be that this result reflects greater familiarity with 
democratic norms and values that come with greater knowledge of state high court 
institutions specifically and other institutions more broadly, and with this, an 
understanding of how those norms work in support of the courts. Education is a 
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significant and positive predictor of state supreme court legitimacy for both subset 
models, as expected. This is further evidence that greater educational attainment may be a 
net positive for judicial legitimacy at the state level, even among respondents who know 
very little about those institutions. The results in total support previous scholarly findings 
that support for democratic values and greater educational attainment are closely linked 
with support for judicial legitimacy. 
 The results measuring partisanship and ideology are similar to those in the full 
model where none of the coefficients are statistically significant. These results across the 
three models in this chapter support scholarly thought that courts exist in the minds of 
Americans as institutions separate from partisanship and ideology. That the influence of 
partisanship and ideology is so nonexistent in these results is interesting particularly 
because respondents took the survey in December 2016 and January 2017, when partisan 
politics in the United States was particularly fraught and divisive. While not a direct test 
of the influence of partisanship on state court support, this does provide some evidence 
that, in increasingly politically polarized times, ideology and partisanship are not factors 
in state supreme court legitimacy among respondents of this survey. 
 Among the demographic variables, age is a significant and positive predictor in 
both subset models, while race does not report a significant coefficient. This indicates 
that white respondents are not more or less likely to confer legitimacy on their state 
supreme courts than their counterpart respondents who do not identify as white. The 
gender variable does produce an interesting result that provides a bit more insight to the 
result for the Woman variable I report in the full model. The Woman variable is not a 
significant predictor of state supreme court legitimacy among respondents who answer 
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zero state supreme court knowledge questions correctly. However, among respondents 
who answer one or more state supreme court questions correctly, gender is a significant 
and negative influence on state high court legitimacy. Among these respondents with 
higher state high court knowledge, women are less likely than men to confer legitimacy 
on their state supreme courts. Additionally, the coefficient is the highest significant result 
in that model, indicating this influence is particularly strong in comparison to the other 
explanatory variables. While it is useful to more closely isolate the influence of gender on 
state supreme court legitimacy among survey respondents with greater state supreme 
court knowledge, this does not provide significant information from which to provide an 
adequate interpretation. However, the following chapter that tests the Elected Judge 
Hypothesis will provide more context for this influence. 
Discussion 
  The results in the full model and the model subset by levels of knowledge are 
evidence in support of the Supreme Court Cue Hypothesis and the Negative Supreme 
Court Cue Hypothesis. If state supreme courts exist in the minds of respondents with low 
state high court knowledge as independent institutions for the purposes of conferring 
legitimacy, the United States Supreme Court should not influence state supreme court 
legitimacy. However, these results provide strong evidence that respondents with low 
levels of state supreme court knowledge rely on the United States Supreme Court to help 
inform their opinions about state supreme court legitimacy.  
 Similar to previous findings, education and support for democratic values are 
positive predictors of state supreme court knowledge across the models. Further, 
knowledge of the Supreme Court is a positive predictor of state supreme court legitimacy, 
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both in the full model and among respondents with low levels of state supreme court 
knowledge. I offer a slight variation on a well-worn saying in the judicial legitimacy 
literature: to know the Supreme Court is to love your state supreme court if you are 
ignorant of that institution. These results help to situate this study within what scholars 
understand about state supreme court legitimacy. The same factors that influence judicial 
legitimacy in other studies are present in these results, but here I illuminate a process that 
previous scholars pay less attention to: testing the influence of respondent ignorance of 
state high courts reveals evidence of a reliance on the Supreme Court as a heuristic when 
conferring legitimacy. This result helps to deepen and complicate our understanding of 
judicial legitimacy. 
 The potential implications include that, for many people, the lack of knowledge of 
state supreme courts makes those institutions potentially vulnerable to the behavior of 
other institutions the share no direct association with. Respondents with low levels of 
knowledge appear particularly susceptible to charges that detail behavior by the Supreme 
Court as overtly politicized. In the Negative Diffuse Support Treatment, I call into 
question the legitimacy of the Supreme Court which, in turn, negatively influences state 
supreme court legitimacy. This finding indicates the potential for trouble, given the 
heightened state of partisanship at the federal level and the broad degree of respondent 
ignorance concerning state supreme courts. However, the specific support treatments did 
not cast a significant influence on state supreme court legitimacy, indicating that one-
time politicized events may not necessarily be harmful to lower institutions. 
Expanding concerns about judicial legitimacy to the limit, in the event that the 
Supreme Court loses diffuse support among the broader population, state supreme courts 
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are not automatically safe among those who know next to nothing about those state 
institutions. While this outcome is admittedly unlikely, it is important to contemplate a 
situation where the Supreme Court loses legitimacy and the effect cascades through the 
rest of the judicial system.67 This may point to a simultaneous strength and weakness 
particular to the American judicial system. Legitimacy of the courts in the minds of many 
may be a product of the highest federal court, which is a strength because of the quality 
of the justices and their awareness of the importance of maintaining diffuse support. At 
the same time, those strengths exist in individuals that make up the institutions, not the 
institution itself, and that positive influence remains only so long as the justices continue 
to make it so through their behavior and judicial decisions.  
Additionally, ignorance of state supreme courts may be both a blessing and a 
curse. Many respondents were shown to be ignorant of state supreme courts and probably 
are not aware of most actions taken by their state supreme courts. As a positive for courts, 
this may reduce the likelihood that any series of actions or decisions might harm their 
legitimacy. People cannot be upset about events they do not know are occurring. 
However, to overcome this ignorance, many citizens are shown to rely on what they 
know and feel about the Supreme Court, which puts the legitimacy of state high courts in 
the hands of a higher institution over which they have no control. This is positive so long 
as perceptions of Supreme Court legitimacy are high and controversial decisions by the 
state courts do not receive wide attention. If either perception or attention change, this 
research has shown how the well of support among respondents with low state high court 
knowledge is susceptible to changes occurring at the Supreme Court level. Additionally, 
                                                             
67 It is growing in importance to consider this as more politicians in the United States, including President 
Trump, appear willing to cast aspersions on the court that may harm institutional legitimacy. 
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this ignorance may make state high courts susceptible to court curbing by legislatures and 
governors—a situation citizens likely would not tolerate if it were done to the Supreme 
Court by congress and/or the president.  
Given these potential concerns, it is important to point out that, for now, state 
supreme courts appear to continue operating outside of some of the more partisan 
pressures the United States is experiencing. Across the models, none of the partisanship 
or ideology measures influence state supreme court legitimacy. While these are not 
definitive findings on the influence of partisanship and ideology on the courts in the 
United States, they provide additional support for earlier scholarly evidence that courts 
are seen as different government actors from executives and legislators, and, thus, they 
are insulated from some of the politics in which those actors engage. On the other hand, 
state supreme court selection methods are varied, and they add an additional wrinkle to 
our understanding of state supreme court legitimacy. Elections in particular offer the 
potential to enhance and detract from judicial legitimacy, but to date scholars have not 
explored this within the context of low levels of institutional knowledge. In the next 
chapter, I explore respondent knowledge of state supreme courts within the context of 
states that elect high court judges and those that do not to observe how elections 
influence judicial legitimacy. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptions of the Variables Used in the Chapter Models 
Model Variables 
Explanatory Variable Variable Description 
Positive Diffuse Support 
Treatment 
1 if they receive this treatment, 0 if otherwise 
Negative Diffuse Support 
Treatment 
1 if they receive this treatment, 0 if otherwise 
Ideological Appointee Treatment 1 if they receive this treatment, 0 if otherwise 
Controversial Decision Treatment 1 if they receive this treatment, 0 if otherwise 
Support for Democratic Values Index of supportive answers to questions gauging 
support for democratic values  
Supreme Court Knowledge Number of questions respondent answers correctly 
about the United States Supreme Court 
State Supreme Court Knowledge Number of questions respondent answers correctly 
about their state supreme court 
Education 1 if no high school diploma 
2 if high school graduate 
3 if some college 
4 if trade/technical/vocational training 
5 if associate’s degree 
6 if bachelor’s degree 
7 if master’s degree 
8 if professional degree 
9 if doctoral degree 
Ideology 1 if very liberal 
2 if somewhat liberal 
3 if moderate 
4 if somewhat conservative 
5 if very conservative 
Political Party 1 if Democrat 
2 if Independent/Other 
3 if Republican 
Obama Support Thermometer 0-100 scale of support where 0 is coldest and 100 is 
warmest 
Trump Support Thermometer 0-100 scale of support where 0 is coldest and 100 is 
warmest 
Woman 0 if male 
1 if female 
Age 1 if <18 
2 if 18-29 
3 if 30-39 
4 if 40-49 
5 if 50-59 
6 if 60 and up 
White 0 if they report another race 
1 if the respondent is white 
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Table 4.2: Results of the Full Model 
Full Model 
Explanatory Variable  
Positive Diffuse Support Treatment 0.0107 
(0.0318) 
Negative Diffuse Support Treatment -0.0806* 
(0.0301) 
Ideological Appointee Treatment -0.0336 
(0.0304) 
Controversial Decision Treatment -0.0060 
(0.0320) 
Support for Democratic Values 0.0488* 
(0.0063) 
Supreme Court Knowledge 0.0457* 
(0.0124) 
State Supreme Court Knowledge -0.0084 
(0.0154) 
Education 0.0297* 
(0.0056) 
Ideology -0.0110 
(0.0129) 
Political Party 0.0173 
(0.0196) 
Obama Support Thermometer 0.0007 
(0.0005) 
Trump Support Thermometer 0.0005 
(0.0005) 
Woman -0.0487* 
(0.0200) 
Age 0.0289* 
(0.0091) 
White 0.0101 
(0.0256) 
Constant -0.1730* 
(0.0718) 
N 673 
R-squared 0.226 
* p<0.05 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses. I predict a connection 
between the Supreme Court acting as a heuristic to inform state court legitimacy. 
Hypothesized null results are highlighted in light gray, while the hypothesized negative 
result is highlighted in dark gray. 
 103 
Table 4.3: Results of the Full Model Subset by Respondent Knowledge 
Model Subset by Respondent Knowledge 
Explanatory Variable Respondents with Low State 
Supreme Court Knowledge 
Respondents with Higher 
State Supreme Court 
Knowledge 
Positive Diffuse 
Support Treatment 
0.0106 
(0.0439) 
-0.0064 
(0.0499) 
Negative Diffuse 
Support Treatment 
-0.0763* 
(0.0378) 
-0.0956 
(0.0518) 
Ideological Appointee 
Treatment 
-0.0030 
(0.0381) 
-0.0871 
(0.0515) 
Controversial Decision 
Treatment 
0.0253 
(0.0405) 
-0.0762 
(0.0545) 
Support for Democratic 
Values 
0.0322* 
(0.0086) 
0.0688* 
(0.0090) 
Supreme Court 
Knowledge 
0.0629* 
(0.0177) 
0.0240 
(0.0179) 
Education 0.0344* 
(0.0076) 
0.0262* 
(0.00863) 
Ideology 0.0036 
(0.0187) 
-0.0292 
(0.0183) 
Political Party -0.0020 
(0.0259) 
0.0368 
(0.0310) 
Obama Support 
Thermometer 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
0.0007 
(0.0007) 
Trump Support 
Thermometer 
0.0002 
(0.0007) 
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
Woman -0.0253 
(0.0266) 
-0.0786* 
(0.0310) 
Age 0.0307* 
(0.0124) 
0.0241* 
(0.0140) 
White 0.0207 
(0.0356) 
0.0022 
(0.0365) 
Constant -0.173* 
(0.100) 
-0.129 
(0.109) 
N 397 276 
R-Squared 0.212 0.280 
* p<0.05 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses. I predict a connection 
between the Supreme Court acting as a heuristic to inform state court legitimacy. 
Hypothesized null results are highlighted in light gray, while the hypothesized negative 
result is highlighted in dark gray. 
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CHAPTER 5 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, INDIVIDUAL IGNORANCE, AND STATE 
SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY
Thus far, this dissertation explores state supreme court legitimacy without directly 
testing the influence of elections on judicial support. The diverse selection methods used 
by the 50 American states is the focal point of scholarly debate concerning the influence 
of elections on state court legitimacy.68 Broadly speaking, there are two schools of 
thought. Some legal thinkers outside of political science focus on the potential problems 
with electing judges: namely, the increase in possibility of corruption and, absent that, the 
perception of corruption by citizens. No less a legal mind than former Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor fights against what she sees as the scourge of judicial 
elections done poorly (O’Connor 2010). She argues, in part: 
Each state has its own method of choosing judges, from lifetime appointments to 
partisan elections. But judges with a lifetime appointment are not accountable to 
voters. And elected judges are susceptible to influence by political or ideological 
constituencies.  
A better system is one that strikes a balance between lifetime appointment and 
partisan election by providing for the open, public nomination and appointment of 
judges, followed in due course by a standardized judicial performance evaluation 
and, finally, a yes/no vote in which citizens either approve the judge or vote him 
out. This kind of merit selection system—now used in some form in two-thirds of 
                                                             
68 I follow the lead of other judicial scholars and use diffuse support, judicial legitimacy, institutional 
loyalty, and institutional support interchangeably. See Gibson 2012, 183. 
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states—protects the impartiality of the judiciary without sacrificing 
accountability… 
State courts resolve the most important legal matters in our lives, including child 
custody cases, settlement of estates, business-contract disputes, traffic offenses, 
drunken-driving charges, most criminal offenses and most foreclosures. More 
than 100 million cases are filed in state courts each year.  
When you enter one of these courtrooms, the last thing you want to worry about is 
whether the judge is more accountable to a campaign contributor or an ideological 
group than to the law.  
In our system, the judiciary, unlike the legislative and the executive branches, is 
supposed to answer only to the law and the Constitution. Courts are supposed to 
be the one safe place where every citizen can receive a fair hearing (O’Connor 
2010). 
 O’Connor’s argument is one that drives to the very heart of judicial legitimacy. 
The judicial scholarship indicates that the unique status judges hold in the minds of the 
public contributes mightily to judicial legitimacy. However, elections and their associated 
campaigns include the potential for behavior that might call judicial fairness into 
question. However, political science scholarship reveals that while there are certain risks 
to holding judicial elections, broadly speaking, they allow for greater legitimacy because 
citizens appreciate access to voting as an accountability tool. Rather than hurting 
legitimacy, scholars find evidence that, even in states with elections performed outside of 
a merit system model that O’Connor references, elections possess the capacity to enhance 
judicial legitimacy. However, this debate, and the literature that engages with it, overlook 
the primary element of judicial legitimacy this dissertation seeks to explore: the 
enormous dearth of knowledge among citizens about state supreme courts.  
In this dissertation, I argue that the study of state court legitimacy is incomplete 
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without more direct accounting for judicial ignorance among the public. Elections serve 
to muddle this accounting. In the previous chapters, I theorize and provide evidence that 
shows respondents with low levels of knowledge about their state supreme court are more 
likely to rely on the United States Supreme Court as a cue. This cue acts as a guide about 
whether they should confer legitimacy on state high courts about which they are far less 
knowledgeable. However, elections act in part as exercises in educating voters about both 
the candidates and the offices those candidates seek through campaigns. This campaign-
education process may influence respondents who otherwise fail to answer any state 
supreme court knowledge question correctly in my survey. Campaigns and the 
accompanying educational benefits may help some respondents with low knowledge of 
state supreme courts to distinguish their state high court from the United States Supreme 
Court as well as provide enough information to confer legitimacy on their state high court 
independent of their thoughts about the Supreme Court. To test the influence of elections 
in this chapter, I develop and test a theory of state supreme court legitimacy that builds 
on the evidence from the previous chapters and tests the degree to which respondents 
living in a state with a recent high court election may differ from their counterparts in 
states without a recent election. First, I turn to the literature on judicial elections and the 
lack of attention to date on the widespread dearth of knowledge citizens and voters 
possess about their state supreme courts. 
State Supreme Court Elections 
 Much of the scholarly work on state supreme court elections and legitimacy seeks 
to understand whether the influence of elections on state supreme court legitimacy is 
harmful, helpful, or non-existent. In particular, campaign advertising receives much 
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attention, particularly because this behavior falls so far outside of the norm of typical 
judicial behavior. Gibson (2012) reports that elections in Kentucky reinforce the 
legitimacy of the court, but campaign ads that respondents find objectionable are harmful 
to court support.69 Pennsylvania elections reveal a similar story, where politicized ads, 
whether traditional or strong attack ads, harm legitimacy even within the context of the 
legitimacy-enhancing influence of the election (Gibson et al. 2011). Bonneau, Hall, and 
Streb (2011b) find a similar results in their study of the influence of Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White (2002) on judicial elections, finding that the loosening of campaign 
restrictions on judicial candidates does not negatively influence judicial support. 
 However, Gibson and Caldeira (2012) report that, in West Virginia, campaign 
contributions have the potential to harm legitimacy, depending on the source of the funds, 
even if the candidate later rejects the contribution. Taking a broader approach, in a study 
done with a national survey, Gibson finds campaign contributions to be harmful to 
judicial legitimacy while politicized attack ads and discussions of policy were not (2009). 
These findings indicate a complex set of factors that influences state supreme court 
legitimacy when the high court judges are selected by elections. While these studies do 
much to inform how legitimacy and elections interact, much of the literature on judicial 
elections does not focus as much on how the process of campaigning and voting 
influence legitimacy.  
 Rather, much of the judicial election scholarship focuses more on the mechanics 
of judicial elections, with a focus on campaign finance and success or failure of 
                                                             
69 These may include ads that Gibson characterizes as negative, partisan, or unfair. On the whole, Gibson 
finds that, in Kentucky, the positive influence of elections outweighs the negative influence of these types 
of ads. 
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incumbents. State supreme court elections attract more challengers and donations than in 
the past (Bonneau 2004), not unlike rising contribution levels to other types of campaigns 
over time. This increase in financial contributions has led some states to increase 
regulations of judicial elections, though some of these attempts at regulation do not 
always work as intended. Bonneau and Cann (2011a) find that campaign spending limits 
intended to support the courts by limiting the ability of candidates to behave in ways 
similar to other politicized actors also serves to limit the success of candidates who 
challenge incumbent judges. Elections appear to aid judicial legitimacy by providing a 
tool for citizens to hold judges accountable, but if elections are not competitive, they may 
act as a counternarrative in the minds of the public.  
 Scholars find that the amount of campaign spending is also a factor of electoral 
and judicial context (Bonneau 2005b), judicial candidates raise money in ways similar to 
other electoral actors (Bonneau 2007), challenger success as a percentage of the vote is 
partially a result of how much money they can raise (Bonneau 2007), and this spending 
has the capacity to increase turnout among the electorate (Hall and Bonneau 2008). 
Further, the evidence indicates that negative ads increase voter participation in elections, 
a “striking” similarity to other non-judicial state elections (Hall and Bonneau 2013, 115). 
Much of this work indicates that judges are engaging in some degree of risky electoral 
behavior if they desire to maintain judicial legitimacy. In particular, the findings that 
money is so closely tied to electoral success and that candidates raise money in similar 
ways to other actors indicate a troubling potential for scandals that may harm legitimacy, 
even as the election and voting process boosts support for courts. This potentially harmful 
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similarity between judicial and other more traditionally politicized non-judicial 
campaigns is well-documented. 
 Much of literature illuminating similarities between judicial and non-judicial 
elections focuses on the success or failure of incumbent judges. Competition for 
incumbents and challengers is predictable based upon several factors including whether 
this is the judge’s first term, the salary, the length of term, the pool of attorneys in the 
state, and partisan competition. The presence of any of these indicators increase the 
likelihood of a challenge (Bonneau and Hall 2003). Incumbent defeats are also 
predictable, due in large part to the quality of challengers with more experience and 
greater qualifications (Hall and Bonneau 2006b) as well as the institutional rules 
governing selection process and the electoral context found in any given state (Bonneau 
2005a). Candidate experience is important in open elections as well, as are the 
institutional rules governing selection and the state’s electoral environment broadly 
(Bonneau 2006). 70  
 More specifically, partisan elections do a better job at increasing voter attention 
and turnout than nonpartisan elections (Hall 2007b), and voters will look for other party 
cues if the election is nonpartisan so they may make what they perceive as an informed 
decision (Bonneau and Cann 2015).71 Additionally, judges who compete in an election 
are aware of the realities this process requires and that greater fundraising increases 
attention and voter turnout (Brace and Boyea 2008). Further, an incumbent judge is more 
likely to vote in ways that are more closely aligned with their constituents as an election 
                                                             
70 An open election in this context is referring to a race for an office without an incumbent. 
71 The media relies on this as well. In the 2016 North Carolina non-partisan state supreme court election, 
the News and Observer headline the day after the election read “Mike Morgan’s rare big win for Democrats 
tilts party balance on NC Supreme Court” (Blythe and Bonner 2016). 
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approaches, even if the judge’s personal preferences and previous voting record diverge 
from the preferences of voters (Hall 1992). Given that much of the legitimacy literature 
indicates that a primary source of court support is the difference people maintain in their 
minds separating the courts from other politicized institutions, the findings in this 
literature point to some potential for trouble. However, taken as a whole, this scholarship 
indicates that judicial elections increase attention from voters. It follows that, at least 
during the campaign season, voters are more likely to possess greater knowledge of their 
state supreme courts, relative to their counterparts in states without elections. Given that, 
the increase in knowledge should appear in a survey of voters and non-voters alike when 
comparing states with judicial elections to states without judicial elections.  
 The scholarship on judicial elections largely focuses on campaigns, fundraising, 
and incumbent versus challenger dynamics, with a comparatively smaller focus on the 
influence of these factors on judicial legitimacy. Even in the studies of judicial elections 
that specifically examine judicial legitimacy, however, I argue that scholars fail to 
adequately address an important element of state supreme court elections and judges. 
These studies do good work examining the mechanics of judicial elections broadly and 
the influence of campaign activities on judicial elections specifically. However, to fully 
understand the influence of judicial elections on the court’s legitimacy, I argue that it is 
necessary to develop a better understanding of the ways in which citizen ignorance 
interacts with judicial elections and campaigns. In previous chapters of this dissertation, I 
present evidence that knowledge of state supreme courts is quite low across a wide 
variety of demographic measures. Additionally, respondents with low state high court 
knowledge rely on the Supreme Court to act as a cue that informs whether they extend 
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legitimacy to their state supreme court. However, up until this point, this dissertation does 
not address how elections influence citizen knowledge. To more directly test how lack of 
state high court knowledge interacts with elections for the purposes of conferring judicial 
legitimacy, I return to the Elected Judge Hypothesis I detailed at greater length in the 
theory chapter: 
Elected Judge Hypothesis: Citizens in states that elect judges are more likely to 
have knowledge of their state supreme court and thus less likely to rely on the 
Supreme Court as a cue for conferring legitimacy on state supreme courts than 
citizens in states that do not elect judges. 
With this hypothesis, I am interested in two primary questions. The first is 
whether respondents in the survey living in states with judicial elections know more 
about their state supreme courts than those living in states without judicial elections. The 
evidence I provide in Chapter Three indicates fairly widespread ignorance of state 
supreme courts across demographic variables. However, the influence of elections and 
campaigns on citizen knowledge is mixed. Scholars find that campaigns and associated 
media increase citizen knowledge (Chaffee and Frank 1996; Zhao and Chaffee 1995), 
although this knowledge is imperfect (Koch 2008). Direct media by campaigns is not as 
successful as traditional media at improving knowledge, but it may improve participation 
(Dimitrova et al. 2014). The survey for this project is in the field in December 2016 and 
January 2017, providing a useful way to test the first clause of this hypothesis by testing 
states with a recent election versus those without one.  
 However, given the lack of knowledge citizens possess about their state supreme 
courts, merely living in a state that elects judges may not improve citizen knowledge 
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absent a campaign to learn and reinforce what people know. The survey also makes it 
possible to test states that recently held an election in 2016 versus those that did not. The 
second clause of the hypothesis focuses on the larger scope of this dissertation and the 
role the Supreme Court plays. I find evidence that the Supreme Court does act as a cue, 
broadly speaking, among the respondents in the full survey with low levels of knowledge. 
In this chapter, I seek to answer whether elections act in a way that alters this reliance on 
the Supreme Court as a heuristic for those respondents with lower levels of court 
knowledge. I turn next to the test of the Elected Judge Hypothesis using the survey data I 
collected. 
The Interplay of Knowledge, Elections, and State Supreme Court Legitimacy 
 Since my survey is in the field in the months immediately following the 2016 
presidential election, this provides an opportunity to examine the influence of elections 
on knowledge. Respondents are subset based on whether they live in a state that held an 
election in November of 2016. Ideally, a pre- and post-election survey would illuminate 
how elections influence knowledge more directly. However, absent that data, I anticipate 
the influence of elections is stronger in states with a recent election, given the temporal 
proximity to an election and the educational benefits that entails. Recall that respondents 
answer three questions about their state courts. I compiled a count variable of the number 
of questions survey takers answer correctly. Comparing levels of knowledge among 
respondents subset by the election categories I describe provides the data to answer the 
first clause of the hypothesis.  
 In an earlier chapter, I briefly discuss levels of knowledge about state supreme 
courts. As I report extensively in that chapter, on the whole, correct answers about state 
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supreme courts are quite a bit lower than for the United States Supreme Court among 
survey respondents. In this chapter, I seek to move beyond these more generalized data 
and focus in on differences that arise between states based on whether they elect judges 
or not. I begin this analysis with the data in Table 5.1, where I divide respondents 
between those who live in a state with a state supreme court election in November 2016 
and those that do not.72  
Here, a clear distinction emerges between the two categories. Among respondents 
living in states with a state supreme court election in November of 2016, 53% fail to 
answer even one question correctly versus 65% of respondents living in states that did not 
have a state high court election at that time. To put that in simpler terms, nearly half of 
respondents in states with a supreme court election in November of 2016 fail to answer at 
least one knowledge question correctly compared to more than two-thirds among 
respondents in states without high court elections at the same time. This difference 
primarily occurs among respondents who answer at least one out of three questions 
correctly. The difference in knowledge extends further to those respondents who answer 
at least one question correctly. Here, 35% of respondents living in a state with a state 
high court election in November 2016 answer one question correctly versus only 23% 
among their counterparts in other states. The results among respondents who answer two 
or three out of three questions correctly are similar across the two categories.  
These results at the crosstab level provide supporting evidence for my hypothesis 
that citizens living in a state with a recent high court election are likely to know more 
about their state supreme courts than their counterparts in states without a recent election. 
                                                             
72 This includes partisan, nonpartisan, and recall elections held alongside the presidential election in 
November of 2016. 
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Based on this data, elections may increase respondent knowledge, at the very least, for 
some time after the election concludes. These results are supporting evidence for the first 
clause of my hypothesis in this chapter: citizens living in states with judicial elections 
appear more likely than those in states without elections to know more about their state 
supreme courts, based on how frequently respondents correctly answer factual questions 
about those courts. I turn next to the second clause of the hypothesis to seek evidence that 
respondents in states that elect judges are less likely to rely on the United States Supreme 
Court as a cue than are their counterparts in other states.  
Elections, Knowledge, and the Experimental Treatment  
 In the previous chapter, I test the primary hypothesis of my theory in this 
dissertation: that respondents rely at least partially on their support for the Supreme Court 
to inform their support for state supreme courts about which they are less knowledgeable. 
The evidence in that chapter indicates that some respondents do, at least in part, lean on 
their support for the Supreme Court to fill the knowledge gaps they have about their state 
supreme courts. However, as I indicate in this chapter, elections play an influential role in 
state court knowledge. The rest of this chapter is a direct test of the hypothesis that 
respondents in states with elections are likely to know more about their state supreme 
courts and thus less likely to rely on the Supreme Court as a cue. Citizens in states with 
recent judicial elections do appear to know more about their state supreme courts than 
their counterparts in states without an election in November of 2016. While the difference 
is not dramatic, it may indicate that there is greater awareness of state supreme courts in 
those states with recent elections, and that awareness may spread even to respondents 
who answer zero questions correctly. I turn next to a description of the data I rely on for 
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this test before turning to the results. 
 I survey respondents on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.73 The model I use is similar 
to that in previous studies of court legitimacy. I rely on ordinary least squares regression 
analysis to measure various influences on a summated index of questions to assess a 
respondent’s loyalty to a court as the dependent variable. I follow the lead of previous 
scholars (Bartels and Johnston 2013; Gibson 2012) who provide a measure of judicial 
legitimacy that captures diffuse support rather than specific support. The dependent 
variable is a measure of loyalty to state supreme courts. Respondents receive the 
following statements to which they may strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree, or strongly disagree:74 
1. If the supreme court of my state started making a lot of decisions that most 
people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the supreme court of 
my state altogether.  
2. The supreme court of my state should be listened to, even if I disagree with 
the ruling.  
3. The right of my state supreme court to decide certain types of controversial 
issues should be reduced.  
4. The supreme court of my state can usually be trusted to make decisions that 
are right for the state as a whole.  
5. Judges of the supreme court of my state who routinely make decisions at odds 
with the majority of the people of my state should be removed from office.  
6. The supreme court of my state ought to be made less independent so that it 
listens a lot more to what the people want.  
7. There should be stronger controls in place to prevent the supreme court of my 
state from becoming involved in politics.  
8. The supreme court of my state gets too mixed up in politics.  
9. The supreme court of my state may have ideas about what the constitution 
means, but it is more important what the majority of the people think the 
constitution means.  
After removing question number four, which deals with trusting the court (see 
                                                             
73 I fully detail the data collection process in the theory chapter. 
74 Bolded text is in the survey instrument to emphasize that the statements are about state supreme courts 
and not the United States Supreme Court. 
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footnote), Common Factor Analysis reveals a unidimensional structure with an 
eigenvalue of 2.18.75,76 Given the unidimensional nature factor analysis reveals, I rely on 
the summated eight question index to measure institutional loyalty that serves as the 
dependent variable. The correlation between the factor score and summated index of 
eight questions without the trust question is .99.  
Some previous research on court legitimacy excludes the non-attentive public 
from analyses of judicial legitimacy (Gibson 2012; Gibson and Caldeira 2003). However, 
since I am specifically interested in the ways in which respondents overcome their 
ignorance of state supreme courts when conferring legitimacy and since this is not a study 
of the influence of any specific campaign activities, I do not separate out the non-
attentive public. I code responses so that they indicate support for or against the court.77 I 
then create a variable that adds the number of supportive responses for the eight-
statement set excluding the trust statement. To make the analysis as simple and direct as 
possible, the dependent variable is the summated index of support for the eight 
statements. In other words, the variable is an index of the number of times each 
respondent supports the court. I next turn to the explanatory variables and what the theory 
indicates their influence might be.  
Treatment Variables 
 The primary independent variables that test the influence of the Supreme Court as 
                                                             
75 There is evidence the trust statement (statement 4) is capturing specific support rather than diffuse 
support. Since scholars are still debating whether to include it, I also include it in the survey. However, in 
the final analysis, I drop it because the case against including it is strong. However, excluding the question 
from the index of support does not significantly alter the findings in any considerable way. See Gibson’s 
(2011) article for further explanation. 
76 The eigenvalue of the second extracted factor is .50. 
77 I code an answer of neither agree nor disagree as not supporting the court. 
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a cue are the five treatment variables.78 Each respondent randomly receives either one of 
the four treatments or no treatment. Two of the treatments attempt to trigger thoughts 
about diffuse support for the United States Supreme Court and cast it as worthy of diffuse 
support or unworthy. Those variables are labeled Positive Diffuse Support Treatment, 
and Negative Diffuse Support Treatment. The other two treatments attempt to trigger 
thoughts of specific support for the United States Supreme Court, focusing on a 
controversial decision about abortion and an ideological appointee to the Supreme Court. 
I code the variables as 1 if the respondent receives the particular treatment, or lack of 
treatment, and 0 otherwise. I omit the no treatment variable from the analysis to serve as 
a baseline for comparison. I expect that the only treatment with a statistically significant 
influence is the Negative Diffuse Support Treatment variable among respondents with 
low levels of state supreme court knowledge in states that do not elect judges. I expect 
the influence on the dependent variable to be negative. However, I expect that the 
Negative Diffuse Treatment is not a statistically significant influence on state high court 
legitimacy among respondents with low levels of knowledge living in states that elect 
judges. Further, I expect that none of the treatments are significant predictors of court 
support among respondents with higher levels of state supreme court knowledge. 
Theoretically, I expect the election process to influence enough respondents so that, while 
they may not be able to answer knowledge questions, they are likely more familiar with 
their state supreme courts than their counterparts in states without a recent election. This 
familiarity is likely to manifest indirectly by a lack of reliance on the Supreme Court as a 
cue to confer legitimacy. 
                                                             
78 The treatment language respondents receive is available in the appendix. 
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Democratic Values 
 In previous research of judicial legitimacy, support for democratic values emerges 
as a strong predictor of court support. To measure support for democratic values, I 
include questions that measure political tolerance of minority opinions, support for the 
rule of law, and liberty over order.79 I code each response as either supportive or not 
supportive of the particular value in question. In previous works using these types of 
variables, it is sometimes possible to construct three variables of support for democratic 
values using summated indexes of the responses. However, the results indicate that none 
of the indexes load onto a single factor when constructed as counts of variables meant to 
measure support for the democratic values of rule of law, liberty over order, and support 
for minority. However, factor analysis reveals a single factor combining all of the 
democratic values variables with an eigenvalue of 1.24. Unfortunately, not all of the 
variables load on it.80 The correlation between the summated index of democratic values 
and the factor score is .83. However, this is a closer approximation to a unidimensional 
result than the separate index variables that seek to measure. Thus, while I cannot say 
with full reliability that the variable captures a single dimension, it is closer to doing so 
                                                             
79 See the appendix for the questions respondents receive about democratic values. The questions are 
borrowed from Gibson’s (2006) work on state supreme court legitimacy in Kentucky and are available in 
the appendix. 
80 The eigenvalue of the second factor is .64. Two survey items in the index of support for democratic 
values do not load on the first factor: question two and question four. Question two asks, “it is not 
necessary to obey a law you consider unjust,” with a factor loading of -.047. Question four asks, 
“sometimes it might be better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately than wait for a legal 
solution,” with a factor loading of -.038. Given the way these items are worded, it may have appeared a bit 
ambiguous to some respondents as to which answer is more supportive of democratic values, which may 
lead to the items not loading on the first factor. Additionally, even though they do not load, their negative 
factor scores are very low. Running the model with the individual items as predictors coded either as 
supportive of democratic values or not reveals results that are complex and difficult to interpret with much 
certainty given the theoretical foundations of this model. Given the greater simplicity inherent in relying on 
an index as a predictor as well as how low the negative factor loadings of the items that do not load on the 
first factor are, I rely on the index as a simpler, if imperfect, measure of support for democratic values.  
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than the other variables, and I rely on it in the analysis. Since support for democratic 
values is usually a strong predictor of state court support, including this variable in the 
model makes it a more robust test of my theory. 
Court Knowledge and Education 
 Beyond democratic values, two additional variables are frequently influential in 
judicial legitimacy scholarship: education and knowledge of the courts.81 For this 
analysis, I separate out those whose results indicate no knowledge of state courts from 
those who have some knowledge. To measure this, respondents receive three questions 
about state supreme courts and four questions about the Supreme Court. I code them as 
answering them correctly or incorrectly.82 I add together the number of correct answers 
for each to create count variables of Supreme Court knowledge and state supreme court 
knowledge. For the test of my theory, I divide those who answer zero questions correctly 
about state supreme courts from those who answer one or more questions correctly.83,84 I 
code education from less than high school diploma to doctorate. This allows for an 
interpretation of a coefficient as a response to increasing education. I expect the 
democratic values variable as well as the education variable to report positive statistically 
significant coefficients. Additionally, I expect knowledge of the Supreme Court to have a 
positive and significant influence among citizens with low knowledge about their state 
supreme court. 
                                                             
81 Previous measures of court knowledge focus on basic facts about courts including the selection process 
for judges as well as term length. I follow suit in this study. 
82 Survey questions are available in the index. 
83 When I refer in this dissertation to citizens with low levels of knowledge about state supreme courts, I 
refer to those who answer zero factual questions correctly about those institutions. 
84 I divide the respondents here as close to the median as I can. Nearly 59% (N= 397 out of 673) of 
respondents answer zero knowledge questions about their state supreme court correctly.  
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Measures of Partisanship 
 The scholarly debate about the influence of partisanship and ideology on judicial 
legitimacy generally suggests that these factors do not influence judicial legitimacy.85 
However, I include them in this analysis to see if there are any unexpected partisan 
influences. I code party as 1 for Democrats, 2 for Independents, and 3 for Republicans so 
that any change in the regression coefficients results from respondents becoming more 
Republican. I follow this logic as I code ideology as well so that any coefficient result 
indicates movement as respondents shift from very liberal to very conservative. 
Additionally, the survey results come from December of 2016 and January of 2017, and 
given that time frame, I include feeling thermometers about President Obama and then 
President-elect Trump. I ask respondents to rank how warmly they feel about either 
person on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is very cold and 100 is very warm. Since my study 
focuses on those with the least amount of state supreme court knowledge, I include these 
thermometer variables because they are less abstract than partisanship or ideology and 
may reveal an unexpected influence of partisanship on support for state supreme courts. 
Demographic Variables 
 I include the demographic variables of age, gender, and race. I code the age 
variable categorically in roughly 10-year age ranges from 18 and above.86 I code gender 
as 0 for male and 1 for female and label the variable Woman. I include a dummy variable 
for white respondents. The baseline for comparison of race is non-white respondents. 
                                                             
85 See Bartels and Johnson (2013) for evidence that partisanship does play a role. However, much of the 
scholarship does not support their finding (Gibson and Nelson 2017; Gibson 2012; Gibson 2008). 
86 The original survey instrument includes a category for younger than 18 as a way to reject respondents 
who do not meet the official criteria. While there are zero respondents in the age category of younger than 
18, I leave it in the data because it was in the original survey instrument. 
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This is primarily because of the very small N of some racial minorities once the sample is 
subset into different categories. I do not expect the demographic variables to influence 
support for state supreme courts in this model. I include a brief description of the 
explanatory variables in Table 5.2. 
 Before I turn to analyze the influence of living in a state that elects judges on 
respondent support for state supreme courts, I first briefly turn to see if there are 
discernable differences in support for state supreme courts across states that elect judges 
and those that do not. While the primary focus of this research is not on how strongly 
respondents support the court, but rather on what influences their support, it is useful to 
understand where respondent’s support for the court is after receiving any treatments they 
may have randomly been assigned. The results are in Table 5.3. Generally speaking, 
across the four categories, support for the court is relatively stable among respondents, 
with means and standard deviations that are roughly similar. This is evidence that, while 
there is some movement within models based on the explanatory factors I test, on the 
whole, support for the state supreme court is fairly stable across various subsets, perhaps 
with slightly higher support among respondents in states with a 2016 judicial election. 
However, this is weak support of previous scholarship that finds evidence that elections 
are a positive influence on state high court legitimacy. 
 In Table 5.4, I start this analysis with respondents who answer zero state supreme 
court knowledge questions correctly and subset them by whether they live in a state with 
a judicial election in November of 2016 or not.87  I first draw your attention to the top 
                                                             
87 Several states held judicial elections in 2016 before November, but I am only interested in the November 
elections given their proximity to when the survey is in the field. I argue that focusing only on elections 
that occur two months prior to the survey in the field provides a more direct test of this electoral influence. 
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four variables in the table that measure exposure to the survey treatments. As my 
hypothesis predicts, the only treatment that is statistically significant attempts to call into 
question the diffuse support for the Supreme Court. This treatment negatively focusing 
on the Supreme Court appears harmful to state supreme court legitimacy, but only among 
respondents with low state court knowledge living in states without a judicial election in 
2016. Among similar low-knowledge respondents in states with a judicial election in 
November 2016, the same treatment is not a significant predictor of legitimacy. Further 
supporting this, Supreme Court knowledge is a positive predictor of state supreme court 
legitimacy among low-knowledge respondents in states without a 2016 election, but this 
influence disappears for similar respondents living in states with an election at the same 
time.  
 These results are reasonably strong support for the Elected Judge Hypothesis. If 
state supreme courts operate in the minds of respondents as distinct institutions when 
deciding whether to confer legitimacy or not, then neither knowledge of the Supreme 
Court nor any treatments focusing on the Supreme Court should influence state high 
court support. Here, there is evidence that the Supreme Court does play a role in state 
court support, but recent judicial elections may mitigate that. I briefly go beyond the data 
for a moment to discuss why this result might appear. The process of elections and 
campaigns serves to educate voters about a choice at the polls while simultaneously 
making people aware of institutions they do not spend a great deal of time thinking about. 
While respondents living in states with 2016 high court elections in this survey may not 
know answers to the specific types of knowledge questions I ask, they may be more 
aware of their state courts as distinct institutions with state-level players thanks to the 
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campaigns and increase in media attention. This, in turn, may help them distinguish 
between those institutions when the Supreme Court is brought to their attention in a 
negative light. Moving beyond the influence of the treatments and the Supreme Court, 
democratic values and education are both positive predictors of state court support, 
supporting previous legitimacy scholarship. The only other significant predictor is age in 
the subset of respondents in a state without an election.  
 While the results in Table 5.4 are partial support for the Elected Judge 
Hypothesis, I also look at respondents who answer one or more state supreme court 
knowledge questions correctly and subset them by whether they live in a state with a 
2016 high court election or not. The results are in Table 5.5. Again, I draw your attention 
to the treatment variables at the top of the table. Among respondents with high levels of 
state court knowledge, none of the treatments are a statistically significant predictor, as 
my hypothesis predicts. Additionally of note, Supreme Court knowledge is never a 
significant predictor of state supreme court support, unlike for respondents with low 
levels of state court knowledge. These are important results to highlight because of what 
they mean in light of the results from respondents with low knowledge of state supreme 
courts. This data suggests that the more respondents know about state supreme courts, the 
less likely it is that the Supreme Court may influence their support for state high courts. 
The presence of an election does not serve to alter the influence of the Supreme Court 
among respondents with higher state court knowledge, unlike their counterparts with 
lower state high court knowledge. Support for democratic values remains a positive 
predictor for both subset categories.  
 There are two unexpected results. First, education is not a significant predictor 
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among respondents with higher state court knowledge who live in a state with a 2016 
high court election. Education is frequently a positive predictor of state court support in 
the literature, and my theory includes education as an important piece of how judicial 
legitimacy is conferred. This result may indicate the power of elections to raise awareness 
of state courts. If respondents know more about their state supreme court, and their 
awareness of them improves as a result of an election, this may mitigate the general 
positive influence of higher educational attainment, possibly indicating that they know 
more about their state courts than their reported level of educational attainment might 
suggest. 
 The second unusual result is among women in states with a 2016 election. They 
are less likely than men to support state supreme courts. This is not a result I expected, 
and the data alone do not offer any insights as to why this might be. Given that these are 
women with higher levels of state court knowledge living in states that recently held a 
high court election at the time of the survey, it may reflect the influences of campaigns on 
issues that adversely influenced diffuse support for state high courts among female 
respondents. Or it may be an anomaly in the data. It is impossible to say with much 
certainty given the data available here. 
Discussion 
 This chapter seeks to further refine the role that knowledge of institutions plays in 
state supreme court legitimacy. In chapter three, I provide evidence that state supreme 
courts appear to be little-known entities among respondents in this survey, even as 
participants do much better answering knowledge questions about the United States 
Supreme Court. In chapter four, I provide evidence that, among respondents with low 
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levels of knowledge about their state high courts, the United States Supreme Court 
appears to inform whether they extend legitimacy to their state supreme court. In this 
chapter, I further refine understanding of state supreme court legitimacy by including the 
presence of elections in the analysis. Here, the influence of the United States Supreme 
Court on state high court legitimacy appears to fade for respondents with low state 
supreme court knowledge if they live in a state with a recent election. Put another way, 
respondents with low levels of state supreme court knowledge in states with recent 
elections are less likely to rely on the Supreme Court as a cue when conferring legitimacy 
on state supreme courts, unlike their less knowledgeable counterparts in states without a 
recent state high court election. While this result does not provide any evidence that 
elections either improve or harm legitimacy for state courts, it does show that elections 
appear to improve the degree to which state supreme courts exist as independent 
institutions in the minds of respondents. This is helpful for state courts that may not want 
to have their legal decisions linked too closely with those of a national Supreme Court 
that some might view in partisan terms. In the next chapter, I conclude this dissertation 
with final thoughts and future implications.
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Table 5.1: Results of State Court Knowledge Questions Subset by Presence of Election 
State Court Knowledge 
Number of state 
court knowledge 
questions answered 
correctly 
Percent of respondents who 
correctly answer the 
corresponding number of 
questions in the first column 
residing in states with a state 
high court election in 2016 
Percent of respondents who 
correctly answer the 
corresponding number of 
questions in the first column 
residing in states without a 
state high court election in 
2016 
0 53.1% 64.6% 
1 34.7% 23.1% 
2 12.8% 11.2% 
3 0% 1.2% 
N= 673 N = 326 N = 347 
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Table 5.2: Descriptions of the Variables Used in the Chapter Models 
Model Variables 
Explanatory Variable Variable Description 
Positive Diffuse Support 
Treatment 
1 if they receive this treatment, 0 if otherwise 
Negative Diffuse Support 
Treatment 
1 if they receive this treatment, 0 if otherwise 
Ideological Appointee Treatment 1 if they receive this treatment, 0 if otherwise 
Controversial Decision Treatment 1 if they receive this treatment, 0 if otherwise 
Support for Democratic Values Index of supportive answers to questions gauging 
support for democratic values  
Supreme Court Knowledge Number of questions respondent answers correctly 
about the United States Supreme Court 
State Supreme Court Knowledge Number of questions respondent answers correctly 
about their state supreme court 
Education 1 if no high school diploma 
2 if high school graduate 
3 if some college 
4 if trade/technical/vocational training 
5 if associate’s degree 
6 if bachelor’s degree 
7 if master’s degree 
8 if professional degree 
9 if doctoral degree 
Ideology 1 if very liberal 
2 if somewhat liberal 
3 if moderate 
4 if somewhat conservative 
5 if very conservative 
Political Party 1 if Democrat 
2 if Independent/Other 
3 if Republican 
Obama Support Thermometer 0-100 scale of support where 0 is coldest and 100 is 
warmest 
Trump Support Thermometer 0-100 scale of support where 0 is coldest and 100 is 
warmest 
Woman 0 if male 
1 if female 
Age 1 if <18 
2 if 18-29 
3 if 30-39 
4 if 40-49 
5 if 50-59 
6 if 60 and up 
White 0 if they report another race 
1 if the respondent is white 
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Table 5.3: Mean Levels of Court Support Subset by Presence of Election 
Support for State Supreme Courts 
 Respondents in state with 
2016 election 
Respondents in state without 
2016 election 
Mean Institutional 
Support 
3.56 (2.31) 3.45 (2.24) 
 N=326 N=347 
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Table 5.4: Full Model Subset by Low Knowledge and Election 
Models of Respondent with Low State Supreme Court Knowledge 
Explanatory Variable Respondents Living in 
States with a 2016 Judicial 
Election 
Respondents Living in 
States without a 2016 
Judicial Election 
Positive Diffuse Support 
Treatment 
-0.0119 
(0.0690) 
0.0107 
(0.0576) 
Negative Diffuse Support 
Treatment 
-0.0176 
(0.0611) 
-0.125* 
(0.0515) 
Ideological Appointee 
Treatment 
0.0649 
(0.0648) 
-0.0362 
(0.0483) 
Controversial Decision 
Treatment 
0.0629 
(0.0689) 
0.00545 
(0.0500) 
Support for Democratic 
Values 
0.0396* 
(0.0147) 
0.0278* 
(0.0101) 
Supreme Court Knowledge 0.0390 
(0.0280) 
0.0758* 
(0.0237) 
Education 0.0322* 
(0.0120) 
0.0345* 
(0.0101) 
Ideology 0.0284 
(0.0329) 
-0.0208 
(0.0215) 
Political Party -0.0524 
(0.0387) 
0.0275 
(0.0353) 
Obama Support 
Thermometer 
0.0016 
(0.0008) 
-0.0005 
(0.0009) 
Trump Support 
Thermometer 
0.0012 
(0.0012) 
-0.0004 
(0.0009) 
Woman -0.0004 
(0.0416) 
-0.0536 
(0.0345) 
Age 0.0245 
(0.0180) 
0.0375* 
(0.0170) 
White 0.0581 
(0.0723) 
-0.0179 
(0.0418) 
Constant -0.2770* 
(0.1570) 
-0.0429 
(0.1370) 
N 173 224 
R-squared 0.240 0.253 
* p<0.05 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses. I predict a connection 
between the Supreme Court acting as a heuristic to inform state court legitimacy. 
Hypothesized null results are highlighted in light gray, while the hypothesized negative 
result is highlighted in dark gray. 
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Table 5.5: Full Model Subset by Higher Knowledge and Election 
Models of Respondent with Higher State Supreme Court Knowledge 
Explanatory Variable Respondents Living in 
States with a 2016 Judicial 
Election 
Respondents Living in 
States without a 2016 
Judicial Election 
Positive Diffuse Support 
Treatment 
-0.0515 
(0.0682) 
0.0947 
(0.0747) 
Negative Diffuse Support 
Treatment 
-0.1240 
(0.0730) 
-0.0238 
(0.0727) 
Ideological Appointee 
Treatment 
-0.1230 
(0.0654) 
-0.0093 
(0.0783) 
Controversial Decision 
Treatment 
-0.0138 
(0.0779) 
-0.0657 
(0.0786) 
Support for Democratic 
Values 
0.0663* 
(0.0124) 
0.0712* 
(0.0136) 
Supreme Court Knowledge 0.0410 
(0.0237) 
0.0114 
(0.0274) 
Education 0.0086 
(0.0119) 
0.0423* 
(0.0122) 
Ideology -0.0111 
(0.0271) 
-0.0266 
(0.0293) 
Political Party 0.0090 
(0.0430) 
0.0590 
(0.0471) 
Obama Support 
Thermometer 
0.0008 
(0.0010) 
0.0006 
(0.0011) 
Trump Support 
Thermometer 
0.0002 
(0.0010) 
0.0009 
(0.0010) 
Woman -0.0969* 
(0.0425) 
-0.0458 
(0.0447) 
Age 0.0331 
(0.0181) 
0.0066 
(0.0216) 
White 0.0687 
(0.0547) 
-0.0780 
(0.0514) 
Constant -0.1104 
(0.1520) 
-0.2140 
(0.1800) 
N 153 123 
R-squared 0.323 0.340 
* p<0.05 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses. I predict a connection 
between the Supreme Court acting as a heuristic to inform state court legitimacy. 
Hypothesized null results are highlighted in light gray. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In embarking on this project, I set out to begin grappling with a puzzle scholars 
have thus far largely ignored or only dealt with indirectly. Succinctly, how do individuals 
confer legitimacy upon institutions of which they are largely ignorant? Scholarship on 
legitimacy focuses heavily on the Supreme Court, where a large percentage of individuals 
are at least somewhat knowledgeable about the institution. From this body of scholarship, 
it appears that judicial legitimacy is a fairly durable phenomenon in the United States at 
both the Supreme Court and state supreme court level. However, in an age of rising 
distrust of American institutions, it is increasingly important to understand how judicial 
legitimacy functions within the context of widespread public ignorance. Without a better 
understanding of how individuals decide that institutions about which they know 
practically nothing are deserving of legitimacy, we are at a heightened risk of 
unintentionally harming those institutions and our own democracy. To understand how 
these elements may work together, this study focuses on two primary areas: 1) judicial 
legitimacy and the causal factors that influence whether an individual sees a court as 
legitimate, and 2) a better accounting of how widespread lack of knowledge about state 
supreme courts is in the United States. 
In chapter two, I detail the theory of this project. Following the foundational work 
of David Easton (1965, 1975), I focus on judicial legitimacy as conceptualized through 
the idea of diffuse support. Some scholarly works included different measures of 
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legitimacy that are more closely akin to the idea of specific support (Benesh 2006; Cann 
and Yates 2008), but consensus emerged around the idea that judicial legitimacy is an 
idea better captured through Easton’s concept of diffuse support (Bartels and Johnston 
2013; Gibson 2012; Gibson and Caldeira 2009; Gibson and Nelson 2016; Hansford, 
Intawan, and Nicholson 2018; Zilis 2018). Starting from this foundation, I also develop 
the theory with a focus on how little individuals know about state supreme courts (Gibson 
2012) and the ways in which individuals use tools like heuristics to overcome their lack 
of knowledge (Darmofal 2005; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998).  
 Synthesizing what we know about judicial legitimacy, lack of state supreme court 
knowledge, and the tools individuals rely on to overcome ignorance, I develop a cue-
based theory of state supreme court legitimacy. In short, I argue that, when individuals 
with low knowledge of state supreme courts are asked whether they think of their state 
supreme court as a legitimate institution, they become aware of their ignorance of their 
state high courts. In addition to their support for democratic values, they turn to the 
United States Supreme Court in part to act as a heuristic, partially informing whether they 
think their state supreme court is a legitimate judicial institution. I borrow from the way 
that Gibson and Caldeira (1998) refer to Supreme Court legitimacy as akin to the loyalty 
ones feels for a friend. I argue that individuals understand that there are similarities 
between the Supreme Court and their state supreme court, and they are willing to extend 
their loyalty in the same manner they might treat the relative of a friend. The loyalty 
toward the relative, in this case the state supreme court, is not as strong as it is for the 
friend, the Supreme Court. However, the loyalty exists and is part of the complicated 
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process of conferring legitimacy, at least among those individuals who possess low levels 
of state supreme court knowledge. To test this theory, I rely on a convenience sample 
collected using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  
The sample I rely on for the analysis in this study reports greater educational 
attainment, is more liberal, and skews younger than the general population of the United 
States. Given the evidence of widespread ignorance regarding state supreme courts that I 
find in chapter three, though, I argue these differences are not likely to matter for the 
purposes of this analysis. In chapter three, I report evidence that the public is more 
knowledgeable about the United States Supreme Court than their state supreme courts. 
More than 50% of respondents cannot answer even one state supreme court knowledge 
question correctly, even as 77.4% correctly answer that John Roberts is the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court. Further, while this ignorance of state supreme courts is high in the 
sample, it does not vary much across demographic characteristics like age, education, 
gender, ideology, or political party. Broadly speaking, a majority of the respondents to 
this survey appears to lack even basic knowledge about their state supreme courts, even 
as I find evidence that state supreme courts maintain high levels of legitimacy. For 
example, nearly 59% of respondents disagree or strongly disagree that their state supreme 
court should be eliminated if the people dislike their rulings, with a further 20.7% being 
uncertain. Nearly 70% of respondents report that individuals should obey state supreme 
court rulings even if they dislike them. This result supports my first hypothesis, which 
expects large scale ignorance of state supreme courts. The findings also illuminate the 
primary puzzle of this project: How do state supreme courts maintain such high levels of 
support among people who do not appear to know much about them? 
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 In chapter four, I focus on my primary research question: Does the Supreme Court 
act as a cue for individuals when they decide whether they should confer legitimacy on 
state supreme courts about which they know nothing? I approach this question by relying 
on three different models to look for evidence of heuristic usage by respondents who 
have low knowledge of their state supreme court. In the survey, individuals are randomly 
assigned into one of five treatment groups. One group does not receive a treatment so that 
they may act as a baseline for comparison to the other treatment groups. The other four 
groups receive a treatment that is designed to stimulate thoughts of either diffuse support 
or specific support of the Supreme Court. The two groups who receive the treatment 
designed to stimulate thoughts of diffuse support receive either a description of the 
Supreme Court acting as a politicized institution over the past 40 years, or a description 
of the Supreme Court as routinely not voting based on party lines and upholding 
precedent regardless of whether the judges agree with it politically. The two treatments 
that attempt to stimulate thoughts of specific support are quoted sections from National 
Public Radio articles that cover the Merrick Garland confirmation and subsequent block 
by Senate Republicans or the Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt abortion case. These 
four treatments provide the primary test of the research question. 
In each model, the index of state supreme court acts as the dependent variable. In 
the first model, all survey respondents are placed together. In the second and third 
models, respondents are subset by whether they answer zero state supreme court 
knowledge questions correctly or one or more knowledge questions correctly. In the 
model with all respondents, two results stand out as supportive of my hypotheses. The 
variable measuring the influence of the treatment that describes the Supreme Court as 
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being as politicized as the other branches is negative and statistically significant—
evidence that negative information about the Supreme Court harmed state supreme court 
legitimacy. Additionally, knowledge of the Supreme Court is a positive predictor of state 
supreme court legitimacy, even as state supreme court knowledge does not have a 
statistically significant influence on state supreme court legitimacy. In the model that 
subsets respondents by level of state supreme court knowledge, a clearer picture emerges. 
Again, the variable measuring the influence of the treatment that describes the Supreme 
Court as being politicized is negative and statistically significant, but it is only so among 
respondents who cannot answer any state supreme court knowledge questions correctly. 
That treatment variable is not a significant predictor of state supreme court support 
among respondents who answer one or more state supreme court knowledge questions 
correctly. Further, the variable measuring Supreme Court knowledge is a positive 
predictor among respondents with low state supreme court knowledge, but it is not a 
significant predictor among respondents who are more knowledgeable about their state 
supreme court. These results support my theory that individuals with low levels of state 
supreme court knowledge are relying on the Supreme Court as a heuristic to help decide 
whether to confer legitimacy upon state supreme courts. Further, individuals with 
knowledge of state supreme courts do not show the same evidence of relying on the 
Supreme Court as a cue. 
The results in the first two empirical chapters provide some insight into how 
individuals who lack state supreme court knowledge make decisions about judicial 
legitimacy. However, state supreme court selection methods vary, and in many states, 
these high court judges are selected through the process of a popular election. Given the 
 136 
scholarly debate around the potential helpful or harmful influence of state supreme court 
elections on judicial legitimacy, it is important to understand how the election process 
intersects with individual ignorance of the courts. In chapter five, I subset the data 
between those respondents who live in a state with a state supreme court election in 
November 2016 and those that do not. The survey was in the field in December and 
January 2017, so the November election occurred not long before the survey. Simply 
comparing the number of respondents who answer even one question correctly between 
these subset data reveals an interesting dynamic. Nearly 35% of individuals in a state 
with a recent high court election answer one state supreme court knowledge question 
correctly versus 23% in a state without a state judicial election in November 2016. 
Almost two-thirds of respondents cannot answer even a single question about their state 
supreme court correctly when they live in a state without a recent election versus only 
half of respondents in a state with a recent high court election. This difference indicates 
that a recent judicial election may involve some degree of education. The difference in 
knowledge may also extend to those who do not answer any knowledge questions 
correctly, but through the influence of the campaign, possess greater awareness of the 
state supreme court, perhaps enough so as to reduce the need to rely on the Supreme 
Court as a heuristic. 
To test the influence of a state high court election on heuristic usage by 
individuals with low levels of knowledge about state supreme courts, I subset 
respondents by knowledge and whether they live in a state with a recent state supreme 
court election. Among respondents with low state supreme court knowledge, the 
treatment that cast the Supreme Court as politicized in a negative way is a significant and 
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negative predictor of state supreme court legitimacy only for those living in a state 
without a state supreme court election in November 2016. Among respondents with low 
state supreme court knowledge living in a state with a judicial high court election in 
November 2016, none of the treatment variables are statistically significant. None of the 
treatments influence state supreme court legitimacy for respondents with higher state 
supreme court knowledge, no matter whether their state held a high court election in 
November 2016 or not. However, across subsets, support for democratic values is a 
statistically significant and positive predictor of state supreme court legitimacy. These 
results support my hypothesis that judicial elections reduce the need to rely on the 
Supreme Court as a cue among individuals with low state supreme court knowledge. 
Taken together, the results largely support the theory I describe in chapter two, where 
support for democratic values is the biggest predictor of state supreme court legitimacy, 
with additional factors like education and specific court knowledge as additional, 
complicated influences. 
Collectively, this research provides evidence that there is a very large portion of 
the population that appears to be largely ignorant of state supreme courts. Further, 
through the experimental survey treatments I employ, it appears that those individuals 
with low levels of knowledge are relying in part on what they think about the Supreme 
Court. Although, a high court election appears to alter this reliance on the Supreme 
Court. This work largely confirms part of what the judicial legitimacy scholarship 
previously found. The perception of politicized courts is a danger to judicial legitimacy, 
and support for democratic values is a positive predictor of diffuse support for the courts. 
However, this project expands on our understanding of how legitimacy operates among 
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individuals without much judicial knowledge. These findings have potential implications 
for the courts and open new avenues for legitimacy research.   
Implications 
 The implications of this research for the courts are varied. I start first with the 
issue already confronting courts in many states: judicial elections. In chapter five, I 
review the scholarship of judicial elections. Scholars report that judicial elections have 
the capacity to enhance legitimacy for the courts even as the campaign process introduces 
risks through fundraising and perceptions of politicized candidates (Bonneau and Cann 
2011; Bonneau, Hall, and Streb 2011; Gibson 2012; Gibson et al. 2011; Gibson and 
Caldeira 2009, 2011). Concerns about elections and their accompanying campaigns 
usually motivate concerns about judicial legitimacy (O’Connor 2010). Even so, this 
project indicates that judicial elections appear to confer an added benefit of reducing 
reliance on the Supreme Court as a cue for state court legitimacy among individuals with 
low state supreme court knowledge. While certainly introducing risks to legitimacy by 
increasing the probability of candidates behaving in ways that individuals may perceive 
as politicized, the current study provides evidence that judicial elections may serve to 
increase public awareness of the candidates’ existence that reduces reliance on the 
Supreme Court as a heuristic. 
This result raises a question: What are the potential implications of all states 
turning toward the usage of judicial elections? Based on this result and previous 
legitimacy research, so long as judges do not violate the norms of behavior that the public 
expects, judicial elections have the potential to positively influence judicial legitimacy. 
This goes beyond the benefits that previous scholars have found, including the perceived 
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benefit of accountability that voters believe elections offer (Gibson 2012), and extends to 
reducing the need to rely on the Supreme Court as a cue when deciding to confer 
legitimacy. At the very least, judicial elections raise awareness about state supreme 
courts, allowing even individuals with very low knowledge of state high courts to be able 
to distinguish them as separate institutions. The added benefit to state supreme court 
legitimacy seems to outweigh the risks that accompany judicial elections. 
Today, the majority of states rely on some sort of election for their state supreme 
courts, ranging from partisan elections to retention elections. However, the risks are 
important to consider, both for states that already rely on elections and for those that may 
switch to some sort of election process in the future. Behavior that fails to meet the 
expectations that the public holds for judges threatens the legitimacy of the courts, and it 
would be wise to consider ways to safeguard judicial legitimacy during and after election 
processes. States may be able to act through fundraising limitations or public funding of 
judicial campaigns as means to avoid candidates engaging in behaviors that the public 
may perceive as politicized. This is an additional burden for states to carry, but in light of 
the positive influence elections appear to have on judicial legitimacy, the efforts are 
likely worthwhile. 
Along the same lines, the political polarization that exists at the national level is a 
concern for state supreme courts. This carries the potential to harm in two primary ways. 
First, this project provides evidence that individuals with low knowledge of state supreme 
courts rely on the Supreme Court as a cue to guide whether they confer legitimacy on 
state supreme courts. As the national government becomes more and more polarized in 
the executive and legislative branches, there are risks that this will start to influence what 
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people think about the Supreme Court. For individuals who do not know a great deal 
about their state supreme courts, this potentially harmful influence on judicial legitimacy 
risks trickling down onto the lower courts in the judicial hierarchy. The second way that 
polarization threatens judicial legitimacy is through judicial elections. This is a real risk 
at the state level if judges have to run for election in order to acquire or maintain their 
jobs as judges in an environment where voters perceive judicial candidates as polarized 
and politicized. The results of this project indicate that there are openings for harm to 
judicial legitimacy through polarization, particularly if the public perceives polarization 
as influencing a politicized court.  
Judicial scholars who research the legitimacy of the courts rarely directly deal 
with the greatest, if currently farfetched, threat to American judiciary institutions. What if 
the Supreme Court loses legitimacy? In the scholarly research available, the United States 
Supreme Court appears to maintain robust and durable legitimacy (Gibson 2012). 
However, the loss of legitimacy for the highest court is not an impossible scenario. The 
result of this project indicates that, if the Supreme Court loses legitimacy, the potential 
negative impact may cascade throughout the judicial hierarchy, at least among 
individuals who lack knowledge about the lower courts. As this study shows, the portion 
of the public that lacks knowledge about the state supreme courts is significant, and, 
given the lower profile that other courts have, it is not too large a leap to assume that this 
widespread lack of judicial knowledge is also true for other types of courts. To that end, 
scholars should not treat Supreme Court legitimacy as something that only influences one 
specific institution. Instead, it carries the capacity to influence legitimacy for other courts 
in the judicial hierarchy, with potentially positive and negative implications.  
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Future Research 
This study reveals two major findings. First, individual knowledge of state 
supreme courts is low. Second, decisions on whether a court deserves legitimacy are 
partially intertwined with the knowledge individuals have about that court. Previously, 
scholarship on state supreme court legitimacy assumed that individuals knew enough 
about these courts to make informed decisions concerning judicial legitimacy for the 
purposes of an experimental survey. The results of the current study provide evidence 
that this assumption is, at best, flawed.  
The use of this sort of federal heuristic among individuals with low institutional 
knowledge may not be confined to the judiciary alone. It is anecdotal, but in my 
experience teaching state and local government at a higher education institution, students 
are largely unaware of how their state governments work. If individuals rely on the 
Supreme Court as a cue for state supreme court legitimacy, similar federal-to-state 
heuristic processes may be occurring for state legislatures and governors but are not 
being accounted for in the scholarship. It is also possible that this heuristic usage does not 
only work in one direction. High profile state supreme court activity that helps or harms 
judicial legitimacy may also influence perceptions of the Supreme Court. While this 
study finds that the public is much more familiar with the United States Supreme Court, 
there are still large percentages of people who lack much knowledge of that institution as 
well. For those people, state supreme court actions that receive their attention may 
influence their perceptions of the Supreme Court. This project opens up the possibility 
that, instead of legitimacy acting as a concept that applies to individual courts, it is 
instead at least loosely related and intertwined with the legitimacy of other courts, 
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depending on the level of knowledge the individual conferring legitimacy possesses 
about a given institution.  
 Future studies of state supreme court legitimacy, or any type of judicial 
legitimacy scholarship that focuses on a court that is not well known, should account for 
this lack of knowledge and any hierarchical influences that may occur. This is the first 
study examining state supreme court legitimacy that specifically tests for how the 
Supreme Court influences the legitimacy of state high courts. With the evidence that 
there are a lot of individuals who do not know much about their state supreme courts and 
that those individuals rely in part on the Supreme Court as a cue, scholarship that does 
not take this result into account when constructing theories of state supreme court 
legitimacy are potentially missing an important causal factor. On a more fundamental 
basis, all judicial legitimacy studies need to take seriously the large dearth of knowledge 
among the public about state supreme courts. To cast this truth aside is to ignore what 
this study shows is an important piece of the puzzle of judicial legitimacy.  
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APPENDIX A 
SURVEY QUESTIONS
Dependent Variable Measures: 
Positive Diffuse Support Treatment: 
In a café near the White House, two observers were overheard talking. William is 
an attorney and Henry is a successful businessman. 
Henry: All I hear on the news is how messed up American politics is today. 
William: The only good institution in Washington, DC is the Supreme Court. It’s 
the only place left where citizens can go and expect to get an unbiased hearing. 
Henry: I’ve heard a lot of people say that judges only care about politics. If they 
are Republican, they vote for Republican causes and the same if they are 
Democrats. 
William: It’s not true. The Courts have been good about upholding precedent 
even if they disagree with it politically, which means that they uphold previous 
laws rather than making it what they want. The media likes to focus on a small 
number of cases where the judges split along party lines. But that’s just the media 
being sensational. The huge majority of cases don’t break down along party lines. 
Negative Diffuse Treatment: 
In a café near the White House, two observers were overheard talking. William is 
an attorney and Henry is a successful businessman. 
Henry: All I hear on the news is how messed up American politics is today. 
William: It’s in the courts too. Decisions are split along party lines all the time. 
Henry: How long has it been going on? 
William: The Supreme Court has, I’d say for about four decades now, become as 
political as the other branches of government, and the result has been more 
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controversial cases. You can’t trust that you’ll get a fair hearing with them. It’s all 
politics when it should be unbiased. 
Specific Support Treatment about a Politicized Appointment: 
From NPR (Chappell and Johnson, 2016): 
Federal appeals court judge Merrick Garland is President Obama's pick to fill the 
Supreme Court seat left vacant by the late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. 
Addressing the refusal by Republican leaders in the Senate to consider a Supreme Court 
nominee, Obama said that in Garland, he had chosen "a serious man and an exemplary 
judge." 
He added that in discussions about Supreme Court vacancies — the current one, as well 
as earlier openings — "the one name that has come up repeatedly — from Republicans 
and Democrats alike — is Merrick Garland." 
After the announcement was made, Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell reiterated his pledge that the Senate would not take any steps toward 
confirming an Obama nominee. McConnell's fellow Republicans in Congress echoed his 
comments. 
Liberal interest groups have joined the fight, arguing that President Obama’s pick is a 
centrist judge, while conservative groups argue he will push the court in a more liberal 
direction. 
Specific Support Treatment about a Controversial Decision: 
From NPR (Domonoske, 2016): 
The Supreme Court has overturned a Texas law requiring clinics that provide abortions to 
have surgical facilities and doctors to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital. The 
law was predicted to close many clinics and further reduce availability of abortion in 
Texas. The court has ruled the law violated the Constitution. 
With a 5-3 decision in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, the court reversed a 
decision by the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which had upheld the law. 
Liberals and Democrats have hailed the decision. The president of Planned Parenthood, 
Cecile Richards, said in a statement that the Texas provisions were "dangerous" and the 
ruling against them is "a win for women." 
Conservatives and Republicans argued that the now-overturned Texas law would have 
protected women's safety. Family Research Council President Tony Perkins said in a 
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statement that his organization "will continue our work to protect women and children 
from the predatory abortion industry." 
Democratic Values Measures 
Support for Rule of Law: 
1. It is not necessary to obey a law you consider unjust. 
2. Sometimes it might be better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately 
than wait for a legal solution. 
3. The government should have some ability to bend the law in order to solve 
pressing social and political problems. 
 
Support for Liberty over Order: 
1. A society shouldn’t have to put up with those who have political ideas that are 
extremely different from the majority. 
2. It is better to live in an orderly society rather than to allow people so much 
freedom that they can become disruptive. 
3. Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger 
to society of extremist political views.  
 
Support for Tolerance of Minority Opinions: 
1. Majority rule may be an important principle for democracies, but the majority 
must always respect the rights of all minorities. 
2. In politics, the majority ought to get what it wants, even if it means that the rights 
of some minorities are restricted. 
 
Political Knowledge Questions  
Bold and underlined words reflect original survey instrument. 
1. From the list below, please select the current Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
a. William Rehnquist 
b. Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
c. John Roberts 
d. Sandra Day O'Connor 
e. Don't know 
2. The Supreme Court of the United States has the final word on constitutional matters. 
a. Agree 
b. Disagree 
c. Don't know 
3. President Obama appointed two of the three women on the United States Supreme 
Court today. 
a. Agree 
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b. Disagree 
c. Don't know 
4. What is the length of time that United States Supreme Court justices are appointed 
for? 
a. 6 years 
b. Life 
c. Until forced retirement at age 70 
d. Don't know 
5. State supreme court judges in your state serve for terms that are 
a. For life 
b. Until forced retirement at a certain age 
c. A fixed number of years at the end of which they come up for a vote by the 
people or the legislature to continue serving 
d. Don’t know 
6. How does your state select judges for the state supreme court? 
a. Confirmation by the state legislature 
b. Partisan election 
c. Recommendation from a nominating commission and appointment by the 
governor 
d. Nonpartisan election 
e. Don’t know 
7. The state supreme court of your state has the final word on all issues regarding the 
constitution of your state. 
a. Agree 
b. Disagree 
c. Don't know 
Control Variables 
Education 
1. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently 
enrolled, highest degree received. 
a. Some high school, no diploma 
b. High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED) 
c. Some college credit, no degree 
d. Trade/technical/vocational training 
e. Associate degree 
f. Bachelor’s degree 
g. Master’s degree 
h. Professional degree 
i. Doctorate degree 
 
Age 
1. What age range do you fall within from the options provided? 
a. Younger than 18 
b. 18 to 29 
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c. 30 to 39 
d. 40 to 49 
e. 50 to 59 
f. 60 and above 
 
Race 
1. Are you Asian, Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, Native 
American/American Indian, White, or a different race? 
a. Asian 
b. Black/African American 
c. Hispanic/Latino 
d. Native American/American Indian 
e. White 
f. A different race 
 
Party 
1. Do you identify as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent/other party? 
a. Democrat 
b. Independent/other party 
c. Republican 
 
Ideology 
1. Do you identify as very liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat 
conservative, or very conservative? 
a. Very liberal 
b. Somewhat liberal 
c. Moderate 
d. Somewhat conservative 
e. Very conservative 
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APPENDIX B 
DATA COLLECTION
To test the theories and hypotheses I developed, I fielded an experimental survey 
in which respondents were randomly assigned into one of four treatment groups or one 
group that did not receive a treatment. The relevant data for this analysis includes 673 
respondents in a national sample recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in 
December of 2016 and January of 2017.88 I paid respondents $0.55 to complete the 
survey and they were only allowed to participate once. Completion times range from 2 
minutes to 12 minutes.89 Respondents who earned Requester approval rates below 97% 
                                                             
88 The sample includes 744 participants. I exclude 70 participants from the analysis because they do not 
live in a U.S. state. One additional participant is also omitted as an outlier. Tests for outliers revealed 
several respondents worth examining but only one warranted removal. In two minutes, the respondent I 
removed chose many options that were contradictory. Further, for each screen of survey questions asking 
about the dependent variable, democratic values, and the feeling thermometer, the respondent chose the 
same option within the same screen, even though these result in nonsensical patterns. Taken together, the 
results of the outlier tests, combined with the rapid completion of the survey and the patterns of answers is 
powerful reason for removal. No other respondent who emerged as a potential outlier revealed similar 
patterns that warrant removal. I remove this respondent from analysis with great caution however. I tested 
each model with and without the removed outlier. The exclusion of this outlier alters the statistical 
significance of one variable in one model in this dissertation. In chapter four, the model of respondents with 
low levels of state supreme court knowledge when the outlier is included shifts the p-value of the Negative 
Diffuse Treatment variable just above the .05 threshold of significance. Without the outlier, the variable 
reaches statistical significance. This is the only model in which the presence or absence of the outlier 
causes the p-value of any variable rises above or below the .05 level. 
89 In trials with volunteers ahead of the survey launch, the survey took between 5-12 minutes to complete. 
However, MTurk workers report that as professional survey takers, they can take surveys more quickly 
than individuals who are not accustomed to answering survey questions, particularly on demographic 
questions. There are some concerns that users are relying on bots to quickly answer surveys but attention 
checks should serve to avoid those (Dreyfuss 2018). However, this does leave some predicament. While 
two minutes does not seem like long enough to take this survey, what cut off would be responsible? Each 
respondent successfully answered both imbedded attention checks. Given the research indicating the 
general reliability of MTurk surveys, aside from the outlier described in Appendix B, I elect to include any 
respondents who successfully answer the attention checks. While not an academic source, for a discussion 
among MTurk workers regarding this subject, see this Reddit thread: 
https://www.reddit.com/r/mturk/comments/6pvjxe/confused_requester_here_workers_completing_30/ 
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on any previous Mechanical Turk tasks were prevented from participating. The sample is 
somewhat young and leans Democratic, as is common with Mechanical Turk surveys. I 
include more information about the demographics of the results in chapter three. 
However, there is wide geographic representation, including coverage of different 
methods of selection of state court judges. 90   
 
                                                             
90 This sample includes respondents from 46 states. There are no respondents who report living in Alaska, 
North Carolina, Wisconsin, or Wyoming. 
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